THE  MAKING  OF  THE 
BALKAN  STATES 


WILLIAM  SMITH  MURRAY,  B.  S.,  M.  S. 


SUBMITTED  IN  PARTIAL  FULFILMENT  OF  THE  REQUIREMENTS 
FOR  THE  DEGREE  OF  DOCTOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY 
IN  THE 

Faculty  of  Political  Science 
IN  Columbia  University 


BY 


NEW  YORK 
I91O 


THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  ILLINOIS 
LIBRARY 


Digitized  by 

the  Internet  Archive 

in  2015 

https://archive.org/details/makingofbalkanstOOnnurr_0 


THE   MAKING  OF  THE 
BALKAN  STATES 

2^ 


BY 

WILLIAM  SMITH  MURRAY,  B.  S.,  M.S. 


SUBMITTED  IN  PARTIAL  FULFILMENT  OF  THE  REQUIREMENTS 
FOR  THE  DEGREE  OF  DOCTOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY 
IN  THE 

Faculty  of  Political  Science 
IN  Columbia  University 


NEW  YORK 
I9IO 


Copyright,  1910, 

BY 

William  Smith  Murray 


REMOTE  STOnAGE 


PREFACE 


Within  the  past  hundred  years  Turkey  has  lost  some- 
what more  than  two-thirds  of  her  European  territory  and 
population.  Much  the  larger  part  of  this  loss  has  gone  to 
make  up  the  four  constitutional  monarchies  that  are  com- 
monly called  the  Balkan  States. 

This  study  aims  to  give  a  brief  account  of  the  peoples 
in  these  four  groups  so  long  under  Ottoman  rule,  and  to 
trace  somewhat  in  detail  the  movements  that  have  led  to 
their  independence.  Parts  of  this  field  already  covered  by 
special  treatises  have  been  passed  over  here  quite  briefly. 
The  works  giving  the  fuller  treatment  have  usually  been 
cited. 

Only  incidental  references  are  made  in  this  sketch  to  the 
other  three  groups  (in  Greece,  Bessarabia  and  Bosnia- 
Herzegovina)  that  have  also  been  completely  separated, 
more  or  less  in  the  same  connection,  from  Turkey.  The 
chief  effort  here  has  been  to  show  the  actual  working  of 
the  forces  that  have  finally  added  Roumania,  Bulgaria, 
Servia  and  Montenegro  to  the  family  of  European  nations. 

I  gratefully  acknowledge  my  indebtedness  to  Professor 
William  M.  Sloane  and  Professor  James  T.  Shotwell,  who 
have  aided  me  with  most  helpful  advice  and  criticisms. 


W.  S.  M. 


New  York  City,  April  i8,  1910. 
5] 


5 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  I 

The  Danubian  Principalities,  Servia  and  Montenegro — 
UP  TO  THE  Treaty  of  Paris— 1856 

PAGE 


Intervention  as  a  factor  in  the  formation  of  new  states   11 

Discontent  and  disunion  in  the  Ottoman  empire   12 

The  beginning  of  Russia's  treaty  rights  in  relation  to  Ottoman 

subjects   13 

Formation  and  early  history  of  Moldavia  and  Wallachia   14 

Turkey's  European  provinces  in  connection  with  the  Napoleonic 

struggles   16 

The  beginning  of  a  Russian  protectorate  over  the  Servians  ....  19 
The  Servians  as  a  free  people,  and  as  vassals  under  the  dominion 

of  Constantinople   20 

The  beginning  of  Servia' s  struggles  against  the  Sultans   25 

Kara  George  and  the  treaty  of  Bucharest   26 

Milosh  Obrenovich  renews  the  contest  and  secures  added  im- 
munities  28 

Turkish  aflfairs  in  connection  with  European  movements — 1814-26.  3a 
The  Sultan  grants  further  concessions  in  the  treaty  of  Ackerman 

and  the  treaty  of  Adrianople   40' 

Additional  liberties  and  a  constitution  for  Servia  .  .    43 

Despotic  rule  and  forced  abdication  of  Prince  Milosh   46 

Russia's  exercise  of  an  exclusive  protectorate  and  the  restoration 

of  the  Karageorgevich  dynasty   47 

Changes  in  the  government  of  the  Danubian  provinces   47 

The  situation  in  Montenegro   49 

The  Crimean  War  and  its  outcome  in  relation  to  the  Balkan 

provinces   5a 

7]  7 


S  CONTENTS  [8 

FACE 

CHAPTER  II 

The  Balkan  Provinces  Under  the  Protection  of  the 
European  Concert 
The  new  status  of  Russia  and  Turkey  in  relation  to  the  Eastern 

Question   56 

Partial  union  of  Moldavia  and  Wallachia  under  a  native  ruler — 

Alex.  Couza   60 

Couza's  downfall  and  the  choice  of  a  foreign  prince   68 

Prince  Charles  of  Hohenzollern  becomes  the  prince  of  *  *  Roumania  " .  69 

The  new  government  and  the  persecution  of  the  Jews  ......  74 

The  most  favorable  turn  of  affairs  under  Prince  Charles'  rule  .  .  -  76 
Recall  of  Milosh  and  later  of  Michael  to  the  princely  office  in 

Servia   77 

Delay  in  Constantinople  and  the  outbreak  in  Belgrade   78 

Servian  fortresses  turned  over  to  the  native  authorities   81 

Outcome  of  further  dynastic  troubles.    General  conditions  in  Servia.  82 

Montenegro's  request  for  European  recognition   86 

Turkey  permitted  to  force  the  Montenegrins  into  submission  ...  89 

The  beginning  of  a  better  state  of  afifairs  in  Montenegro   91 

The  Bulgarians,  and  their  existence  under  the  dominion  of  Con- 
stantinople  92 

The  status  of  religious  communities  in  Turkey   95 

The  Bulgarian  struggle  for  a  national  hierarchy  ,  ,  .  .  98 

CHAPTER  III 

International  Complications  and  the  Outcome  in  the 
B  AL  KA  N  s — 1 870- 1 878 
Abrogation  of  the  Black  Sea  stipulations  in  the  treaty  of  Paris.  .  .  103 
Failure  of  the  efforts  of  the  treaty  powers  in  connection  vyith  the 

Balkan  uprising   105 

The  Bulgarian  "atrocities"  iii 

Russia  wages  war  against  Turkey    121 

The  rejection  of  the  treaty  of  San  Stefano  and  the  settlement  in 
the  Berlin  congress   124 

CHAPTER  IV 

Organization  of  Bulgaria  and  Eastern  Roumelia  and  the 
Movements  Leading  up  to  Union  and  to  Independence 
The  Bulgarians  in  connection  with  the  Russo-Turkish  war  .  i\  .  .  129 

The  provisional  governments  in  the  two  provinces   134 

Determined  efforts  of  the  Bulgarians  to  prevent  the  separation  .  .  134 


g]                                   CONTENTS  9 

PAGB 

Formulation  of  the  Bulgarian  constitution  and  election  of  Prince 

Alexander                                                                   ....  138 

The  "  Organic  Statute"  for  Eastern  Roumelia   141 

Russia  dispels  various  disquieting  apprehensions   144 

Aleko  Pasha  to  govern  in  Eastern  Roumelia,  aided  by  the  Inter- 
national Commission  .  i   146 

Party  antagonism  in  Bulgaria  and  Prince  Alexander's  coup  d'etat.  151 
The  change  in  Russia's  attitude  and  the  restoration  of  the  consti- 
tution     152 

The  unionist  movement  virtually  unites  the  two  Bulgarian  prov- 
inces ....                                                                •  .  .  •  155 

Abduction  of  Prince  Alexander.    His  return  and  abdication  ....  162 

The  regency  and  the  choice  of  another  ruler   168 

The  treaty  powers  follow  the  lead  of  Russia  and  will  not  recognize 

Prince  Ferdinand   171 

The  regime  of  the  Russophobe  ministries  under  StamboulofiF  ...  175 

Bulgaria  in  relation  to  the  Macedonian  agitation   176 

Bulgaria  becomes  an  independent  kingdom   178 

CHAPTER  V 
Summary—Present  Situation  in  the  Balkan  States 
The  Young  Turk  movement  changes  the  aspect  of  the  Macedonian 

Question   186 

General  view  of  foreign  intervention  in  the  Balkans   187 

The  situation  in  Roumania   190 

The  favorable  outlook  in  Montenegrin  affairs   lOO 

The  unfortunate  conditions  in  relation  to  Servia   191 

Unpromising  outlook  because  of  the  situation  in'^connection  with 

Macedonia  and  Servia   194 


Map  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula 


opposite  p.  II 


LIBRARY 
OF  THE 
ONfVERStTY  OF  IUINM 


CHAPTER  I 


Wallachia,  Moldavia,  Servia  and  Montenegro,  Up 
TO  THE  Treaty  of  Paris — 1856 

The  interference  of  nations  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
other  countries,  although  once  a  more  common  thing  than 
it  is  to-day,  has  continued  to  play  an  important  role 
in  the  creation  of  new  states.  This  has  happened  de- 
spite the  tendency  of  leading  nations  in  recent  times  to  take 
more  and  more  account  of  the  principle  of  non-intervention. 
Certain  changes  in  ideas  and  conditions  during  the  past 
century  have,  no  doubt,  had  a  most  decided  bearing  in  that 
connection.  Keeping  pace  with  increasingly  rapid  and  suit- 
able means  of  communication,  the  widening  range  of  trade 
and  travel  has  so  spread  out  the  interests  of  civilized  coun- 
tries that  most  nations  have  come  to  be  scrupulously  sensi- 
tive to  the  policies  and  practices  of  many  others.  Then  too 
the  aggressive  and  propagandist  character  of  democracy 
and  the  efforts  among  those  of  the  same  race  to  achieve 
political  unity  have  helped  now  and  then  to  produce  com- 
plications that  have  afforded  more  or  less  plausible  ex- 
cuses for  intervention. 

There  has  been,  meanwhile,  no  lack  of  imperative  calls 
for  the  readjustment  of  political  relations  estabHshed  as  a 
result  of  conquest.  For  various  reasons,  it  would  seem, 
these  manifestations  of  discontent,  especially  in  the  Turkish 
empire,  have  been  quite  generally  seized  upon  as  pretexts 
for  interference  from  without.  It  is  in  this  connection  that 
II]  II 


12  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [12 

the  suspected  national  ambitions  of  some  of  the  European 
governments  and  the  lingering  faith  in  the  balance-of-power 
principle  have  quite  frequently  carried  so-called  friendly  in- 
terpositions over  into  destructive  wars. 

The  anomalous  conditions  so  long  existing  in  Turkey 
have  laid  that  country  open  in  recent  times  to  the  applica- 
tion of  what  may  be  called  exceptional  principles  of  inter- 
vention. Nowhere  else  since  the  close  of  the  French  Revo- 
lution has  intervention  been  so  constant  and  in  one  sense 
so  effective.  Although  the  peace  of  Europe  has  often  suf- 
fered by  reason  of  the  resulting  complications,  all  this  has 
been  a  most  important  factor  in  the  creation  of  the  four 
constitutional  monarchies  in  the  Balkans.^ 

The  Ottoman  empire  was  built  up  by  a  series  of  con- 
quests that  made  subjects  of  peoples  who  either  could  not 
or  would  not  be  one  with  the  conquerors  or  with  each  other, 
hence  patriotism  there,  in  relation  to  the  whole  state,  has 
been  one-sided,  to  say  the  least.  Religious  differences  and 
accompanying  prejudices  have  ever  been  operative;  while 
national  and  racial  ambitions,  together  with  the  pressing 
need  and  the  burning  desire  for  a  larger  measure  of  liberty 
and  security,  have  fostered  there  a  spirit  of  jealousy,  of 
discontent  and  of  disunion.  With  these  influences  at  work 
and  with  the  increasing  probability  that  a  determined 
struggle  would  eventually  receive  the  support  of  one  or 
more  of  the  great  powers  of  Europe,  the  discontented  na- 
tionalities under  Turkish  rule  have  succeeded  for  nearly 
a  century  in  keeping  up  almost  a  constant  strain  on  the 

'  Phillimore,  Sir  R.,  Commentaries  upon  International  Law  (London, 
1879),  vol.  i,  pp.  553  et  seq.;  Holland,  T.  E.,  Studies  in  International 
Law  (Oxford,  1898),  chs.  xi-xii;  Moore,  J.  B.,  International  Law 
Digest  (Washington,  1906),  vol.  i,  ch.  xix. 


13]  UP  TO  THE  TREATY  OF  PARIS— 1856  13 

forces  that  were  calculated  to  hold  the  empire  together/ 
Yet  this  very  clashing  of  interests,  ambitions,  and  aspira- 
tions— to  be  seen  as  well  in  the  consequent  strivings  of  the 
interested  powers  —  and  the  apprehension  in  Europe  of 
grave  and  far  reaching  consequences  likely  to  result  from 
the  impending  conflict,  have  given  a  semblance  of  solidarity 
and  a  measure  of  perpetuity  to  what  has  come  to  be  called 
the  "  Concert  of  Europe."  ^ 

THE  WALLACHIANS  AND  THE  MOLDAVIANS  UP  TO  THE 

GREEK  INSURRECTION  (1821) 

The  beginning  of  a  continuous  control,  under  treaty 
rights,  in  the  affairs  of  the  Ottoman  empire  by  one  of  the 
great  powers  of  Europe,  was  in  1774.  Six  years  previous, 
in  connection  with  Russian  interference  in  Poland,  Turkey 
declared  war  against  Russia.  After  several  other  nations 
became  involved,  this  struggle  resulted  in  the  first  partition 
of  Poland,  and  in  the  acquirement  by  Russia  of  a  protector- 
ate over  a  part  of  the  Ottoman  subjects.  In  the  treaty  of 
peace  (Kutschouc-Kainardji,  1774)  the  Porte  agreed  that  a 
permanent  Russian  embassy  might  be  established  at  Con- 
stinople,  and  that  Russia  should  have  the  right  of  free  navi- 
gation in  Turkish  waters;  and,  most  important  of  all,  the 
Sultan  promised  to  protect  constantly  the  Christian  reli- 
gion and  its  churches,"  and  to  keep  religiously  "  to  a  list 
of  conditions  under  which  Russia  restored  Wallachia  and 
Moldavia  to  Turkey.^    Also,  as  the  circumstances  of  these 

'Odysseus,  Turkey  in  Europe  (London,  1900),  passim;  Seignobos, 
Political  History  of  Europe  since  1814  (New  York,  1900),  trans,  by 
MacVane,  ch.  xxi. 

^De  Worms,  England' s  Policy  in  the  East  (London,  1877),  passim; 
Dennis,  Eastern  Problems  at  the  Close  of  the  Eighteenth  Century 
(Cambridge,  Mass.,  1901),  ch.  ii. 

^Duggan,  The  Eastern  Question  (New  York,  1902),  ch.  ii;  Menzies, 
Turkey  Old  and  New  (London,  1883),  pp.  293-308. 


14 


THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES 


[14 


two  principalities  might  require,  the  Russian  ministers  resi- 
dent at  Constantinople  were  to  be  permitted  to  intercede  in 
their  favor.  This  treaty  which  expressed  the  agreement  of 
the  two  empires  to  annihilate  and  leave  in  an  eternal  ob- 
livion all  the  treaties  and  conventions  "  previously  made 
between  the  two  states  (some  reference  to  boundaries  was 
excepted),  marks  the  beginning  of  a  Russian  regime,  so  to 
speak,  in  Turkish  affairs,  which  was  only  brought  to  an  end 
when  the  armies  and  navies  of  England  and  France  joined 
with  those  of  Turkey  against  Russia,  in  1853-6/ 

Wallachia  and  Moldavia  already  had  a  history  of  nearly 
five  hundred  years,  and  the  two  principalities  had  now 
(1774)  been  tributary  to  the  Porte  for  more  than  three  cen- 
turies.^ A  few  descendants  of  the  Latin-speaking  Roman 
colonists  in  that  part  of  Europe  are  supposed  to  have  sur- 
vived from  the  third  century,  A.  D.,  and  about  the  end  of 
the  thirteenth  century  these  were  joined  by  other  Roumans 
(more  or  less  Latinized  peoples  of  eastern  Europe)  and 
thus  were  formed  the  two  Rouman  principalities.  The 
southern — Wallachia — took  its  name  from  that  by  which  its 
people  were  known  to  their  neighbors,  and  the  northern — • 
Moldavia — was  called  by  the  name  of  its  principal  river.^ 
During  the  fifteenth  century,  these  principalities  were 
brought  under  the  supremacy  of  the  Ottoman  government, 

^The  treaty  of  Kainardji  (1774)  was  written  in  Italian,  and  may  be 
seen  in  that  language  and  in  French  also  in  Martens,  Recueilde  Traitis 
(Gottingen,  1817),  vol.  ii,  pp.  286  et  seq.  Copies  of  principal  treaties 
between  the  Porte  and  Russia  (i  774-1850)  may  be  seen  in  Parliamentary 
Papers  (1854),  vol.  Ixxii  (French  and  English). 

''De  Testa,  Recueil  des  Traites  de  la  Porte  Ottomane  (Paris,  1882), 
vol.  V.  (Four  treaties  between  Sultans  and  Moldavia  and  Wallachia— 
1392-1529.) 

'  Noyes,  Roumania,  The  Border  Land  of  the  Christian  and  the  Turk 
(New  York,  1858),  pp.  156-59;  Walsh,  From  Constantinople  to  England 
(London,  1831),  ch.  xiii. 


15] 


UP  TO  THE  TREATY  OF  PARIS— 1856 


15 


but  by  paying  a  yearly  tribute  they  retained,  for  a  long 
period,  practical  independence  in  internal  affairs  and  were 
governed  down  to  1720  by  native  hospodars  (governors) 
of  their  own  choosing.^  Unlike  the  social  conditions  in 
other  Balkan  provinces,  however,  the  old  nobility  in  Mol- 
davia and  Wallachia  managed  to  perpetuate  itself,  and  all 
governmental  affairs  administered  by  the  principalities 
were  controlled  for  centuries  by  the  aristocracy.^ 

Although  the  Treaty  of  Kainardji  professed  that  there 
would  be  cultivated  between  the  two  sovereigns — the  Em- 
press and  the  Sultan — ,  as  well  as  between  the  two  empires, 
a  "  sincere  union  and  a  perpetual  and  inviolable  friendship," 
with  a  careful  "  accomplishment  "  and  maintenance  of  the 
Articles,  yet  within  ten  years  Russia  annexed  the  Crimean 
peninsula  and  some  nearby  territory,  and  the  Porte  promptly 
responded  by  undertaking  another  war  against  the  Czarina.' 
This  struggle  was  brought  to  an  end  in  1792  by  the  treaty 
of  Jassy,  which  ceded  to  Russia  some  sections  of  Turkish 
territory,  and  reaffirmed  all  the  former  stipulations  respect- 
ing Wallachia  and  Moldavia,  beginning  with  the  treaty  of 
Kainardji.* 

The  principalities  suffered  for  a  century  (1720-1820) 
from  their  relations  with  the  Phanariot  Greek  governors, 
who  were  sent  to  them  by  the  Porte.  As  each  appointment 
added  somewhat  to  the  income  of  the  Sultan,  it  became  cus- 
tomary to  change  these  hospodars  frequently.''    But  every 

^Wilkinson,  Wallachia  and  Moldavia  (London,  1820),  ch.  i. 
'Noyes,  op  cit.,  passim. 

'  Holland,  The  Treaty  Relations  of  Russia  and  Turkey,  1774-1853 
(London,  1877). 

*  Martens,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  291;  Menzies,  op.  cit.,  pp.  315  et  seq. 
^Wilkinson,  op.  cit.,  ch.  vi;  Tennent,  History  of  Modern  Greece 
(London,  1845),  vol.  vii,  pp.  41-54;  cf.  infra,  pp.  22,  36. 


l6  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [i6 


such  change  added  greatly  to  the  burdens  of  the  principali- 
ties; and,  mindful  of  her  treaty  rights,  Russia  induced  the 
Sultan  to  issue  a  Hatti-cheriff,  in  1802,  fixing  the  terms  of 
office  for  these  officials  at  seven  years,  and  making  the 
consent  of  the  Russian  minister  necessary  to  their  removal/ 
This  promise  was  made  while  the  Tsar  was  posing  as  the 
friend  of  Turkey,  by  helping  to  drive  the  French  army  out 
of  Egypt.  Only  three  years  later,  however,  the  great  vic- 
tory at  Austerlitz,  and  the  treaty  that  followed,  making 
France  through  her  new  possessions — the  Illyrian  provinces 
— a  neighbor  to  the  Ottoman  empire,  inclined  the  Sultan 
and  his  advisers  to  put  themselves  again  under  the  guidance 
of  the  French.^ 

In  his  efforts  to  remain  neutral  in  the  European  conflict 
just  ended,  the  Sultan  had  taken  the  precaution  to  make 
some  warlike  preparations  along  the  lower  Danube;  and 
that  led  the  Tsar  to  increase  his  influence  over  Ottoman  sub- 
jects in  that  territory.  Urged  on  now  by  the  representa- 
tions of  the  French  minister,  Sebastiani,  and  disregarding 
his  agreement  of  four  years  previous,  the  Sultan  permitted 
himself  to  be  so  deeply  moved  by  the  traitorous  attitude  of 
the  governors  of  Wallachia  and  Moldavia  in  favoring  Rus- 
sian intrigue,  that  he  removed  these  officials  without  the 
consent  of  Russia.^  The  ambassadors  of  England  and 
Russia  then  determined  to  force  the  Sultan  to  reinstate  the 
governors,  and  he  yielded,  after  a  time;  but,  notwithstand- 
ing his  submission,  Russia  moved  her  army  into  the  prin- 
cipalities.* England's  threatening  attitude  failed  before  the 
end  of  the  year  (1806)  to  prevent  the  Porte  from  declar- 
ing war  against  Russia.    With  a  British  fleet  anchored  a 

^De  Testa,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  288. 

'Menzies,  op.  cit.,  p.  329.  ^ Ibid.,  p.  331. 

*  Lane-Poole,  Life  of  Stratford  Canning  (London,  1888),  vol.  i,  p.  37. 


I?] 


UP  TO  THE  TREATY  OF  PARIS— 1856 


17 


few  miles  from  Constantinople  (February,  1807),  the  Sul- 
tan's government  seemed  inclined  to  yield  to  the  English 
ambassador's  ultimatum,  that  Sebastiani  be  at  once  dis- 
missed from  the  city;  that  the  Porte  renew  the  treaty  of 
alliance  with  England  and  Russia;  that  the  Bosphorus  and 
Dardanelles  be  open  to  Russian  ships  of  war;  and  that  the 
Turkish  navy  be  held  by  the  English  until  the  return  of 
peace/  Time  was  gained  at  Constantinople  by  delaying 
negotiations  with  England,  and  under  the  encouragement 
and  direction  of  the  French  ambassador  the  defenses  of  the 
city  were  made  ready  to  withstand  an  attack.  Within  two 
weeks  the  idea  of  an  assault  was  abandoned  by  the  British 
and  their  fleet  sailed  away;  but  they  then  made  an  unsuc- 
cessful attempt  to  invade  Egypt,  and  as  a  result  the  Porte 
declared  war  against  England  (March)  and  formed  an 
alliance  with  France. 

The  Russian  forces  being  mostly  engaged  with  the  Prus- 
sians at  this  time  against  the  French,  made  the  outlook  quite 
promising  for  the  Turks.  But  the  deposition  of  Sultan 
Selim  (May,  1807)  and  the  prospect,  after  the  French  won 
the  battle  of  Friedland  (June),  that  Napoleon  and  the  Tsar 
Alexander  would  settle  their  differences  served  to  bring 
about  an  entire  change  in  the  situation.  The  disorders  in 
Turkey,  culminating  in  the  Sultan  being  set  aside  on  the 
charge  of  "  combating  the  religious  principles  consecrated 
by  the  Koran,"  seemed  to  cause  Napoleon  to  feel  that  the 
Osmanlis  were  hopelessly  unstable,  and  that  the  fall  of  their 
empire  was  inevitable.  He  therefore  all  the  more  readily 
abandoned  Turkey  when  he  formed  his  alliance  with  the 
Tsar  (July,  1807).^     The  treaty  of  Tilsit,  setting  forth 

^Menzies,  op.  cit.,  p.  335. 

'Sloane,  W.  M.,  Life  of  Napoleon  Bonaparte  (New  York,  1896), 
vol.  iii,  ch.  iv;  Menzies,  op.  cit.,  p.  343. 


l8  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [ig 

the  terms  of  this  alHance,  stipulated  that  Russia  should 
evacuate  the  Danubian  principalities,  but  that  the  Turks 
were  not  to  be  allowed  to  enter  that  territory  until  a  treaty 
of  peace  should  be  made  between  Russia  and  the  Porte. 
The  Tsar  and  Napoleon  secretly  agreed,  however,  that  the 
Porte  must  accept  the  mediation  of  France,  and  that  a  satis- 
factory result  must  be  reached  within  three  months  after 
negotiations  were  commenced,  else  France  and  Russia  would 
make  common  cause  in  leaving  to  the  Porte  simply  Con- 
stantinople and  the  province  of  Roumelia/  This  treaty 
led  to  an  armistice  between  Russia  and  the  Porte  (August), 
which  continued  for  two  years.  France  and  Russia  joined 
in  another  alliance  in  October,  1808,  to  be  kept  secret  for 
at  least  ten  years,  in  which  France  promised  to  aid  Russia 
in  annexing  Wallachia  and  Moldavia.^  At  the  beginning 
of  the  next  year,  friendly  relations  were  resumed  between 
England  and  the  Porte.  ^ 

Russia  continued  to  occupy  the  principalities;  and  when 
Turkey  tried  to  come  to  terms  with  the  Tsar  Alexander, 
his  demands  were  such  that  the  Porte  renewed  hostilities 
(April,  1809).  Although  the  Tsar  was  soon  obliged  to  be- 
gin preparations  for  an  impending  struggle  in  his  own  coun- 
try against  the  French,  still  the  Russians  continued,  in  gen- 
eral, to  be  successful  against  the  Turkish  forces. 

Influenced  by  England's  ambassador,  Stratford  Canning, 
and,  doubtless,  by  a  general  distrust  of  France,  the  Porte 
finally  accepted  the  offer  of  Russia  to  give  back  all  but  about 
half  of  Moldavia,  and  the  terms  of  peace  were  signed  at 

'De  Clercq,  Recueil  des  TraiiSs  de  la  France  (Paris,  1888),  vol.  ii, 
pp.  207-14. 
""Ibid.,  p.  284. 

^Martens,  Nouveau  Recueil  de  Traiiis,  vol.  i  (Gottingcn,  1817), 
p.  160. 


19] 


UP  TO  THE  TREATY  OF  PARIS— 1856 


19 


Bucharest  in  May,  1812/  Menzies  expresses  the  opinion 
that  "  Turkey  had  committed  suicide  in  not  having  seconded 
Napoleon  in  his  audacious  invasion  of  Russia;"  and  that  in 
signing  the  treaty  of  Bucharest,  the  Porte  missed  the  most 
brilHant  opportunity  which  ever  presented  itself  to  repair 
the  losses  of  Turkey."  ^  All  of  the  former  stipulations  be- 
tween Russia  and  the  Porte,  back  to  1774,  in  respect  to 
Wallachia  and  Moldavia,  were  again  reaffirmed;  but  most 
important  of  all,  perhaps,  was  the  article  of  this  treaty  re- 
lating to  Servia. 

THE  SERVIANS  UP  TO  THE  GREEK  INSURRECTION  1 82 1 

The  treaty  of  Bucharest  marks  the  beginning  of  a  Russian 
protectorate  over  another  portion  of  the  Ottoman  popula- 
tion. In  this  treaty  the  Tsar  and  the  Sultan  came  to  "  a 
solemn  agreement  "  respecting  the  security  of  the  Servians ; 
and  though  the  terms  were  somewhat  indefinite,  still  Russia 
could  now  demand  and  exact,  under  treaty  right,  that  a 
fairly  well-defined  policy  sho^uld  be  followed  by  the  Porte 
in  dealing  with  these  people.  The  Sultan  was  to  proclaim 
a  general  amnesty  to  the  Servians;  and  he  was  to  leave  to 
them  the  administration  of  their  internal  affairs,  and  to  ex- 
act only  moderate  taxes  which  were  to  be  paid  direct  to  the 
Porte.  But  the  Turks  were  still  allowed  to  garrison  the  Ser- 
vian fortresses;  and  that  opened  the  way  for  troubles  that 
soon  followed.^ 

These  stipulations  gave  a  new  anchorage  tO'  the  hopes  of 

^  For  the  text  of  the  treaty  of  Bucharest,  see  Martens,  op.  ciL,  vol.  iii, 
P-  397J  and  for  a  glance  at  the  diplomatic  policies  of  the  time,  see  Mr. 
Canning's  efforts  to  release  Russia,  and  at  the  same  time  prevent  an 
alliance  between  the  Sultan  and  Napoleon,  Lane-Pool,  op.  cii.,  vol.  ii, 
ch.  iv. 

'Menzies,  op.  cit.,  p.  350. 

■^See  Treaty  of  Bucharest,  article  viii. 


20  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [20 

the  Servians  for  reasonable  security  and  increasing  liberty 
in  a  portion  of  the  territory  which  had  been  occupied  by  their 
race  for  centuries.  Back  in  the  ninth  century,  A.  D.,  the 
Serbs  had  taken  possession  of  that  part  of  Europe  at  the 
close  of  the  period  of  migrations  and  were  already  making 
a  start  toward  forming  political  institutions.^  They  early 
embraced  the  Christian  faith,  and  being  within  the  Roman 
Empire  of  the  East  they  acknowledged  the  emperor's  su- 
premacy, on  condition  that  their  rulers  should  be  native 
chiefs,  of  their  own  choosing.  Thus  their  early  patriarchal 
form  O'f  government  was  preserved.  In  the  eleventh  cen- 
tury, however,  the  Greeks  made  an  armed  attack  in  order 
to  force  the  Servians  to  accept  a  Greek  governor.  The  at- 
tempt failed  and  only  served  to  establish  on  a  firmer  basis 
the  princely  power  of  the  native  rulers. 

The  Servians  were  not  long  in  discovering  the  advantages 
of  being  alongside  of  Western  Christendom.  By  the  pros- 
pect of  support  from  the  West — from  the  Pope  as  well  as 
from  the  Western  emperor — the  Servians  were  from  time 
tO'  time  encouraged  in  resisting  the  encroachments  of  the 
Eastern  Empire.  During  a  considerable  part  of  the  four- 
teenth century,  Servia  was  the  strongest  power  in  south- 
eastern Europe;  and  her  last  and  only  great  king,  Stephen 
Dushan  (1333-56),  even  besieged  Constantinople,  with  the 
idea,  it  is  said,  of  destroying  the  Empire  of  the  East.^  Under 
Dushan,  the  clergy  elected  their  own  patriarch,  thus  com- 
pleting the  independence  of  the  Servian  empire,  which  then 
comprehended  the  larger  part  of  the  Balkan  peninsula.^  An 

^Ranke,  History  of  Servia.  Translation  by  Kerr.  (London,  1847), 
ch.  i. 

'Menzies,  op.  cii.,  p.  47. 

^Freeman,  Historical  Geography  of  Europe  (London,  1881),  vol.  i, 
p.  424. 


21] 


UP  TO  THE  TREATY  OF  PARIS— 1856 


21 


Assembly  composed  of  clergy  and  laity,  under  the  presidency 
of  the  king  and  patriarch,  exercised  legislative  and  other 
functions,  but  the  laws  continued  in  keeping  with  the  more 
or  less  primitive  ideas  of  these  people/  As  the  Servians 
most  nearly  represent  the  unmixed  Slavic  race,  so  their  sys- 
tem of  laws  is,  of  all  the  Slavonic  systems,  the  most  na- 
tional.^ 

After  the  death  of  Dushan  (1356),  a  half-century  of  in- 
ternal struggle  left  Servia  once  more  a  small  kingdom.  The 
Osmanlis  were  already  overrunning  that  part  of  Europe, 
and  the  battle  of  Kosova  (1389)  brought  Servia  under 
tribute  to  the  Sultan;  then  the  great  victory  for  the  Turks 
at  Varna  (1444)  made  the  Servians  defenceless  rayahs — 
non-Moslem  subjects  under  Ottoman  rule.  A  century  of 
comparative  quiet  then  followed  in  Servia.  The  Christian 
Servians  were  not  allowed  to  hold  office,  or  to  carry  arms ; 
but,  as  time  went  on,  some  of  their  most  illustrious  families 
turned  Mohammedans,  and  thus  it  was  that  now  and  then 
the  people  of  this  province  were  governed  by  officials  united 
with  them  in  race,  but  separated  from  them  by  religion.^ 

For  more  than  four  centuries  the  Servian  Church  re- 
mained independent ;  the  native  patriarchs  paying  the  Porte, 
meanwhile,  an  annual  tribute  of  something  like  sixty-three 
thousand  asperes  (about  $650.00).  Finally,  when  the 
struggle  began  which  tore  Hungary  from  the  Turkish  empire, 
the  Servian  patriarch  joined  the  Austrian  forces.  By  the 
end  of  the  war  (1699)  thirty-seven  thousand  families  from 
Servia  had  migrated  with  him  to  Hungary.  The  Porte  ap- 
pointed another  Servian  patriarch.    But  the  people  who  re- 

^  Ranke,  op.  cit.,  pp.  19-20. 

'  Maciciowski,  Sclavische  Rechtsgeschichte,  vol.  i,  part  ii,  section  v. 
(Quoted  by  Ranke,  op.  cit.,  p.  20.) 
'Ranke,  op.  cit.,  p.  31. 


22 


THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES 


[22 


mained  in  Servia  now  saw  a  part  of  their  race  enjoying  a 
good  degree  of  freedoin  outside  of  Turkish  territory.  So 
when  another  opportunity  came  to  aid  Austria  against  the 
Porte,  they  joined  with  the  enemies  of  the  Sultan,  and  in 
the  Peace  of  Passarowitz  (1718)  Turkey  was  forced  to 
cede  to  Austria  a  large  part  of  Servia.  European  politics, 
however,  soon  restored  this  territory  to  the  Ottoman  empire 
(1739);  and  then  it  was  that  the  Servians  lost  the  privi- 
lege and  the  inestimable  advantage  of  having  a  native  pa- 
triarch, and  were  given  over,  in  relation  to  the  many  inter- 
ests then  centered  in  the  Church,  to  the  domination  of  the 
Greek  patriarch  at  Constantinople.  Servia  thus  lost  the  last 
vestige  of  self-government,  and  became  doubly  dependent; 
for  the  people  must  now  struggle  against  the  Greeks  as  well 
as  the  Osmanlis.  All  through  the  eighteenth  century  the 
Greeks  exercised  a  wide  influence,  especially  in  European 
Turkey;  and  now,  with  a  Greek  Metropolitan  in  Servia,  the 
Phanariots  could  also  extend  their  influence  over  that  pro^ 
vince.^  Wherever  the  Greek  patriarch  exercised  complete 
ecclesiastical  authority  over  those  who  were  not  of  the  Greek 
race,  his  priests  and  teachers  were  sure  to  labor  assiduously 
in  transferring  their  own  language  and  ideas  to  the  people. 
It  may  be  added,  also,  that  the  more  educated  Greeks  hoped 
for  the  restoration  of  the  Byzantine  Empire,  and  that  their 
views  respecting  the  union  of  Church  and  State  naturally 
made  them  feel  certain  that,  in  such  an  event,  political  power 
would  go  hand  in  hand  with  ecclesiastical  authority,  and 
that  the  Greeks  would  thus  become  the  dominant  race.^ 

^  Ranke,  op.  cit.,  ch.  ii.  The  buildings  of  the  Greek  Patriarchate 
have  long  been  in  the  part  of  Constantinople  called  Phanar.  As  early 
as  the  seventeenth  century  that  quarter  of  the  Turkish  capital  was  prin- 
cipally inhabited  by  Greeks.  So  many  of  these  played  such  an  active 
and  influential  part  in  Turkish  and  Greek  afifairs  that  they  are  now 
commonly  referred  to  as  Phanariots.    Odysseus,  op.  cit.,  p.  306. 

^Finlay,  History  of  Greece  (Oxford,  1877),  vol.  vi,  p.  7. 


23] 


UP  TO  THE  TREATY  OF  PARIS— 1856 


23 


Later  on,  in  the  Servian  crisis  (1805-12),  Russia  sent  a 
councillor  and  various  supplies  tO'  them,  promising  to  sup- 
port their  cause  if  they  would  accept  the  Russian  protec- 
torate with  a  Phanariot  prince.  But  the  Servians  soon 
came  to  distrust  their  Greek  Metropolitan,  who  kept  up 
familiar  relations  with  the  Russian  councillor;  and  the  fear 
of  Greek  influence  had  much  weight,  during  that  struggle, 
in  keeping  Servia  from  forming  a  closer  alliance  with  Russia.^ 

When  Austria  joined  with  Russia  back  in  1788,  prepara- 
tory to  a  decisive  struggle  against  Turkey,  the  Servians 
again  readily  volunteered  against  the  Porte,  and  many  of 
them  fought  in  a  body,  under  Austrian  commanders.^  Jeal- 
ousy among  the  maritime  powers  and  fear  occasioned  by  the 
upheaval  in  France  hurried  the  conclusion  of  peace  (1791- 
92),  however,  and,  in  keeping  with  England's  demands, 
the  treaty  was  O'U  the  basis  of  the  strict  status  quo  ante  hel- 
ium.^ Again,  and  quite  contrary  to  expectations,  Servia 
Vv^as  left  to  form  a  part  of  the  Ottoman  territory,  but  under 
a  general  amnesty,  nevertheless,  for  Servians  who-  had 
fought  against  Turkey,  and  with  the  agreement  that  those 
who  had  left  the  principality  or  had  been  driven  from  their 
homes  might  return  to  their  estates.  The  intervention  of 
the  European  powers  had  at  least  rendered  their  return  to 
the  dominion  of  the  Porte  a  fait  accompli.  But  many  of 
them  had  received  a  training  in  the  Austrian  service,  never- 
theless, that  was  soon  to  be  turned  to  account."* 

The  next  two  Pashas  of  Belgrade  endeavored  to  rule  in 
a  way  that  would  naturally  lead  the  Servians  to  favor  the 
Turkish  administration,  and  there  was  a  beginning  now 

^  Odysseus,  op.  cit.,  p.  308;  Finlay,  History  of  Greece,  vol.  v,  pp.  2,  4; 
vol.  vi,  pp.  2,  6,  7. 
'Holland,  op.  cit.,  p.  12;  Menzies,  op.  cit.,  p.  319. 
'Ranke,  op.  cit.,  pp.  93-105.  ^Menzies,  op.  cit.,  p.  324. 


24  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [24 

among  these  people  of  contentment  and  prosperity.  This 
brief  period  of  ten  years  followed  the  expulsion  of  the 
Janisaries  from  Servian  territory  because  they  would  not 
give  up  their  opposition  to  the  Pasha,  and  their  habits  of 
plundering  the  rayahs.  In  the  general  weakness  of  the  Otto- 
man empire  at  that  time,  groups  of  brigands  began  to  over- 
run European  Turkey,  and  it  was  not  long  before  the  ex- 
pelled Janisaries  united  with  one  of  these  bands  and  made 
an  effort  to  force  their  way  back  into  Servia  (1804).  The 
Turkish  Pasha  of  Belgrade  now  took  an  unprecedented  step 
in  calling  the  Servian  rayahs  to  arms,  and  they  fought  side 
by  side  with  their  Mohammedan  neighbors,  against  the  in- 
vaders. This  united  force  co'utinued  to  be  victorious  until 
the  Sultan  weakened,  and  ordered  the  Pasha  to  reinstate 
the  Janisaries.^  It  was  not  long,  however,  before  one  of 
these  who  had  returned  shot  a  former  Servian  leader  for 
refusing  to  comply  with  his  unjust  demand,  and  when  the 
Pasha  undertook  tO'  punish  the  murderer  the  Janisaries 
quickly  united  and  the  Pasha  was  slain.  The  supreme  au- 
thority in  Servia  was  then  taken  over  by  four  chiefs  of  the 
Janisaries,  and  they  sent  others  of  their  number  into  the 
provincial  towns,  where  they  were  unmerciful  in  their  ex- 
actions, and  exercised  the  power  of  life  and  death.  When 
the  Sultan  hinted  that  he  would  send  an  army  against  them 
if  they  did  not  modify  their  conduct,  the  Janisaries  felt 
sure  that  it  must  be  the  purpose  at  Constantinople  to  arm 
the  Servians  against  them.  Accordingly,  they  at  once  fell 
to  killing  off  all  the  possible  leaders  among  the  natives 
(1804).  In  sheer  desperation,  the  Servian  leaders  quickly 
roused  their  people,  and  within  a  few  weeks  the  Janisaries 
were  driven  out,  and  the  native  leaders  and  their  followers 
were  left  in  control. 

^Ranke,  op.  cit.,  ch.  vi;  Menzies,  op.  cit.,  p.  324. 


25] 


UP  rO  THE  TREATY  OF  PARIS— 1856 


25 


It  was  at  this  stage  that  the  Servians  determined  to  make 
an  appeal  to  some  Christian  power  to  intervene  in  their  be- 
half.^ At  different  times,  they  had  fought  v^ith  and  for 
Austria ;  but  Austria,  they  remembered,  had  always  returned 
conquered  territory  and  its  inhabitants  to  the  Porte.  They 
were  fully  aware,  also,  of  the  effectual  way  in  which  the  Tsar 
of  Russia  had  cared  for  the  interests  of  the  Wallachians  and 
the  Moldavians.  So  they  were  not  long  in  deciding  to 
apply  to  Russia;  and  accordingly,  in  August,  1804,  three 
Servian  representatives  were  sent  to  St.  Petersburg.  These 
returned  the  next  February,  to  say  that  Russia  would  help 
in  Constantinople  to  secure  compliance  with  their  requests, 
so  soon  as  these  were  laid  before  the  Ottoman  government. 
Deputies  were  then  sent  to  Constantinople  (1805),  where 
they  were  soon  imprisoned;  and  the  Sultan  sent  a  pasha  to 
assume  control  in  Servia. 

But  the  Serbs  already  had  a  native  leader,  Kara  George, 
a  simple  peasant;  and  they  determined  that  they  would 
not  surrender  their  country  to  the  Sultan's  representative 
until  they  were  given  some  reason  to  hope  for  some  amelior- 
ation of  their  former  condition.  From  that  time  the  Ser- 
vians were  fighting,  not  a  party,  but  the  Ottoman  empire, 
and  they  looked  to  Russia  for  support."  However,  they  be- 
gan the  struggle  alone,  and  by  the  middle  of  the  next  year 
(1806),  excepting  the  fortresses,  their  territory  was  free 
from  Ottoman  soldiers.  An  embassy  was  again  sent  to 
Constantinople.  Realizing  now  the  danger  of  a  closer  al- 
liance between  the  Servians  and  the  Russians,  the  Porte 
agreed  to  concede  all  the  requests  of  the  Servians  on  condi- 
tion of  being  paid  a  fixed  annual  tax  and  having  an  official 

*  Ranke,  op.  ciL,  ch.  vi;  Menzies,  op.  ciL,  pp.  144-5. 
'Menzies,  op.  cit.,  pp.  330-351. 


26  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [26 

in  Belgrade  with  one  hundred  and  fifty  Turks/  These 
promised  concessions  would  have  made  the  country  practi- 
cally independent;  but  late  in  the  autumn  the  Porte  refused 
to  ratify  the  terms  already  agreed  upon,  and  the  Servians 
then  fought  their  way  into  the  fortresses.^ 

There  was  already  a  sort  of  representative  central  gov- 
ernment among  the  Servians,  carried  on  by  two  groups  of 
native  councilors.  Each  of  the  twelve  districts  into  which 
their  territory  was  divided  had  a  military  chief,  and  these 
leaders  held  an  assembly  (Skupschtina,  from  skupti,  to  as- 
semble) each  year,  soon  after  New  Year's  Day,  and  made 
necessary  plans  for  war  and  attended  to  matters  relating  to 
finance  and  judicature.  The  need  of  another  council,  how- 
ever, was  soon  apparent,  and  in  1805,  a  Senate  (Sowiet) 
compO'sed  of  one  elected  representative  from  each  district, 
had  begun  its  meetings.  This  body  began  at  once  to  estab- 
lish schools  and  courts  of  justice,  and  undertook  to  care  for 
the  civil  affairs  of  the  whole  country. 

The  success  of  Kara  George  as  a  leader  in  the  field,  how- 
ever, soon  laid  the  foundation  for  his  real  leadership  in  both 
civil  and  military  matters.  As  the  war  went  on,  there  were 
instances  of  merciless  vengeance;  and  cruel  jealousies 
among  native  leaders  bore  deadly  fruit.  The  Tsar  sent  com- 
panies O'f  soldiers,  and  gave  aid  to  the  Servians  from  time 
tO'  time  in  various  other  ways ;  so  when  Turkey  made  liberal 
proposals  to  Kara  George  (1811),  with  the  idea  of  induc- 
ing him  to  renounce  the  protectoirate  of  Russia,  he  com- 
municated with  the  Russian  headquarters  and  then  informed 
the  Porte  that  he  would  accept  such  terms  as  might  be 
agreed  upon  between  the  Sultan  and  the  Tsar.^  The  treaty 
of  peace  that  followed  (Bucharest,  181 2)  was  undoubtedly 


iRanke,  op.  cit.,  p.  172.  ^Ibid.,  p.  200. 

^Ranke,  op.  cit.,  chs.  xii,  xiii;  Menzies,  op.  cit.,  pp.  351-352. 


2y]  UP  TO  THE  TREATY  OF  PARIS— 1856 


a  disappointment  to  the  Servians/  It  stipulated,  never- 
theless, that  their  peace  must  not  be  disturbed;  and  Turkey 
agreed,  as  a  mark  of  her  generosity,"  to  come  to  an  un- 
derstanding with  them  in  the  matter  of  regulations  for 
carrying  out  this  promise. 

Throughout  the  career  of  Napoleon,  affairs  in  Turkey 
were  a  sort  of  barometer  of  many  of  his  undertakings ;  and 
at  this  time  the  Tsar's  necessity  for  concentrating  all  his 
forces  in  Russia  against  the  invading  army  of  the  French 
left  the  Servians  without  any  material  support.^  In  fact, 
the  turn  in  the  great  conflict  in  the  West  in  18 13  might  well 
have  led  them  tO'  despair  of  receiving  any  aid  until  that 
struggle  should  end.  Because  of  the  general  indefiniteness 
of  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  Bucharest  relating  to  Servia, 
and  also  owing  to  the  prevailing  conditions,  it  is  not  strange 
that  the  two  parties  differed  in  interpreting  the  promises  that 
had  been  made.  The  Ottomans  claimed  that  the  treaty  of 
Bucharest  required  the  Servians  to  surrender  the  fo^rtresses 
and  their  arms  and  ammunition,  and  to  allow  the  banished 
Turks  to  return.  The  Servians  were  not  willing  to  accept 
that  interpretation;  but  after  a  Turkish  army  reached  their 
frontier  (May,  1813),  Kara  George  offered  his  submission, 
on  condition  that  the  expelled  Ottomans  should  not  be  al- 
lowed to  return.^  Their  return,  he  held,  would  be  sure  to 
disturb  the  peace  of  the  country.  But  the  Porte  would  delay 
no  longer,  and  the  Turkish  forces  pressed  on  into  Servia.* 
French  influence  at  Constantinople,  and  the  expectation  of 
receiving  the  assistance  of  France,  are  claimed  to  have  in- 
fluenced the  Turks  in  hurrying  forward  what  proved  to  be 

^  Cf.  supra,  p.  19. 

'Dennis,  Eastern  Problems  at  the  Close  of  the  Eighteenth  Century^ 
ch.  iii. 

'Ranke,  op.  cit.,  p.  270.  ^Menzies,  op.  ext.,  p.  352. 


28 


THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES 


a  successful  attempt  to  reconquer  that  territory/  On  the 
third  of  October,  Kara  George,  abandoning  his  countrymen, 
fled  from  Servia.  His  example  was  quickly  followed  by 
the  senators  and  many  of  the  other  Servian  leaders,  and  re- 
sistance tO'  the  Turks  was  soon  abandoned.  The  Servians 
as  a  whole  had  made  a  good  effort  to  defend  their  country; 
but  their  warrior  chiefs  who^  had  sO'  often  led  them  tO'  victory 
during  the  eight  years  before  the  treaty  of  Bucharest 
(1812),  for  one  cause  and  another,  were  now  no  longer  in 
command.  The  changes  incident  to  the  acquirement  of 
monarchial  power  by  one  chief — Kara  George — had  driven 
away  a  number  of  the  former  leaders  and  had  lessened  the 
spirit  of  self-reliance  in  the  several  districts.^  Ranke  has 
most  carefully  traced  the  history  of  Servia,  and  he  tells  us 
that  in  this  struggle,  "  from  some  incomprehensible  cause," 
Kara  George  did  not  appear  upon  the  scene  of  battle. 

One  of  the  native  leaders,  however,  Milosh  Obrenovitch, 
would  not  desert  his  countrymen,  and  he  was  soon  recog- 
nized by  the  Ottoman  authorities  as  a  man  who  could  aid 
the  Porte  in  pacifying  the  country.  Accordingly  they  prom- 
ised to  make  him  governor  of  a  district  if  he  would  help 
toward  that  end.  Milosh  accepted  the  proposal,  and  was  at 
once  appointed  governor  of  three  districts.  For  two^  years 
he  kept  his  promise;  but  the  increasing  atrocities  perpetrated 
by  the  Turks  upon  his  people,  the  fear  for  his  own  life  and 
very  probably  the  utter  defeat  of  the  French,  finally  induced 
him  to  become  the  leader  of  his  people  (Palm  Sunday, 
181 5)  in  still  another  attempt  to  throw  off  the  severe  burdens 
imposed  upon  them  by  the  local  Turkish  misrule.^  Within 
a  year  the  Ottomans  outside  the  fortresses  were  conquered, 
and  the  Porte  then  dispatched  two  large  armies  against  the 


^  Ranke,  p.  274. 

*  Ranke,  op.  cit.,  pp.  299-302. 


^ Ibid.,  ch.  xiii. 


29] 


UP  TO  THE  TREATY  OF  PARIS— 1856 


29 


insurgents.  But  these  forces  were  very  cautiously  halted 
at  the  Servian  frontier.  The  Russian  ambassador  at  Con- 
stantinople had  already  inquired  of  the  Sultan :  "  What  war 
is  this  now  going  on  in  Servia,  contrary  tO'  the  stipulations 
of  the  treaty?  "  and  the  members  of  the  Hetaeria  (a  secret 
political  society  of  Greeks)  were  spreading  their  doctrine 
of  the  possibility,  through  opposition  to  the  Sultan  and 
loyalty  to  the  Tsar,  of  freeing  the  Greeks  from  Ottoman 
rule.^  There  was  fear  also  among  the  Turkish  leaders  that 
the  Holy  Alliance  threatened  dire  consequences  to  the  Mo- 
hammedan government.^  The  commanding  pasha  led  the 
Servians  tO'  hope  for  liberal  concessions ;  and  representatives 
of  both  sides  returned  in  about  a  month  from  Constantinople 
with  the  Sultan's  firman  of  peace.  In  this  imperial  decree, 
the  pasha  was  appointed  to  the  pashalic  of  Belgrade  and 
simply  instructed  "  that  as  God  had  entrusted  the  Servians 
to  the  Sultan,  so  the  Sultan  recommended  them  to  the  pasha, 
and  that  by  kind  treatment  towards  these  people  he  would 
best  perform  his  duty."  "  This  new  Turkish  governor  then 
proceeded  to  Belgrade.  After  a  Httle  time  Milosh  and  the 
other  chiefs  appeared  before  him,  and  to  his  thrice-repeated 
question,  "  Are  ye  Servians  subject  to  the  Grand  Signor 
(the  Sultan)  ?  "  Milosh  answered  each  time,  "  We  are  sub- 
ject tO'  him and  it  was  sixty  years  before  the  Servians  took 
up  arms  again  against  the  Constantinople  government. 

The  Servians  were  now  allowed  to  retain  their  arms  and 
were  themselves  to  collect  the  taxes  and  administer  justice 
for  their  people  in  the  provincial  towns.  A  National  As- 
sembly was  formed,  similar  tO'  the  former  senate,  which  ex- 
ercised the  functions  of  a  national  chancery  court.  The 
Turkish  authorities  also'  granted  a  number  of  important 


*  Ranke,  op.  cit.,  p.  323;  Finlay,  op.  cit.,  vol.  vi,  p.  98. 
'Ranke,  op.  cit.,  p.  336.  ^Ibid.,  p.  327. 


30 


THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES 


[30 


privileges  to  Milosh,  personally;  and  in  1817  the  chiefs  of 
the  several  districts  agreed  to  recognize  him  as  the  supreme 
chief  (knes)  and  to  make  his  official  position  hereditary. 
Milosh  thus  possessed  a  double  authority,  and  he  went  on 
taking  more  and  more  power  unto  himself  from  both  sides, 
until  his  downfall  in  1839. 

The  government  and  the  territory  of  the  Ottomans  were 
important  factors  in  nearly  all  the  movements  connected 
with  Napoleon's  campaigns.  Nevertheless,  that  empire  and 
the  appeals  of  some  of  its  people — the  Greeks  and  the  Ser- 
vians, especially — were  wholly  ignored  in  the  many  confer- 
ences which  undertook,  in  connection  with  the  series  of 
treaties  of  1814-1815,  to  provide  for  the  "  peace  the  "  re- 
pose and  the  "  tranquilHty  of  Europe.^  That  there  was 
no  discussion  of  Turkish  affairs  in  these  conferences  is 
claimed  to  have  been  due  to  the  influence  oi  the  Tsar,  Alex- 
ander I.^  Russia  was  thus  left  with  greater  freedom  of 
action  in  that  part  of  Europe. 

Through  the  activity  of  the  Tsar,  Russia  certainly  played 
a  very  important  role  in  the  overthrow  of  the  Napoleonic 
regime,  as  well  as  in  the  attempt  to  solidify  and  perpetuate 
the  territorial  and  governmental  regulations  established  in 
the  reorganization  of  Europe  (1814-15).  Among  all  his 
associates  in  these  various  efforts  to  provide  for  lasting  peace 
in  Europe,  Alexander  was  for  a  time  pre-eminent  in  the 
field  of  what  his  guide-to-be,  Metternich,  called  "  wrong 
ideas  of  liberalism  and  philanthropy — erroneous  theories  in 
themselves,  and  ridiculous  in  their  application."  ^  For 
nearly  a  decade  after  the  Congress  at  Vienna,  Europe  was 

'Hertslet,  Map  of  Europe  by  Treaty  (London,  1875),  vol.  i. 
'Metternich,  Memoirs,   translated  by  Napier  (New  York,  1880), 
vol.  iv,  p.  63;  Wilkinson,  op.  cit.,  p.  195. 
'Metternich,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  317. 


31  ]  UP  TO  THE  TREATY  OF  PARIS— 1856  31 

largely  under  the  control  of  these  two  personalities;  but  the 
ultra-conservative  Count  Metternich,  as  Austria's  prime 
minister,  was  so  resourceful  and  relentless  that  his  was  the 
dominant  influence.  He  tells  us  that  the  Tsar's  judgment 
was  always  influenced  by  fanciful  ideas,  and  that  his 
strength  of  character  was  not  sufficient  to  maintain  the 
balance  of  his  different  inclinations.  Metternich  knew  how 
and  when  to  fill  Alexander's  mind  with  forebodings  of  the 
machinations  of  secret  societies  and  the  horrors  of  revolu- 
tions, and  thus  win  the  emperor's  support  in  furthering  his 
own  reactionary  policies.^ 

When  the  conference  of  Aix-la-Chapelle  (1818)  withdrew^ 
the  allied  troops  from  French  territory,  that  act_was  con- 
sidered by  the  Quadruple  Alliance  as  the  "  completion  of 
the  political  system  destined  to  insure  the  solidity  of  the 
work  of  peace."  ^  A  new  union,  including  France,  was 
then  formed,  which  Metternich  called  "  the  moral  Pen- 
tarchy."  ^  This  union,  the  five  contracting  powers  affirmed, 
"  is  the  more  real  and  durable  inasmuch  as  it  depends  on 
no  separate  interest  or  temporary  combination,  and  can 
only  have  for  its  object  the  maintenance  of  general  peace; 
and  this  intimate  union,"  they  continued,  "  established 
among  the  monarchs,  offers  to  Europe  the  most  sacred 
pledge  of  its  tranquillity."  These  allies  were  to  hold  meet- 
ings from  time  to  time.  Lord  Castlereagh,  England's  For- 
eign Secretary,  was  willing  to  say  that  he  thought  the  re- 
unions to  be  a  new  discovery  in  the  European  government 
.  .  .  ,  giving  to  the  councils  of  the  powers  the  efficiency  and 
almost  the  simplicity  of  a  single  state."  *    It  was  not  long, 

•Metternich,  op.  ciL,  vol.  i,  p.  333;  vol.  iii.  pp.  58,  665. 
'Hertslet,  op.  ciL,  vol.  i,  p.  573. 

'Comprising  Austria,  England,  France,  Prussia  and  Russia. 

^  Correspondence y  Despatches,  and  Other  Papers,  of  Viscount  CastU'* 


32  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [32 

however,  before  the  two  constitutional  monarchies  found 
themselves  unable  to  follow  the  absolutists  of  the  East  in 
going  to  Naples  (1821)  simply  to  "fight  against  and  repel 
rebellio'n,"  on  the  plea  of  going  "  to  the  assistance  of  sub- 
dued peoples,"  and  going  "  in  support  of  their  liberty."  The 
declaration  of  the  allied  sovereigns  of  Austria,  Prussia  and 
Russia,  May,  1821,  clearly  stated  that  those  countries  in- 
tended to  preserve  "  the  independence  and  the  rights  of  each 
State,"  as  then  recognized  in  existing  treaties/ 

Such  was  the  feeling  of  the  allied  monarchs  of  Europe 
toward  all  disturbers  of  the  peace  of  nations,  when  an  em- 
bassy of  Servians  arrived  in  Constantinople  (1820)  to  de- 
mand of  the  Porte  what  they  regarded  as  Servia's  rights, 
granted  in  the  Peace  of  Bucharest  (1812).  It  was  an  inop- 
portune effort  to  influence  the  Sultan's  government,  and  the 
embassy  had  nO'  other  immediate  result  but  the  imprisonment 
of  the  Servian  representatives  soon  after  they  reached  the 
Turkish  capital.  About  this  time  an  armed  rebellion  against 
Ottoman  authority  was  started  by  Greeks  who  were  in  Wal- 
lachia  and  Moldavia.  Milosh  then  at  once  relinquished  all 
efforts  with  the  Porte,  and  turned  his  attention  to  the  exten- 
tion  of  his  own  authority  throughout  Servia.  Fearing  that 
the  Servians  might  join  with  the  leaders  of  the  rebellion  in 
the  Danubian  provinces,  the  Turkish  governor  in  Belgrade 
offered  little  or  no  resistance  to  Milosh's  aggressive  policy. 
The  chieftains  in  the  several  districts,  however,  and  later  on 
the  peasants  in  genei'al,  forcibly  resisted,  for  a  short  time, 

reagh  (Third  series,  London,  1853),  vol.  xii,  p.  55.  Prince  Metter- 
nich's  confidence  in  concerted  efforts  is  clearly  discernible  in  such  ex- 
pressions as  the  following:  "The  limits  of  states  are  of  late  years  firmly 
and  inviolably  fixed  by  diplomatic  negotiations  .  .  .  —political  repose 
rests  on  fraternization  between  monarchs,  and  on  the  principle  of  main- 
taining that  which  is."  Metternich,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  199. 
^Hertslet,  op.  cii.,  vol.  i,  pp.  664,  667. 


33] 


UP  TO  THE  TREATY  OF  PARIS— 1856 


33: 


the  momrchial  tendencies  of  their  Grand  Knes  (Milosh). 
But  the  idea  of  their  possible  hberation  from  the  Ottomans 
had  already  given  life  and  abiding  force  tO'  the  spirit  of  na- 
tionality, and  that  bond  of  common  aspiration  and  mutual 
sympathy  triumphed  for  more  than  a  decade  over  jealousies 
and  disappointments.  Under  the  authority  of  Milosh,  there- 
came  to  be  a  good  degree  of  internal  unity. 

WALLACHIA,  MOLDAVIA,  AND  SERVIA,  IN  CONNECTION  WITH 
THE  GREEK  INSURRECTION,  1 82 1 -29 

After  the  treaty  of  Bucharest  was  signed  (18 12)  the 
Porte  soon  established  its  authority  in  the  Danubian  princi- 
palities, but  the  Turkish  army  was  not  withdrawn.  This 
continued  occupation  of  Wallachia  and  Moldavia  and  the 
atrocities  perpetrated  upon  the  Greeks  in  Constantinople,, 
called  forth  from  time  to  time  unavailing  remonstrances 
from  the  Russian  ambassador.  He  finally  delivered  a  note 
to  the  Porte  (July  18,  1821)  allowing  only  eight  days  for  an 
answer.  In  brief  his  demands  were :  that  the  Greek  churches 
that  had  been  destroyed  and  plundered  should  immediately 
be  restored ;  that  the  Christian  religion  should  be  restored 
to  its  prerogatives  by  granting  it  the  protection  it  formerly 
enjoyed- and  by  guaranteeing  its  inviolability  for  the  future, 
and  that  the  Turkish  government  should  enable  Russia,  by 
virtue  of  existing  treaties,  to  contribute  to  the  pacification 
of  the  principalities  of  Wallachia  and  Moldavia.^  Two- 
days  before  this  note  was  handed  to  the  Porte,  Lord  Castle- 
reagh  wrote  the  Emperor  Alexander  a  long  and  interesting 
letter,  pointing  out  that  the  dreadful  events  then  afflicting 
Turkey  were  but  a  branch  of  that  organized  spirit  of  in- 
surrection which  was  systematically  propagating  itself 
throughout  Europe,"  and  expressing  his  "  sanguine  per- 

^Stapleton,  The  Political  Life  of  George  Canning  (London,  1831), 
vol.  i,  ch.  iv. 


34  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [34 

suasion  "  that  the  Tsar  would  determine  to  maintain  "  in- 
violably "  the  European  System,  as  consolidated  by  the  late 
treaty  of  peace/  The  letter  fully  recognized  the  ample  pro- 
vocation that  the  Emperor  had  for  intervening  but  suggested 
several  reasons  why  he  should  not  do  so,  and  it  concluded 
by  urging  that  Alexander  could  afford  to  temporize  and 
to  suffer  the  tempest  to  exhaust  itself."  ^  The  Porte  did 
not  answer  Russia's  ultimatum  within  the  specified  eight 
days,  and  the  Russian  ambassador,  who  already  had  his  in- 
structions, left  at  once  for  Odessa,  with  the  whole  of  his 
embassy.  By  this  time  the  Greeks  were  already  fighting 
with  some  success  in  their  own  country  against  the  Turks. 

A  few  days  after  the  ambassador's  departure,  the  Porte 
sent  to  St.  Petersburg  an  unsatisfactory  reply  to  the  Russian 
demands.  The  Tsar's  request  for  the  good  offices  of  the 
other  Christian  embassies  at  Constantinople  "  followed,  and 
called  forth  instructions  from  London  and  Vienna,  direct- 
ing the  British  and  Austrian  ambassadors  at  the  Porte  to 
urge  upon  the  Sultan  the  need  of  making  concessions. 
Russia  soon  renewed  her  demands  at  Constantinople  (Oc- 
tober, 1821),  with  some  additions,  and  two  months  later 
the  Porte  made  an  unsatisfactory  conditional  promise  to 
fulfil  the  Tsar's  latest  requirements.^  By  this  time,  Eng- 
land and  Austria  had  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  it  was 
necessary  that  Russia  should  refrain  from  any  hostile  act 
against  Turkey."^  Metternich  used  all  his  powers  to  induce 
the  Russian  government  to  delay  any  act  of  war;  and  when 
the  Tsar  consented  to  make  further  pacific  efforts  to  arrive 

^  Meaning  the  European  treaty,  at  the  close  of  the  Napoleonic  wars — 
1815.    See  Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i. 
'^Correspondence  and  Despatches  of  Castlereagh,  vol.  xii,  pp.  403-8. 
'Stapleton,  op.  cii.,  vol.  i,  p.  191. 
*  Metternich,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iii,  p.  558. 


35] 


UP  TO  THE  TREATY  OF  PARIS— 1856 


35 


at  a  good  understanding  with  the  Sultan,  the  proud  minister 
of  Austria  considered  that  he  had  achieved  "  perhaps  the 
greatest  victory  that  one  cabinet  had  ever  gained  over  an- 
other "  (May,  1822).  Prince  Metternich  was  far  too  san- 
guine, however,  when  he  avowed  his  conviction  that  what 
he  called  the  ''mistakes  of  the  Russian  minister  and  the  rec- 
titude of  the  conceptions  and  conduct  of  the  allied  Cabinets  " 
had  destroyed  the  influence  that  the  Russian  cabinet  had  so 
long  exercised  over  the  Sultan's  government,  and  "  that  a 
new  era  had  opened  for  the  Turkish  empire.^ 

Although  Russia  had  been  checked  in  its  policy  of  inter- 
vention the  redoubled  efforts  of  England  and  Austria  soon 
began  to  have  a  more  marked  influence  on  the  Sultan's 
policies,  and  it  was  not  long  before  he  issued  orders  for  his 
armies  to  evacuate  the  Danubian  principalities.  He  de- 
termined now,  likewise,  to  free  those  provinces  from  Phan- 
ariot  rule,  and  appointed  a  native  hospodar  to  govern  in 
each  principality.^  Moreover,  in  relation  to  the  other  Rus- 
sian demands,  the  Turkish  ministers  claimed  that  their  gov- 
ernment was  proceeding  to  rebuild  churches,  and  "  that 
every  degree  of  indulgence  and  forgiveness  would  be 
granted  to  the  Greek  people."  ^  Thus,  when  the  congress 
of  the  Allies,  at  Verona  (1822),  held  a  conference  on  the 
relations  between  Russia  and  Turkey,  it  appeared  that  the 
only  matters  still  at  issue  were  the  need  that  the  Porte 
should  renew  the  amnesty  to  the  Greeks,  restore  to  Russia 
former  privileges  of  navigation  in  the  Black  Sea,  and  make 

^  Metternich,  op.  cit.,  pp.  609-50. 

hundred  years  had  passed  since  Moldavia  and  Wallachia  were  de- 
prived of  the  privilege — or  rather  the  treaty  right — of  having  native 
governors.  All  this  time  these  provinces  had  been  administered  by 
men  selected  by  the  Sultan  from  among  the  official  aristocratic  class  of 
Greeks  in  Constantinople.    Cf.  supra,  pp.  is  et  seq. 

'Stapleton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  203. 


36  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [36 

some  conciliatory  overtures  to  the  St.  Petersburg  govern- 
ment with  a  view  of  re-establishing  diplomatic  relations 
between  the  two  countries.  In  the  Verona  conference,  in- 
terference in  the  struggle  going  on  between  Turks  and 
Greeks  was  not  even  proposed;  but  the  allies  agreed  to 
urge  the  Porte  to  concede  Russia's  demands  and  thus  restore 
diplomatic  relations  with  the  Tsar.^  Alexander,  however, 
expressed  the  conviction  that  public  opinion  would,  in  time, 
compel  the  British  ministry  to  take  the  condition  of  Greece 
into  consideration;  and  he  suggested  that  the  utmost  extent 
of  his  wishes  would  be  to  see  the  Greeks  placed  on  the  same 
footing  as  the  inhabitants  of  Servia  or  of  Wallachia  and 
Moldavia."  For  some  time  yet  the  one  object  and  aim  of 
English  diplomacy,  and  of  Austrian  also,  was  the  preserva- 
tion of  peace  between  the  Turks  and  the  Russians.  France, 
however,  was  more  anxious  to  aid  the  Greeks.^  Canning's 
main  object  was  to  avert  the  danger  that  "  Russia  would 
swallow  up  Greece  at  one  mouthful  and  Turkey  at  an- 
other." * 

In  the  early  part  of  the  year  1823,  the  Ottoman  govern- 
ment assumed  a  more  defiant  attitude;  and  the  aid  given  to 
the  Greek  cause  by  British  subjects  somewhat  weakened 
the  influence  of  the  English  ambassador  with  the  Sultan's 
government.  Nevertheless,  on  the  demand  of  the  ambassa- 
dor, the  Turkish  ministers  held  a  conference  with  him,  with 
the  result  that  the  Ottoman  government  promised  to  concede 
the  particular  demands  of  Russia  in  respect  to  commerce.^ 
Throughout  all  these  efforts  to  direct  the  action  of  both 
Russia  and  Turkey,  England  and  Austria,  in  particular, 

'  Stapleton,  op.  cit.,  p.  208  et  seq.  "^Ibid.,  p,  213. 

^Debidour,  Histoire  Diplomatique  de  V Europe  (Paris,  1891),  vol.  i, 
pp.  212  et  seq. 

*  Stapleton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  377-  ^Ibid.,  p.  388. 


37]  UP  TO  THE  TREATY  OF  PARIS— 1856  37 

were  most  anxious  to  separate  the  question  of  Russia's 
grievances  against  the  Porte,  in  connection  with  treaty 
rights,  from  the  matter  of  giving  help  to  the  Greeks. 

Russia  obstinately  refused  to  send  an  ambassador  to  Con- 
stantinople until  the  Turkish  troops  were  all  withdrawn 
from  the  Danubian  principalities.  The  Porte  learned,  how- 
ever, through  the  public  prints,  that  Russia  intended  to 
bring  about  the  pacification  of  Greece  also.  This  led  Tur- 
key to  determine,  against  the  most  urgent  advice  of  Aus- 
tria, that  she  would  not  evacuate  the  principalities  until 
some  settlement  should  be  made  including  all  her  subjects 
then  in  revolt.^ 

England  was  now  invited  by  the  Russian  government  to 
take  part  in  a  conference  of  the  Allies  at  St.  Petersburg  on 
the  affairs  of  Greece;  and  in  January,  1824,  a  general 
scheme  for  the  pacification  of  that  territory  was  suggested 
by  Russia.  The  main  proposition  was  that  the  Porte  should 
retain  its  sovereignty  there  and  receive  a  fixed  tribute  but 
should  allow  continental  Greece  to  be  divided  into  three 
principalities  and  should  grant  to  each  a  large  measure  of 
independence.  England  recognized  Russia's  right  by 
treaty,  .if  on  friendly  terms  with  the  Porte,  to  interfere  in 
behalf  of  the  Greeks  and  to  consult  her  allies  in  reference 
to  the  exercise  of  that  right.  But  Russia  had  no  minister 
at  the  Porte  at  this  time,  and  therefore  the  British  cabinet 
could  not  consent  to  take  part  in  discussing  the  above  pro- 
positions without  renouncing  its  former  attitude  (1821- 
22),  which  was  that  the  European  Allies  possessed  no  right 
of  jurisdiction  over  the  internal  affairs  of  a  sovereign  state.^ 
The  plan  adopted  by  the  St.  Petersburg  conference  for  the 

'Stapleton,  op.  ciL,  pp.  397,  401. 

^  Wellington  s  Dispatches,  Correspondence  and  Memoranda  (London, 
1868),  vol.  iii,  p.  157. 


38  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [38 

pacification  of  Greece  was  prematurely  published,  and  deeply 
offended  both  the  Greeks  and  the  Ottomans.^  Under  these 
circumstances,  the  Porte  did  not  hurry  forward  the  restora- 
tion of  the  status  quo  in  the  principalities  of  Wallachia  and 
Moldavia,  and  Russia  accordingly  delayed  sending  a  minis- 
ter with  full  powers  to  Constantinople.  A  little  later  on, 
after  the  Turkish  forces  were  mostly  withdrawn  from  Wal- 
lachia and  Moldavia  (1824),  Russia  put  forth  the  claim  that 
the  civil  status  quo  had  been  a  part  of  the  requirement,  and 
still  refused  to  re-establish  full  diplomatic  relations  with  the 
Sultan's  government.^ 

The  Greeks  now  turned  to  Great  Britain,  and  voted  to 
place  themselves  under  the  protection  of  that  country  (Au- 
gust, 1825)  ;  but  the  English  government  would  only  pro- 
mise to  contribute  its  good  offices  toward  the  termination 
of  the  contest.  Alexander  was  exasperated  by  the  failure 
of  his  allies  to  come  to  an  agreement  with  him  on  an  ef- 
fective plan  for  settling  his  difficulties  with  the  Porte.  This 
was  the  situation  when  the  Tsar  died,  in  December,  1825. 
The  successor,  Nicholas  I,  promptly  announced  his  intention 
to  carry  into  execution  the  last  wishes  and  intentions  "  of 
the  late  emperor.  At  the  same  time,  also,  some  who  had 
been  connected  with  the  government  under  Alexander  de- 
clared that  his  latest  resolve  had  been  upon  immediate  war 
with  Turkey.^  Having  been  solicited  by  the  provisional 
Greek  government  to  mediate  in  behalf  of  the  Greeks,  Mr. 
George  Canning,  England's  Foreign  Secretary,  now  felt 
that  his  government  had  real  grounds  on  which  Greek  af- 

^Debidour,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  217. 

2 Wellington,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  470-82,  531. 

'Joyneville,  Life  and  Times  of  Alexander  I  (London,  1875),  vol.  iii, 
p.  336;  Stapleton,  op.  cit,,  vol.  ii,  p.  468;  Wellington,  Dispatches,  etc.,  c/. 
cit.,  vol.  iii,  pp.  172  et  seq. 


39]  UP  TO  THE  TREATY  OF  PARIS— 1856  39 

fairs  might  be  discussed  with  Russia.  Accordingly,  with 
the  purpose  of  preventing  Russia  from  going  to  war  with 
Turkey,  the  Duke  of  Wellington  was  sent  to  St.  Petersburg 
(February,  1826),  and  was  instructed  to  offer  the  ''single 
intervention  "  of  Great  Britain  between  the  Tsar  and  the 
Sultan,  and  also  between  the  latter  and  the  Greeks.  The 
Duke  found  that  the  Tsar  Nicholas  was  not  much  concerned 
about  the  Greeks,  but  that  he  had  already  determined 
(March,  1826)  to  issue  an  ultimatum  to  the  Porte,  and  to 
require  an  answer  within  a  month.  This  was  to  be  a  per- 
emptory demand  for  the  execution  of  treaties  respecting  the 
Danubian  principalities,  and  for  the  release  of  the  Servian 
deputies,  still  imprisoned  (since  1820)  in  Constantinople.^ 
The  ultimatum  was  to  require,  moreover,  that  Turkish  pleni- 
potentiaries should  be  sent  to  the  Russian  frontier  in  order 
to  settle  the  arrangements  for  executing  the  treaty  of  Bucha- 
rest. Wellington  tried  to  delay  the  sending  of  this  note. 
Failing  in  this  he  finally  made  efforts  to  have  the  time  al- 
lowed for  an  answer  extended,  and  to  have  the  demand  re- 
lating to  the  meeting  of  plenipotentiaries  left  out.^  The  ulti- 
matum was  presented  to  the  Porte  (April,  1826),  six  weeks 
being  now  allowed  to  the  Sultan  in  which  to  return  an  an- 
swer. At  this  juncture,  France  and  Austria  joined  with 
England  in  urging  the  Sultan  to  concede  the  Tsar's  de- 
mands; and  before  the  time  expired,  Turkey  promised  that 
the  three  requirements  would  be  fulfilled.^ 

The  plenipotentiaries  of  the  Sultan  and  of  the  Tsar  met 
(July-October,  1826)  and  concluded  the  treaty  of  Acker- 
man.  ^   The  treaty  of  Bucharest  was  thereby  confirmed, 

^Cf.  supra,  p.  32;  Wellington,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iii,  pp.  179  ei  seq. 
'Wellington,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iii,  pp.  172,  181,  224-33. 
'Stapleton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  479,  494. 
^Menzies,  op.  cit.,  p.  365. 


40  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [40 

and  some  important  stipulations  were  added.  According 
to  the  terms  of  the  new  treaty  the  hospodars  of  Wallachia 
and  Moldavia  were  to  be  elected  for  seven  years,  and  were 
to  be  selected  in  each  province  by  the  General  Assembly  of 
the  nobles.  The  two  governors  thus  chosen  were  to  be  re- 
quired to  take  into  consideration  the  representations  of 
Russian  ministers  on  the  subject  of  taxes,  together  with  the 
maintenance  of  the  privileges  of  the  country."  The  nobles 
who  had  left  during  disturbances  were  to  be  permitted  to 
return  to  their  estates,  and  all  the  inhabitants  were  to  enjoy 
liberty  of  commerce.  A  separate  act,  relating  to  Servia,  set 
forth  the  interpretation  of  Article  VIII  of  the  treaty  of 
Bucharest,  as  held  by  the  Servians  in  181 3;  and  the  Porte 
now  promised  to  settle  the  Servian  demands  in  concert  with 
Servian  deputies  and  to  communicate  the  details  of  the  set- 
tlement to  the  court  of  Russia  within  eighteen  months.^ 

The  treaty  of  Ackerman  temporarily  separated  the  Greek 
question  from  other  matters  that  had  been  in  dispute  be- 
tween Russia  and  Turkey  since  1821.^  But  even  before 
the  Porte  promised  to  satisfy  Russia  in  reference  to  the 
principalities  and  Servia,  in  particular,  the  English  gov- 
ernment had  come  to  an  agreement  with  the  Tsar 
(April  4,  1826)  regarding  the  pacification  of  Greece.^ 
The  Greeks  had  asked  England  to  interpose  with  the  object 
of  bringing  about  a  settlement  of  their  differences  with 
Turkey,  and  hence  Canning  took  the  initiative,  at  this  time, 
in  coming  to  an  understanding  with  Russia.  These  two 
powers  agreed  to  try  mediation;  but  whether  the  recon- 
ciliation should  be  brought  about  by  intervention  in  concert, 
or  separately,  Greece  was  to  be  made  a  dependency  of  Tur- 

^  See  supra,  p.  27. 

^For  the  treaty  of  Ackerman,  see  Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  474. 
^Ibid.,  p.  741. 


41] 


UP  TO  THE  TREATY  OF  PARIS— 1856 


41 


key,  with  an  independent  internal  government.  Neither 
England  nor  Russia  was  to  seek  in  the  settlement  any  terri- 
tory or  any  exclusive  influence.  The  Ottoman  government 
continued,  however,  to  reject  every  offer  of  .  mediation  in 
relation  to  the  Greeks.  France  then  joined  with  England 
and  Russia  in  the  treaty  of  London  (July,  1827).  In  the 
battle  of  Navarino,  as  is  well  known^  the  ships  of  these  allies 
destroyed  the  Turkish  and  Egyptian  fleets  (October),  but 
the  Sultan  now  became  even  more  defiant.  Then  Nicholas 
proposed  more  severe  measures.^  Wellington,  now  Eng- 
land's prime  minister,  was  fearful  of  consequences  and 
pleaded  for  delay  of  hostilities.  But  on  the  twenty-sixth  of 
April,  1828,  in  a  lengthy  declaration  of  war,  accompanied 
with  a  comprehensive  manifesto  accusing  the  Ottoman 
Porte  of  trampling  under  foot  the  Convention  of  Acker- 
man,  and  therewith  all  preceding  treaties,"  Russia  reopened 
the  entire  Eastern  question,  and  moved  her  armies  into 
Turkish  territory.^  Moldavia  and  Wallachia  were  occupied 
(May,  1828)  and  administered  by  Russia;  and  when  the 
Tsar's  army  reached  Adrianople,  the  Porte  asked  for  an 
armistice,  and  on  September  fourteenth,  1829,  the  treaty  of 
Adrianople  was  signed.^ 

The  terms  of  this  treaty  advanced  the  Danubian  provinces 
and  Servia  a  long  way  towards  independence.  Moldavia 
and  Wallachia  were  left  under  the  suzerainty  of  the  Porte, 
but  were  granted  independent  national  governments,  and 
liberty  of  commerce.  The  hospodars  of  these  provinces  were 
to  be  elected  as  before,  but  with  the  term  of  office,  hence- 

^  State  Papers—  British  and  Foreign — vol.  xvii,  p.  30. 

'Wellington,  Dispatches,  Correspondence  and  Memoranda,  vol.  iv, 
pp.  204-5,  273  et  seq.  The  declaration  and  the  manifesto  may  be  found 
in  Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  777. 

'Hertslet,  vol.  ii,  p.  813. 


42 


THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES 


[42 


forth,  for  life.  Turkey  was  required  to  give  up  every  forti- 
fied place  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube.  After  eighteen 
months  no  Moslems  were  to  be  allowed  to  reside  in  these 
two  provinces,  and  none  except  merchants  with  special  per- 
mits were  even  to  visit  that  territory.  Turkey  relinquished 
all  right,  moreover,  to  demand  supplies  of  any  kind  from 
Wallachia  and  Moldavia;  and  payment  of  taxes  was  not  to 
begin  there  until  two  years  after  the  Russians  should  evacu- 
ate the  territory.  Under  some  other  specified  circum- 
stances, these  two  provinces  were  to  pay  definite  sums  to  the 
Porte ;  but  it  was  stipulated  that,  with  the  exception  of  these 
dues,  there  should  never  be  exacted  from  Moldavia  or 
Wallachia,  nor  from  the  hospodars,  any  other  tribute,  con- 
tribution, or  gift,  under  any  pretext  whatever."  Russia 
exacted  from  Turkey  a  war  indemnity,  and  payment  for  the 
losses  of  merchants,  amounting  to  about  $28,000,000;  and 
until  full  payment  should  be  made — to  be  within  ten  years 
— Russia  was  to  continue  her  occupation  of  Moldavia  and 
Wallachia.^ 

It  was  admitted  that  circumstances  had  kept  the  Porte 
from  carrying  out  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  Ackerman 
(1826),  in  reference  to  Servia.  But  now  (1829)  it  was 
stipulated  that  the  six  districts  previously  detached  from 
Servia  must  immediately  become  a  part  of  that  province; 
and  the  Porte  was  to  have  but  one  month  in  which  to  formu- 
late the  regulations  and  issue  the  necessary  orders  for  carry- 
ing into  execution  in  Servia  the  present  stipulations  con- 
firming the  rights  of  that  province,  as  given  in  the  treaty 

^  The  British  Foreign  Office  complained  of  the  excessive  exactions  of 
the  treaty  of  Adrianople,  and  held  that  more  liberal  terms  for  Turkey 
might  well  have  been  expected.  "The  Treaty,"  wrote  the  Earl  of 
Aberdeen  (1829),  ''appears  to  vitally  afifect  the  interests,  the  strength, 
the  dignity,  the  present  safety,  and  the  future  independence  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire."    Parliamentary  Papers  (1854),  vol.  Ixxii,  p.  i. 


43] 


UP  TO  THE  TREATY  OF  PARIS— 1856 


43 


of  Ackerman.  Moreover,  it  was  required  that  within  that 
time  such  regulations  and  orders  should  be  communicated 
to  the  Court  of  Russia.  Within  half  the  time  allowed  the 
Sublime  Porte  issued  to  Servia  the  necessary  Hatti-Sheriff, 
in  which  the  Turkish  governor  and  the  Cadi  of  Belgrade 
were  commanded  to  turn  over  to  the  Servians  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  internal  affairs  of  the  country,  with  the  six 
districts  annexed.  These  officials  were  likewise  instructed  to 
grant  substantially  the  privileges  that  had  been  claimed  by  the 
Servians  in  181 3,  under  the  treaty  of  Bucharest.^  No  Mus- 
sulmans, except  those  left  to  guard  the  fortresses,  were  to  be 
permitted  henceforth  to  reside  in  this  province;  and  as  mer- 
chants, with  their  own  passports,  Servians  were  now  to 
pass,  at  pleasure,  throughout  Turkish  territory. 

SERVIA  FROM  THE  TREATY  OF  ADRIANOPLE  TO  THE  TREATY 

OF  PARIS  1829-1856 

Within,  a  year  following  the  making  of  the  treaty  of 
Adrianople,  and  after  full  consultation  with  Servian  deputies 
at  Constantinople,  the  Sultan  issued  a  firman,  which  was 
ostensibly  intended  to  insure  to  the  Servian  nation  the 
"  inviolabil'ty  and  stability  "  of  all  the  privileges  heretofore 
granted  to  that  province.^    In  keeping  with  the  request  of 

*The  Pasha,  or  governor  of  Belgrade,  was  the  Sultan's  representa- 
tive, charged  with  the  duty  of  administering  the  province.  After  the 
Servian  uprising  in  1804,  however,  the  jurisdiction  of  that  official  was 
cut  down  more  and  more,  until,  by  the  withdrawal  of  the  last  of  the 
Turks  in  1867,  he  was  left  without  any  place  in  Servia.  The  Cadi  for 
Kadi),  in  Turkey,  is  a  town  or  village  magistrate,  who  administers  the 
religious  law,  under  the  Sheik-ul-Islam — the  Sultan's  representative  for 
the  realm  in  religious  matters.  Since  the  religious  law  of  the  Moham- 
medans (the  Sheri)  is  extended  so  as  to  apply  to  nearly  all  the  activities 
of  Moslems,  as  well  as  to  questions  relating  to  real  property  in  Turkey, 
the  Sheik-ul-Islam  and  his  subordinates  exercise  very  important  legal 
as  well  as  ecclesiastical  functions.  For  the  text  of  this  Imperial  mandate 
(Hatti-Sheriff),  see  Hertslet,  op  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  832. 

^ Ibid.,  p.  842.    A  firman  is  an  edict  of  the  Turkish  government,  and 


44 


THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES 


[44 


the  people,  Milosh  Obrenovitch  was  to  continue  to  be  the 
prince,  that  dignity  now  being  made  hereditary  in  the 
Obrenovitch  family.  Prince  Milosh  was  instructed  by  the 
Sultan  to  rule  in  the  name  of  the  Sublime  Porte,  and  to 
administer  the  internal  affairs  of  the  country,  in  concert 
with  the  Council  and  the  Assembly  of  the  chiefs  and  elders 
of  the  nation.  The  authorities  of  the  Porte  in  Servia  (the 
Governor  and  the  Cadi)  were  now  commanded  by  the  Sultan 
not  to  interfere  in  the  affairs  of  the  country,  and  not  to 
exact  the  smallest  amount  (even  i/io  of  one  cent)  beyond 
the  permanently  fixed  tribute.  A  number  of  other  privileges 
were  likewise  granted  to  the  Servians,  such  as  the  right  to 
establish  printing  offices,  post  offices,  hospitals,  schools,  etc. ; 
and  the  metropolitan  and  bishops  that  the  Servians  should 
appoint,  were  to  be  confirmed  by  the  Patriarch  of  Constanti- 
nople, without  their  being  obliged  to  go  to  the  capital  of 
the  empire  for  confirmation.  This  privilege  of  electing 
metropolitans  and  bishops  from  their  own  nation,  was 
looked  upon  by  the  Servians  as  a  special  blessing;  and  it  was 
enacted  that  the  bishops  should  now  receive  a  fixed  salary 
from  the  public  treasury.^  Turkish  and  Russian  commis- 
sioners traveled  over  Servia  at  this  time  for  the  purpose 
of  settling  its  boundaries.  When  their  report  was  ready 
(1833),  the  Sultan  issued  another  firman  ordering  the 
boundary  to  be  fixed  in  accordance  with  the  maps  and  in- 
formation furnished,  and  also  allowing  the  Turks  five  years 
more  in  which  to  sell  their  estates  and  leave  Servia.^  (Mus- 

may  be  signed  by  a  Minister  of  State;  while  a  Hatti-Sheriff  is  in  the 
nature  of  an  irrevokable  order  or  decree  signed  by  the  Sultan. 
^Ranke,  op.  cit.,  ch.  xx. 

*Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  929.  Thirty  years  later  this  last  part  of 
the  firman  had  not  been  carried  out,  and  an  armed  struggle  between  the 
two  races  then  led  to  all  Mussulmans  being  withdrawn  from  Servia.  Cf. 
infra,  ch.  ii,  p.  77. 


45]  UP  TO  THE  TREATY  OF  PARIS— 1856  45 

sulmans  in  the  fortresses  and  in  the  city  of  Belgrade  were 
to  be  permitted  to  remain). 

The  relations  between  the  Servians  and  the  Ottomans, 
as  now  adjusted  left  little  cause  for  further  agitation  in 
Servia,  at  the  moment,  against  the  Turks.  But  some  of 
Milosh's  staff  of  officials  were  again  displeased  with  his  ex- 
treme monarchial  tendencies.  He  failed  tO'  respect  the 
private  rights  of  his  people,  and  he  soon  appeared  to  con- 
sider inferior  officers  as  so  many  servants,  with  no  other 
duty  than  to  dO'  his  bidding.  He  spared  the  peasants  many 
hardships,  however,  for  he  resolutely  refused  to  distribute 
fiefs  and  thus  to  create  a  class  of  overbearing  landlords. 
But  early  in  1835,  the  opposition  to  him  became  more  ag- 
gressive, and  was  found  toi  be  sO'  well  organized  that  the 
prince  promised  to  allow  some  limit  to  his  personal  rule.  A 
charter  was  accordingly  drawn  up  and  duly  accepted  by 
Servians ;  but  the  Porte,  and  some  of  the  other  powers, 
would  not  permit  the  operation  of  anything  like  a  constitu- 
tion granted  under  the  pressure  of  a  popular  uprising.  In 
accordance  with  the  wish  of  the  Sultan,  Milosh  now  visited 
Constantinople,  and  soon  after  his  return  his  official  Gazette 
announced  that  the  people  were  happy  in  having  the  Prince 
as  their  master.  Meanwhile,  his  monopoly  of  trade  grew 
more  and  more  extensive;  and  those  who  had  opposed  him 
were  now  sorely  persecuted.  Russia  warned  him,  and  the 
Sultan  required  him  to  send  a  deputation  to  Constantinople 
(1837).  These  deputies  and  the  Porte,  with  the  Russian 
court  in  full  accord,  were  not  long  in  preparing  for  Milosh 
and  his  people  a  charter  that  was  very  similar  to  the  con- 
stitutions of  Western  states.  Strangely  enough,  the  abso- 
lute monarchies  favored  this  constitution,  with  its  limita- 
tions on  the  authority  of  the  prince,  while  France  and  Eng- 
land opposed  the  grant  of  so  much  liberty  to  a  people  not 
yet  ready,  it  was  argued,  for  self-government. 


46  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [46 

Under  this  new  constitution  a  senate  of  seventeen  life 
members  was  created,  together  with  courts  and  a  central 
administration  made  up  of  four  officers,  who  were  to  preside 
respectively  over  foreign  affairs,  home  affairs,  finance,  and 
justice  and  education.  All  details  were  carefully  worked 
out,  and  it  may  be  said  that  the  constitution  of  1838  repre- 
sents an  excellent  system  of  checks  and  balances/  The 
senate  of  seventeen  members  could  exercise  so  much  au- 
thority, however,  that  Milosh,  in  his  disappointment  at  the 
loss  of  supreme  leadership,  early  convinced  some  of  his 
people  that  they  would  now  be  obliged  to  satisfy  seventeen 
masters.  A  half-hearted  revolt  in  favor  of  the  prince  was 
soon  suppressed ;  and  when  Milosh  would  not  consent  to  any 
division  of  authority,  he  was  told  by  his  rivals  that  he  must 
leave.  He  resigned  (June,  1839)  in  favor  of  his  son  and 
left  his  country.  The  eldest  son,  Milan,  was  already  too 
ill  to  take  the  exiled  father's  place,  and  he  died  without 
knowing  that  he  was  really  at  the  head  of  the  government. 
Michael,  a  younger  son,  was  then  elected,  and  as  he  was  but 
seventeen  years  of  age,  the  Porte  appointed  two  native  chiefs 
to  be  his  official  counselors.  With  the  support  of  his 
people,  Michael  rejected  these  counselors;  but  it  was  not 
long  before  he  too  fell  into  disfavor  with  some  of  the  native 
leaders,  who  accused  him,  among  other  things,  of  giving  too 
many  places  in  the  government  to  Austrian-Seryians.^ 

The  leaders  of  the  opposition  among  the  Servians  soon 
joined  with  the  Turks,  who  were  displeased  because  the 
prince  and  his  party  rejected  the  counsel  of  the  Sultan's 
appointees,  and  Prince  Michael  also  was  obliged  to  abdicate 
and  to  leave  his  country  (August,  1842).    The  Skupschtina 

^Hertslet,  op.  cii.,  vol.  i,  p.  968. 

'Ranke,  op.  cit.,  ch.  xxiii.  Several  of  the  Servian  leaders  were  very 
anxious  for  the  restoration  of  Milosh. 


47]  UP  TO  THE  TREATY  OF  PARIS— 1856  47 

then  promptly  elected  Alexander,  son  of  Kara  George,  to 
fill  the  vacancy.  Russia  would  not  permit  this  change  to 
be  made,  however,  as  a  result  of  revolution,  and  demanded 
a  new  election,  together  with  the  deposition  of  the  Pasha 
of  Belgrade  and  the  exile  of  the  two  counselors  who  had 
been  leaders  in  the  opposition  to  the  late  prince.  Austria 
agreed  with  Russia  that  the  concerns  of  Servia  did  not  fall 
within  the  discussion  of  the  five  powers;  so  the  Porte  and 
Servia  carried  out  the  requirements  of  the  Russian  court, 
and  Alexander  was  then  regularly  elected  (June,  1843).^ 
The  movement  thus  culminated  in  the  restoration  of  the 
Karageorgevich  dynasty. 

After  these  changes,  Servia  passed  through  a  period  of 
comparative  quiet  down  to  the  Crimean  War,  and  details 
may  well  be  passed  over.^ 

THE   DANUBIAN    PRINCIPALITIES         FROM    THE   TREATY  OF 

ADRIANOPLE  TO  THE  CRIMEAN  WAR  1829-1855 

The  treaty  of  Adrianople  left  Wallachia  and  Moldavia 
temporarily,  as  will  be  remembered,  in  the  possession  of 
Russia.^  The  Tsar's  government  continued  to  occupy  and 
administer  these  provinces  for  about  six  years,  and  during 
that  time  a  constitution,  commonly  called  the  Reglement 
Organique,  was  framed  for  the  government  of  the  two  prin- 
cipalities (1831).*  Unlike  the  conditions  in  Servia,  these 
provinces  had  two  quite  distinct  classes,  the  peasants  and 
the  so-called  nobles.  The  Reglement  Organique  placed  the 
government  in  the  keeping  of  the  nobles  and  the  hospodars 

'  Russia,  Prussia,  Austria,  England  and  France — Metternich's  "Moral 
Pentarchy,"  formed  in  1818.    Cf.  supra,  p.  31. 

'  Ranke,  op.  cit.,  pp.  383  et  seg.  Cf.  Minchin,  Growth  of  Freedom  in 
the  Balkan  Peninsula  (London,  1886),  ch.  iv. 

Supra,  p.  42, 

*Filitti,  Les  Principautis  roumaines  sous  V occupation  russe  (Bucca- 
rest,  1904),  pp.  81  et  seq. 


48  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [48 

for  life  whom  they  should  elect.  The  common  people 
shared  in  the  affairs  of  their  country  simply  by  paying 
taxes.  However,  under  Russian  occupation,  sanitation  was 
greatly  improved,  and  tribunals  were  created  in  order  to 
secure  a  regime  of  justice  between  man  and  man.  In  the 
treaty  of  Adrianople,  the  Porte  had  agreed  to  confirm  the 
administrative  regulations  which  might  be  made  in  these 
principalities  while  they  were  occupied  by  Russian  garri- 
sons.^ Accordingly,  when  Russia  evacuated  the  two  pro- 
vinces (1834)  the  Reglement  Organique  was  formally  re- 
cognized by  Turkey  as  the  constitution  of  Wallachia  and 
Moldavia.  The  boundaries  and  the  amount  of  tribute  to 
be  paid  to  the  Porte  were  also  definitely  specified.^  A  few 
months  later  the  Sultan  issued  a  Hatti-Sheriff  guaranteeing 
the  territory  against  incursions  from  the  Turkish  side,  and 
giving  the  hospodars  the  right  to  regulate  freely  the  in- 
ternal affairs  of  the  two  provinces. 

A  national  spirit  was  already  manifest  there  in  the  move- 
ment for  schools,  and  for  the  study  of  art  and  other  branches. 
The  hospodars  and  the  nobles  did  not  work  together  har- 
moniously, however,  and  the  European  revolutionary  move- 
ment of  1848  found  parties  in  these  principalities,  also,  ready 
for  revolt.  Jealousies  there  among  the  nobles,  together 
with  the  desire  for  freedom  from  Russian  interference,  and 
the  wish  for  full  political  equality,  were  the  underlying 
causes  of  the  outbreak.  Both  Russia  and  Turkey  promptly 
sent  armies  into  these  provinces  and  quickly  restored  order. 
In  the  treaty  that  followed  (Balta-Liman,  May,  1849), 
Russia  and  the  Porte  set  aside  some  portions  of  the  organic 
statute  of  1 83 1,  and  now  appointed  hospodars,  not  for  life, 
but  for  a  term  of  seven  years.    The  two  countries  likewise 


^Hertslet,  op.  ciL,  vol.  ii,  p.  827. 
'/did.,  p.  936. 


49]  ™^  TREATY  OF  PARIS— 1856  49 

continued  the  suspension  of  the  regular  Assemblies,  and 
sent  a  special  commissioner  from  each  Court  to  watch  over 
the  progress  of  affairs  there,  and  to  choose  a  commission  of 
the  most  reputable  nobles  to  revise  the  constitution.^  This 
agreement  between  Russia  and  Turkey  was  for  a  term  of 
seven  years,  and  in  the  meantime  each  country  was  to  keep 
in  the  province,  or  near  by,  a  sufficient  number  of  troops 
to  maintain  order  and  security  in  that  territory.  But  before 
the  seven  years  elapsed,  however,  the  Crimean  War  began, 
and  the  whole  situation  was  changed.^ 

MONTENEGRO  UP  TO  THE  CRIMEAN  WAR  1853 

The  latter  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  began  with  a 
series  of  events  in  southeastern  Europe,  which  opened  the 
way  for  still  another  group  of  the  Sultan's  people  to  steer 
toward  statehood.  Either  because  of  the  independent  at- 
titude of  the  Montenegrins,  or  because  of  their  predatory 
practices,  in  1852  the  Porte  sent  an  army  against  them. 
On  the  plea  of  avoiding  the  danger  of  consequent  uprisings 
in  her  own  neighboring  territory,  and  supported  by  Russia, 
Austria  promptly  demanded  and  procured  the  withdrawal 
of  the  Turkish  forces  from  Montenegro.^ 

The  resolute  resistance  of  the  Montenegrins,  together 
with  the  inaccessible  nature  of  their  country  and  the  sup- 
port of  the  Russians,  coupled  with  the  general  confusion  in 
Ottoman  affairs,  had  enabled  that  little  group  of  mountain- 
eers to  withstand,  for  centuries,  the  many  attempted  in- 
vasions of  the  sultans,  and  to  maintain  throughout  their  his- 
tory a  large  degree  of  liberty.'^    When  the  Turks  overran  a 

'  Hertslet,  op.  cii.,  p.  390.  '  Menzies,  op.  cit.,  pp.  389-90. 

'  Denton,  Montenegro — lis  People  and  Their  History  (London,  1877), 
pp.  278-81. 

*FrilIey  &  Wlahovitj,  Le  Montinigro  Contemporain  (Paris,  1876), 
Introduction. 


50  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [50 

part  of  the  Balkan  peninsula  in  the  fifteenth  century,  some 
of  the  Servians  found  a  safe  retreat  on  the  western  slope 
of  the  Black  Mountain  (called  by  Venetians,  Montenegro)/ 
The  extent  of  their  territory  was  only  something  like  sixty 
by  thirty  miles  —  sometimes  more  and  sometimes  less. 
From  15 16  to  185 1  they  lived  as  a  democracy  of  warriors, 
under  the  leadership  of  Vladikas,  or  prince-bishops."  It 
is  said  that  down  to  1800,  these  people  had  withstood 
attacks  by  Turkish  armies  in  more  than  forty  systematic 
campaigns/  In  171 1  they  declared  themselves  subjects  of 
Peter  the  Great,  and  from  that  time  on,  Russia  assumed 
toward  them  the  attitude  of  a  protector,  often  aiding  them, 
especially  with  money  and  counsel/ 

THE  CRIMEAN  WAR  AND  SOME  OF  ITS  IMMEDIATE  CONSE- 
QUENCES 1853-1856 

The  Roman  Catholics  at  Jerusalem  complained  that  the 
ecclesiastics  of  the  Orthodox  Greek  church  there  had 
usurped  some  of  the  Holy  Places  which  a  century  earlier 
had  belonged  to  the  Latins.  The  exclusive  guardianship, 
it  was  claimed,  of  certain  chapels  which  enshrined  the 
monuments  of  some  of  the  crusaders  had,  in  course  of  time, 
passed  from  the  Latins  to  the  Greeks;  and  it  was  charged 
by  the  Latins  that  these  chapels  and  monuments  had  been 
allowed  to  fall  into  a  lamentable  state  of  decay.  The 
Latins  expressed  their  anxiety  to  make  the  needed  repairs, 
and,  among  other  things,  they  asked  for  the  vindication 
of  their  right  to  the  possession  of  these  chapels.    The  claims 

*  Freeman,  Historical  Geography  of  Europe,  p.  428. 
'Odysseus,  Turkey  in  Europe,  p.  276. 
^Edinburgh  Review,  vol.  109,  p.  461. 

*  Wilkinson,  op.  cit.,  pp.  429,  482;  Ranke,  op.  cit.,  p.  215;  DeTesta, 
op.  cit.,  vol.  X,  p.  373. 


5i]  UP  TO  THE  TREATY  OF  PARIS— 1856  51 

of  the  Roman  Catholics  were  based  on  some  stipulations  in 
a  treaty  between  France  and  Turkey  (1740),  and  hence 
France  took  the  lead  (1850)  in  supporting  the  demands 
of  the  Latins.  The  Tsar  of  Russia  very  promptly  made 
his  influence  felt  at  the  Porte,  also,  "in  behalf  of  his  co- 
religionists— the  Greeks — and  he  soon  demanded  the  main- 
tenance of  the  status  quo  in  respect  to  the  Holy  Places. 

So  it  came  about  that  while  Austria  was  forcing  the 
Sultan  to  abandon  the  attempt  to  punish  the  Montenegrins 
(1852-3),  Russia  was  insisting  that  he  should  pronounce 
a  verdict  favoring  a  continuance  of  all  the  privileges  here- 
tofore possessed,  at  Jerusalem,  by  the  Greek  Church.  Both 
France  and  Russia  persistently  pressed  the  Constantinople 
government  for  a  settlement ;  and  the  Sultan  found  him- 
self face  to  face  with  the  unpleasant  necessity  of  reconcil- 
ing the  rival  claims  of  the  two  Churches,  as  well  as  the  con- 
flicting demands  of  the  two  great  powers.  Finally,  in  1852, 
the  Sultan  issued  a  firman  providing  for  a  settlement  in  the 
form  of  a  compromise.  But  the  concessions  thereby  made 
to  the  Greeks  and  the  Latins  were  soon  found  to  overlap. 
Nevertheless,  both  France  and  Russia  threatened  demon- 
strations against  Turkey  unless  the  conflicting  grants  were 
carried  into  effect  without  delay.'  Unremitting  diplomatic 
efYorts  were  kept  up,  however,  especially  on  the  part  of 
England,  and  by  the  end  of  April,  1853,  the  Sultan  issued 
another  firman  whereby  the  contradictory  concessions  were 
satisfactorily  adjusted.^ 

But  Russia  had  already  (March  16  and  April  19)  re- 
quested from  the  Sultan  a  written  Act  that  would  afford  the 
government  of  the  Tsar  "  solid  and  inviolable  pledges," 
that,  in  the  future,  the  Porte  would  protect  the  privileges 
and  the  immunities  of  the  Orthodox  Eastern  church  and  its 

^  Parliamentary  Papers ,  1854,  vol.  Ixxv,  pp.  i  et  seq.     Ibid.,  p.  183. 


52  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [52 

clergy/  The  Sultan's  government  hesitated  about  the 
matter  of  pledges  for  the  future.  So  within  a  few  days 
after  the  privileges  of  the  Greeks  and  Latins  at  Jerusalem 
had  been  harmonized,  the  Tsar's  envoy  to  the  Porte,  Prince 
Menchikoff,  demanded  that  within  five  days  an  answer 
should  be  given  to  Russia's  request  for  guarantees."  Great 
Britain  held  that  such  a  guarantee  as  was  demanded  would 
"  extend  the  religious  influence,  and  by  that  means  the 
political  power,  of  Russia,  in  Turkey,"  and  determined  that 
the  Tsar  should  not  receive  from  the  Sultan  any  such 
pledges  for  the  future.^ 

Russia  contended,  now,  that  she  was  not  demanding  a 
recognition  of  her  right  to  protect  the  Christian  subjects  of 
the  Ottoman  empire,  but  that  the  requirement  was  merely 
a  pledge  for  the  future  maintenance,  by  the  Sultan,  of  the 
religious  status  quo  of  the  Greek  Church  in  Turkey.  The 
Tsar  professed  tO'  feel  bound  in  honor  to-  require,  as  a  final 
demand,  a  simple  note,"  as  "  reparation  for  the  past  and  a 
guarantee  for  the  future."  When,  after  much  urging,  it  was 
seen  that  the  "  simple  note  "  was  not  forthcoming,  the  Rus- 
sian embassy  was  recalled  from  Constantinople,  and  Russian 
troops  were  sent  tO'  occupy  and  hold  Moldavia  and  Walla- 
chia,  as  a  pledge  for  the  desired  guarantee  (July,  1853).* 
The  hospodars  departed,  leaving  the  two  provinces  in  the 
hands  of  the  Russian  generals.  The  Turkish  declaration 
of  war  (October)  was  followed  by  that  of  Russia  (Novem- 
ber), and  several  battles  ensued  in  these  principalities.  The 
next  March  (1854),  England  and  France  called  on  Russia 
to  evacuate  the  two  provinces ;  and  when  the  Tsar  refused 
to  answer  their  communication,  the  two  states,  as  the  allies  of 

^Parliamentary  Papers,  1854,  vol.  Ixxv,  pp.  160,  174.    ^ Ibid.,  p.  182. 
^Ibid,,  p.  179;  Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  87. 
Parliamentary  Papers ,  (1854),  vol.  Ixxi,  pp.  209,  233,  243. 


53]  UP  TO  THE  TREATY  OF  PARIS— 1856  53 

Turkey,  began  active  operations  against  the  Russians.  Austria 
and  Prussia  were  trying  to  avoid  participation  in  the  war, 
but  becoming  alarmed  by  the  continued  nearness  of  Russian 
troops  in  Moldavia  and  Wallachia,  these  two  states  formed 
an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  (April,  1854),  and  also 
summoned  the  Tsar  to  evacuate  the  two  provinces  (June 
3).^  Austria  then  entered  into  an  agreement  with  the  Porte 
(June  14),  providing  for  Austrian  occupation  of  Walla- 
chia and  Moldavia,  until  peace  should  be  declared.  During 
the  period  of  such  occupation,  however,  the  local  authorities 
in  the  principalities  were  to  be  free  to  govern  in  accordance 
with  rights  and  privileges  previously  granted  by  Turkey. 

The  Servians  had  watched  the  warlike  preparations  in 
Austria,  and  becoming  suspicious  that  there  might  be  de- 
signs of  invading  their  territory,  they  addressed  a  strong 
protest  to  the  Porte,  and  promised  to  answer  for  the  main- 
tenance of  tranquillity  and  public  order  in  their  country 
( April). ^  In  December  (1854),  Austria,  France  and  Eng- 
land entered  into  an  alliance  for  concerted  action  in  refer- 
ence to  possible  terms  of  peace  with  Russia,  and  the  occu- 
pation.of  Moldavia  and  Wallachia  by  Austrian  troops.  The 
sovereigns  of  these  three  states  promised  to  each  other,  in 
the  same  connection,  that  they  would  join  in  an  offensive  and 
defensive  alliance  in  case  hostilities  should  break  out,  during 
the  war,  between  Austria  and  Russia,  The  treaty  was  ac- 
ceded to  by  Sardinia,  in  March,  1855.^ 

The  death  of  Nicholas  I  (March  2,  1854)  and  the  acces- 
sion O'f  Alexander  II,  together  with  the  extended  efforts  of 
the  warring  powers  to  agree  on  terms  of  peace,  did  not 
have  much  bearing  on  the  struggle  that  followed.  It  was 
not  until  after  the  inexpressible  suffering  and  the  bloody 


'  Hertslet,  op.  ciL,  vol.  ii,  p.  1201. 
'  /did.,  p.  1 196. 


^  Ibid.,  p.  1221. 


54  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [54 

campaigns  in  the  Crimea,  that  the  Tsar  bowed  tO'  the  in- 
evitable, and  in  the  treaty  of  Paris  (March,  1856)  joined 
in  the  total  annihilation  of  all  the  exclusive  rights  which  his 
predecessors,  in  the  struggles  of  three-quarters  of  a  century, 
had  wrung  from  the  sultans. 

Not  long  after  the  beginning  of  this  contest,  England, 
Austria  and  France  declared  (December,  1854)  that  the 
erroneous  interpretation  of  the  treaty  of  Koutchouk-Kain- 
ardji  (1774)  had  been  the  principal  cause  of  the  war;  and, 
at  the  same  time,  these  powers  determined  that  Russia  must 
"  renounce  the  pretention  to  take  under  an  official  protec- 
torate "  the  Sultan's  Christian  subjects  (Orthodox  Greeks), 
and  must  also  renounce  the  revival  of  any  of  the  articles 
of  her  former  treaties  "  with  Turkey,  relating  to  Moldavia, 
Wallachia,  or  Servia/  The  treaty  of  Paris  (1856)  satisfied 
these  demands.  Thus  it  was  that  the  exclusive  Russian  pro- 
tectorate over  the  Sultan's  Christian  provinces  and  the 
Greek  Church  in  Turkey,  was  outlawed. 

Whatever  ambitions  may  have  been  cherished  by  Russia's 
rulers — from  Peter  the  Great  on — for  more  than  half  a  cen- 
tury, by  encouraging  and  in  a  large  measure  supporting  and 
directing  the  efforts  of  groups  of  co-religionists  in  Turkey, 
that  nation  had  helped  these  peoples  to  secure  the  privileges 
and  the  right  of  internal  self-government.^  Happily,  the 
interdiction  now  of  Russian  interference  in  the  Ottoman 
empire  could  not  bring  about  the  obliteration  of  what  Rus- 
sian diplomacy  and  Russian  armies  had  helped  to  establish 
in  the  Danubian  principalities,  in  Servia,  and  in  Montenegro. 
Hopes  and  aspirations  had  been  awakened  in  these  provinces, 
looking  toward  a  still  more  distinctively  national  life  there. 
Nevertheless,  the  powers  were  content  to  do  little  more  than 


^  Hertslet,  op.  cii.,  vol.  ii,  p.  1225. 
^Parliamentary  Papers  (1854),  vol.  Ixxi,  p.  845. 


55] 


UP  TO  THE  TREATY  OF  PARIS— 1856 


55 


to  stipulate  in  the  treaty  of  1856  that  Wallachia,  Moldavia, 
and  Servia  were  to  continue  tO'  enjoy  such  "  rights  and  im- 
munities "  as  they  already  possessed.  Pledges  were  also 
given  foT  the  preservation  in  these  provinces  of  independent 
and  national  administrations,  as  well  as  full  liberty  of  wor- 
ship, oi  legislation,  of  commerce,  and  of  navigation;  and 
there  was  to  be  no  intervention  without  the  previous  agree- 
ment of  the  contracting  powers/  A  part  of  Bessarabia 
was  taken  from  Russia  and  annexed  to  Moldavia,  and  pro- 
vision was  made  for  a  commission  charged  with  the  duty 
of  investigating  the  state  of  the  Danubian  principalities  and 
of  revising  their  laws  and  statutes.  All  the  rights  and  privi- 
leges of  the  three  provinces — Wallachia,  Moldavia  and 
Servia — were  placed,  by  the  treaty,  under  the  guarantee, 
henceforward,  of  the  contracting  powers.^ 

While  Montenegro  was  not  mentioned  in  this  treaty,  it 
is  significant  that  in  the  protocol  oi  one  of  the  co^nferences 
resulting  in  its  formulation  (March  25),  the  Sultan's  pleni- 
potentiary reiterated  Turkey's  claim  tO'  that  province  as  an 
integral  part  of  the  Ottoman  empire,  and  declared  that  the 
Porte  had  no  intention  of  changing  the  status  quo  there. 
At  the  same  time,  also,  Russia  gave  assurances  that  she  did 
not  claim  any  exclusively  political  relations  with  the  Mon- 
tenegrins.^ 

^  England,  Russia,  Austria,  France,  Prussia,  Sardinia  and  Turkey. 
For  the  general  treaty  of  peace  (Paris,  March  30,  1856),  see  Hertslet, 
vol.  ii,  p.  1250.    The  Bessarabian  territory  taken  from  Russia  was  taken 
away  from  Roumania  (united  Moldavia  and  Wallachia)   by  the  Euro- 
pean powers  in  1878  and  restored  to  Russia. 

^  State  Papers,  op.  cit.,  vol.  xlvi,  pp.  102,  104. 


CHAPTER  II 


The  Balkan  Provinces  under  the  Protection  of  the 
European  Concert — 1856-1870 

Well  might  the  treaty  of  Paris  (1856)  have  seemed  to 
inaugurate  a  new  regime  in  relation  to  the  affairs  of  the 
Ottoman  empire.  For  the  first  time  in  its  history  that  em- 
pire was  now  recognized  as  forming  a  component  part  of 
the  great  European  system,  and  the  SubHme  Porte  was 
formally  "  admitted  to  participate  in  the  advantages  of  the 
Public  Law  and  System  (Concert)  of  Europe."  ^ 

In  the  famous  Hatti-Humayoun  (famous  though  futile) 
of  February  18,  1856,  the  Sultan  confirmed  all  the  privi- 
leges and  immunities  heretofore  granted  tO'  his  non-Mussul- 
man communities,  and  promised  equal  rights  to  all  subjects, 
irrespective  of  race,  religion  or  language.^  Provision  was 
also  made  in  this  imperial  decree  for  needed  reforms  along 
various  other  lines;  and  we  may  discern  in  the  firman  the 
expression,  at  least,  of  a  feeling  that  the  empire  had  now 
been  raised  to  a  higher  dignity,  and  had  entered  upon  a  new 
era. 

The  formulation  and  the  promulgation  of  this  definite  and 
comprehensive  Imperial  edict  was  largely  due  to  the  untiring 
efforts  of  Stratford  Canning  (Viscount  Stratford  de  Rad- 
cliffe).  For  sixteen  years  (1842-58),  as  England's  am- 
bassador at  Constantinople,  he  kept  up  "  active  and  friendly 

^ Peace  of  Paris  (1856),  Art.  vii;  Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  1254. 

^Jbid.,  vol.  ii,  p.  1243. 

56  [56 


UNDER  PROTECTION  OF  EUROPEAN  CONCERT  57 

intervention  "  with  the  Porte,  in  order  to  bring  about  from , 
within  the  reform  of  the  Ottoman  empire.^ 

Mr.  Canning  felt  very  keenly,  however,  that  unless  some 
"  force  from  without  "  should  "  keep  up  a  steady  animating 
pressure "  on  the  Turkish  authorities,  this  great  Charter 
of  Reforms  would  be  merely  "  a  lifeless  paper,  valuable  only 
as  a  record  of  sound  principles."  ^  He  tried  to  induce  the 
London  government  to  protest  against  placing  in  the  treaty 
any  promises  or  guarantees  that  would  lead  to  the  conclusion 
among  Ottoman  authorities  that  the  Sultan  was  thereby 
rendered  unquestionably  secure  in  the  possession  of  his 
dominions  and  in  the  exercise  of  absolute  sovereignty.  All 
his  efforts  in  that  direction,  however,  were  unavailing.  The 
powers  that  had  conquered  Russia  were  already  committed 
to  that  policy;  and  such  promises  and  guarantees  were  em- 
bodied in  the  treaty  of  Paris  as  would  naturally  ins2ire,  at 
the  Porte,  an  implicit  confidence  that  the  integrity  and  the 
independence  of  the  empire  had  now  become  inviolable.^ 

Although  the  treaty  of  Paris  lacks  any  specific  guarantee 
that  the  signatories  would  defend  the  independence  and  ter- 
ritorial integrity  of  the  Turkish  empire,  still  there  is  in  it 
engagements  and  guarantees  that  might  well  have  seemed 
to  free  the  Porte  from  all  danger  in  this  connection,  because 
of  coercion  from  without.^  Each  of  the  contracting  parties 
guaranteed  the  strict  observance  of  its  engagement  to  re- 
spect the  independence  and  territorial  integrity  of  the  Otto- 
man empire,  and  any  violation  of  the  engagement  was  to 
be  considered  a  "  question  of  general  interest."  Moreover, 

'Lane-Pool,  Life  of  Stratford  Camming,  vol.  ii,  ch.  xxii. 
'Lane-Pool,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  437. 
Annual  Register  (London,  1858),  p.  183. 

*  Moore,  International  Law  Digest  (Washington,  1896),  vol.  i,  p.  20; 
Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  1281. 


58  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [58 

it  was  agreed  that  no  one  or  more  of  the  signatories  should 
use  force  against  the  Porte  without  first  giving  the  others 
an  opportunity  for  mediation.  Also,  in  recognizing  the  high 
value  of  the  Sultan's  communication  to  the  powers  (the 
Hatti-Humayoun  of  February  18,  1856),  decreeing  radical 
reforms,  and  recording  the  Sultan's  generous  intentions 
toward  the  Christian  population  of  his  empire,"  it  was  ex- 
pressly agreed  that  in  no  case  could  the  communication  of 
this  edict  give  to  the  powers  the  "  right  to  interfere,  either 
collectively  or  separately,  in  the  relations  of  the  Sultan  with 
his  subjects,  or  in  the  internal  administration  of  his  em- 
pire." ^  Moreover,  among  other  precautionary  measures, 
the  treaty  neutralized  the  Black  Sea,  closed  the  Dardanelles 
and  the  Bosphorus  to  foreign  ships  of  war  while  the  Porte 
was  at  peace,  and  provided  for  the  free  navigation  of  the 
Danube,  under  an  international  commission  for  improving 
and  regulating  the  navigation  of  that  river.^  Then,  also, 
before  the  ratifications  of  the  treaty  of  Paris  were  ex- 
changed (April  27,  1856),  Great  Britain,  France  and  Aus- 
tria signed  a  treaty  of  alliance  (April  15,  1856),  guaran- 
teeing, jointly  and  severally,  the  independence  and  integrity 
of  the  Ottoman  Empire  recorded  in  the  treaty  of  Paris,  and 
agreeing  to  consider  any  infraction  of  the  latter  treaty  as  a 
casus  belli 

The  treaty  of  Paris  was  a  somewhat  carefully  devised 
system  of  checks  and  balances,  with  the  primary  purpose,  it 
would  appear,  of  providing  for  the  peace  and  the  perpetuity 
of  the  Ottoman  empire.*    In  general,  the  privileges  of  four 

^Treaty  of  Paris  (1856),  arts,  vi,  ix. 

'Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  1251;  Holland,  The  European  Concert 
in  the  Eastern  Question  (Oxford,  1885),  p.  249. 
'Hertslet,  vol.  ii,  p.  1280. 

*Ibid.,  vol.  ii,  p.  1251.  See  especially  the  preamble  and  article  i  of 
the  treaty  of  Paris. 


59]      UNDER  PROTECTION  OF  EUROPEAN  CONCERT  59 


parties  are  noted  in  the  treaty:  the  Ottoman  empire  (politi- 
cally and  territorially)  ;  the  contracting  powers;  the  autono- 
mous provinces;  and  all  non-Moslem  (but  in  particular  the 
Christians)  subjects  of  the  empire.  Of  these  four  parties, 
the  provinces  seem  to  have  been  the  least  limited  by  either 
legal  or  circumstantial  restrictions.  It  is  true  that  the  sig- 
natories guaranteed  to  these  provinces  only  such  privileges 
and  immunities  as  they  already  possessed;  but  at  the  same 
time  the  Porte  engaged  tO'  preserve  in  each  (not  including 
Montenegro)  "  an  independent  and  national  government." 

One  of  the  three  "  requisite  levers  "  suggested  by  Mr. 
Stratford  Canning  for  improvement  within  the  Turkish  em- 
pire was  action  prompted  by  "  the  right  spirit  "  on  the  part 
of  the  provincial  authorities.^  But  in  undertaking  to  pro- 
tect Turkey's  semi-independent  European  provinces,  the 
powers  denied  themselves  everything  except  the  right  of 
collective  intervention;  and  as  disagreement  respecting  the 
necessity  or  the  manner  of  coercion  was  probable,  no  really 
effective  means  remained  for  making  the  action  of  the  pro- 
vincial authorities  conform  to  the  chief  aim  of  the  treaty — 
the  independence  and  integrity  of  the  Turkish  empire.^ 

Subsequent  events  indicate  that  the  European  powers  were 
more  inclined,  all  along,  to  induce  the  Porte  to  pacify  the 
Balkan  pro-vinces  by  granting  increasingly  liberal  conces- 
sions, than  they  were  to  hold  in  check  the  ambitions  and  as- 
pirations of  these  groups  of  the  Sultan's  subjects.  So  one 
concession  followed  another,  until  racial  sympathies  were 
to  lead  Servia  and  Montenegro  to  join  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina in  a  war  against  the  Porte  (1876),  which  in  its  turn 
was  to  lead  on  to  other  complications,  thereby  drawing  the 
affairs  of  the  Balkan  territory  into  one  general  current  of 

'  Lane-Pool,  op.  ctL,  vol.  ii,  p.  439. 
'See  the  preamble  of  the  treaty  of  Paris. 


6o  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [60 

events  that  carried  Roumania,  Servia  and  Montenegro  on 
tO'  independence.  This  same  struggle  also  virtually  separ- 
ated Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  from  Turkey,  and  created  a 
semi-independent  New  Bulgaria  and  the  partly  autonomous 
province  of  Eastern  Roumelia  (1878)/  In  tracing  some- 
what in  detail  these  political  movements  in  Servia,  Monte- 
negro, and  the  principalities  of  Wallachia  and  Moldavia 
(Roumania,  after  1866),  between  the  treaty  of  Paris  and  the 
treaty  of  Berlin  (1856-78),  it  seems  advisable  to  continue 
the  method  adopted  in  the  first  chapter  and  follow  separately, 
for  the  most  part,  the  course  of  events  in  each  province.  As 
in  the  previous  chapter,  the  affairs  of  Wallachia  and  Mol- 
davia (Roumania)  first  claim  our  attention. 

THE  FORMATION  OF  ROUMANIA 

Provisions  were  made  in  the  treaty  of  Paris  for  blocking 
Russia's  supposed  roadway  to  Constantinople.  By  requir- 
ing the  Tsar  to  cede  a  part  of  Bessarabia  to  Turkey,  the 
Russian  frontier  was  pushed  away  from  the  Danube;  and 
it  was  particularly  stipulated  that  no  exclusive  protection  by 
any  one  of  the  guaranteeing  powers  should  be  exercised 
over  Wallachia  and  Moldavia.^ 

France,  England  and  Russia  were  ready  to  proceed  at 
once  to  organize  these  two  principalities  under  oiie  central 
government,  but  Turkey  and  Austria  objected  to  such  a  pro- 
cedure, and  Prussia  and  Sardinia  were  more  or  less  uncon- 
cerned.^ The  result  was  that  the  treaty  merely  provided  that 
the  laws  and  statutes  of  these  principalities  should  be  re- 
vised ;  and  that  a  special  commission  should  proceed  to 
Bucharest  charged  with  the  duty  of  investigating  the  con- 

^ British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  vol.  Ixvii,  p.  1238. 
'Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  1260. 

^  State  Papers ,  op,  cit.,  vol.  xlvi,  p.  80;  Parliamentary  Papers  (1859), 
vol.  Ixi,  p.  66. 


6i]      UNDER  PROTECTION  OF  EUROPEAN  CONCERT  6l 

ditions  in  the  twO'  provinces.  This  commission  was  ex- 
pected, moreover,  to  ascertain  the  wishes  of  the  peopje,  as 
expressed  in  representative  assembHes  (divans  ad  hoc)  ;  to 
suggest  bases  for  the  future  organization  of  the  principali- 
ties; and  to  transmit  a  report,  without  delay,  to  Paris.  ^  But 
there  was  delay  and  difficulty  in  getting  at  the  wishes  of  the 
people  through  these  constituent  assemblies.  After  about  a 
year  (September,  1857)  these  bodies  expressed  a  practi- 
cally unanimous  wish  for  a  union  of  Moldavia  and  Walla- 
chia  under  a  foreign  prince.^  The  next  year,  from  May  to 
August,  the  powers  held  conferences  in  Paris  and  finally 
agreed  on  a  series  of  ordinances  that  were  to  constitute  the 
definitive  organization  of  these  principalities.  These  "  Ar- 
ticles "  represented  a  very  comprehensive  scheme,  according 
to  which  the  people  in  the  provinces  were  to  carry  on  their 
own  affairs  under  the  suzerainty  of  the  Porte.  ^ 

The  peculiar  features  of  this  European  plan  for  the  gov- 
ernment of  these  provinces  resulted  from  the  attempt  to  con- 
form, as  nearly  as  might  be,  to  the  wishes  of  all  parties  con- 
cerned. Turkey  and  Austria  still  continued  to  oppose  the 
fo'rmation  of  one  government  for  the  two  provinces,  so  the 
treaty  powers  w^orked  out  a  sort  of  combination  of  union 
and  separation.*  The  name  adopted  was  The  United  Prin- 
cipalities of  Moldavia  and  Wallachia,  and  a  central  commis- 
sion was  ordered.  This  commission  was  made  up  of  eight 
members  from  each  principality — four  selected  by  the  hos- 
podar  from  among  men  who  had  served  the  people  in  high 
offices,  and  four  by  each  Assembly  from  its  own  body.  This 

^Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  Treaty  of  Paris,  arts.  23-25;  Annuaire 
Historigue,  1856  (Paris,  1861),  pp.  57-60. 

^Ibid.,  p.  397.  ^Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  1329. 

*  See  Martens,  A^.  G.  de  traitSs,  tome  xvi,  p.  15;  also  pp.  16-50, 
for  the  Protocols  of  the  conferences  (19)  at  Paris,  May  22-August  19, 
1858. 


62  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [62 

so-called  Central  Commission  was  intended  to  be  permanent 
during  the  life  of  the  two  provincial  Assemblies  (seven 
years).  It  was  made  the  special  duty  of  this  central  govern- 
ing body  to  protect  and  revise  the  Articles  ",  together  with 
the  laws,  so  as  to  bring  all  except  matters  of  purely  local 
interest  under  the  care  and  administration  of  this  Central 
Commission/  Each  principality  was  to  have  an  Assembly, 
elected  for  seven  years  by  voters  twenty-five  years  old  or 
more  and  having  a  fixed  property  qualification.  Each  As- 
sembly was  directed  to  proceed  to  the  election  of  a  hospodar 
for  a  life  term.  The  hospodars  were  to  keep  agents  at  the 
suzerain  court,  and  in  case  the  Porte  should  not  attend  to 
the  complaints  of  these  agents  respecting  any  violation  of 
immunities,  the  hospodars  were  empowered  to  communicate 
their  grievances  directly  to  the  representatives  of  the  guar- 
anteeing powers  at  Constantinople.  It  was  distinctly  stated 
also  that  before  the  Porte  could  interfere  in  the  affairs  of 
these  principalities  for  the  purpose  of  re-estabhshing  order 
there,  an  understanding  must  be  had  with  the  treaty  powers. 
At  the  same  time  it  was  stipulated  that  the  regular  militia 
required  to  be  maintained  in  each  of  the  two  provinces 
should  be  given  an  "  identic  "  organization,  in  order  that 
they  might  readily  co-operate  as  two  corps  of  one  and  the 
same  army.  The  new  scheme  provided  for  the  equality,  in 
the  eyes  of  the  law,  of  all  Moldavians  and  Wallachians,  and 
ordered  that  all  privileges,  exemptions,  or  monopolies  en- 
joyed by  certain  classes,  be  abolished.  This  constitution, 
which  was  formulated  in  Paris  by  the  concert  of  the  powers, 
is  a  lengthy  document  (seventy-three  articles),  and  it  bears 
witness  to  the  efforts  of  the  contracting  powers  to  give  to 

^  It  will  be  seen  that  this  somewhat  ingenious  compromise  was  as  arti- 
ficial as  it  was  complex.  Cf.  McCarthy,  A  History  of  Our  Own  Times 
(New  York),  vol.  i,  p.  502. 


63]      UNDER  PROTECTION  OF  EUROPEAN  CONCERT  63 

these  people  very  comprehensive  and  expHcit  laws  and  di- 
rections for  governing  their  provinces. 

It  has  already  been  noted  that  the  Moldavians  and  Walla- 
chians  requested  the  Paris  conference  to  grant  them  a  cen- 
tral government,  under  a  foreign  prince/  The  powers,  how- 
ever, took  nO'  notice  of  their  expressed  desire  for  a  foreign 
ruler;  but  finally,  on  the  question  of  union,  the  compromise 
was  effected  which  provided,  as  we  have  seen,  for  two  gov- 
ernments, and  also  for  the  Central  Commission,  as  the  com- 
mittee of  sixteen  was  called,  to  attend  to  matters  of  common 
concern. 

However,  this  detailed  scheme  of  government  which 
neither  united  nor  separated  the  two  peoples  worked  out 
very  well  from  the  standpoint  of  the  local  authorities.  The 
next  spring  (1859)  being  the  time  for  choosing  new  hos- 
podars,  Moldavia  elected  a  Moldavian,  Colonel  Alexander 
Couza,  and  about  two  weeks  later  the  Wallachian  Assembly 
elected  the  same  man.^  While  it  is  clear  that  the  new  con- 
stitution was  drafted  on  the  basis  of  there  being  two  hos- 
podars,  it  is  equally  clear  that  the  document  does  not  contain 
any  statement  that  seems  intended  to  prohibit  the  election 
of  the  same  person  to  the  hospodariat  of  both  provinces.^ 
But  the  suzerain  court  contended  that  the  double  election 
was  illegal,  and  called  for  a  conference  of  the  guaranteeing 
powers  to  deal  with  the  matter.  Accordingly,  the  plenipo- 
tentiaries in  Paris,  from  these  courts,  held  two  meetings. 
April  7th  and  13th,  1859.  At  the  second  sitting,  and  after 
listening  to  the  protests  of  Turkey  and  Austria  against  the 
double  election  of  Colonel  Couza,  the  representatives  of 
England,  Russia,  Prussia,  France  and  Sardinia  agreed  to  a 
resolution  requesting  the  Porte  to  make  an  exception  jn  the 


'  See  supra,  p.  61. 

'Hertslet,  op.  ciL,  vol.  ii,  p.  1335. 


^  Ibid.,  p.  1329. 


64  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [64 

case  of  the  election  already  held,  and  recognize  Prince  Couza 
as  the  governor  of  both  Moldavia  and  Wallachia.  The 
Porte,  on  the  other  hand,  urged  military  intervention  for  the 
purpose  of  enforcing  strict  conformity  tO'  the  principles  of 
the  new  constitution;  but  the  five  powers  insisted  that  the 
suzerain  court  must  take  their  resolution  under  careful  con- 
sideration. The  Central  Commission  met  in  June,  and  with 
the  expression  of  an  earnest  desire  for  union,  pledged  its 
support  to  Prince  Couza.  Couza  had  already  taken  the 
name  of  Alexander  John  I,  and  he  and  the  Commission  now 
made  free  use  of  the  terms  "  Roumania  ''  and  ''Rouman- 
ians/' ^ 

After  the  lapse  of  six  months,  another  meeting  of  the 
powers  was  held,  and  the  Porte  then  promised  (September 
6)  to  recognize  Colonel  Couza  as  being  exceptionally  called 
for  that  occasion  to  the  government  of  both  provinces,  with 
the  condition  that  he  must  maintain  in  each  of  the  princi- 
palities separate  and  distinct  administrations.^  It  was  also 
understood  among  the  guaranteeing  powers  that  no  further 
infraction  of  the  administrative  and  legislative  organization 
already  given  to  the  principalities  would  be  permitted.^  The 
Sultan  then  sent  to  Colonel  Couza  two  identical  firmans  of 
investiture  in  the  two  hospodarships  (September  24). 

The  following  year  the  prince  urged  the  attention  of  the 
legislators  to  the  need  of  reforms,  especially  in  relation  to 
the  peasantry.*  He  soon  found  great  difficulty,  however, 
in  bringing  his  ministers  and  the  members  of  the  two  Assem- 
blies tO'  his  way  of  thinking.  Consequently,  at  the  beginning 
of  1 861,  he  addressed  a  long  letter  to  the  Porte,  explaining 

'  De  Testa,  Recueil  des  Traitis  de  la  Porte  Otiomane,  vol.  v,  p.  407; 
Annuaire  Historique,  1859,  p.  369. 
^  State  Papers ,  op.  cit.,  vol.  49,  pp.  454  seg. 

'Hertslet,  vol.  ii,  p.  1377.  *De  Testa,  op,  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  407. 


65]      UNDER  PROTECTION  OF  EUROPEAN  CONCERT  65 

fully  the  need  of  changes  in  the  constitution.  He  requested 
at  the  same  time  that  the  electoral  law  be  amended,  and  that 
there  be  but  one  ministry  and  one  Assembly  for  both  pro^ 
vinces/  Before  the  end  of  the  year,  and  with  the  full  con- 
sent of  the  powers,  the  Sultan  granted  Prince  Couza's  re- 
quest, and  issued  a  firman  uniting  the  two  ministries  and 
also  the  twO'  Assemblies,  and  suspending  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  Central  Commission.  This  imperial  decree  likewise  or- 
dered that  a  Council  be  convoked  regularly  in  each  princi- 
pality. The  right  of  being  consulted  on  all  laws  and  regu- 
lations of  local  interest  was  given  to  these  councils,  and  each 
was  charged  with  the  duty  of  controling  the  administra- 
tion of  the  funds  of  its  own  province.^  The  Sultan  under- 
took to  make  it  very  clear,  however,  that  other  limits  which 
had  formerly  divided  the  two  principalities  must  be  left  in 
tact,  and  that  as  soon  as  Prince  Couza  should  cease  to  ad- 
minister the  two,  the  constitution  of  1858  must  again  be- 
come the  law  of  the  provinces.  Austria  was  in  full. accord 
with  this  view  of  future  procedure ;  but  the  other  five  powers 
offered  the  suggestion  that  favorable  results  might  make  it 
seem  advisable  to  continue  the  union,  and  reserved  the  right, 
when  a  vacancy  in  the  hospodariat  should  re-open  the  ques- 
tion, of  considering  with  the  Porte  the  course  to  be  fol- 
lowed.^ 

As  soon  as  the  Sultan's  firman  was  communicated  to 
Prince  Couza,  he  issued  a  proclamation  (December  20, 
1861)  beginning  with,  ''Roumanians!  the  union  is  accom- 
plished !  the  Roumanian  nationality  is  formed !  "  and  ending 
with,  "  Vive  la  Roumanie 

In  opening  the  first  session  of  the  new  Roumanian  As- 
sembly (February  5,  1862),  the  prince  set  before  that  body 
'  De  Testa,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  pp.  408  et  seq. 

'Hertslet,  vol.  ii,  p.  15.  "•Ibid,,  vol.  ii,  p.  1499. 

De  Testa,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  -145- 


66  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [66 

the  most  urgent  needs  of  the  country,  and  expressed  his  be- 
Hef  that  neither  the  Porte  nor  the  guaranteeing  powers 
would  ever  destroy  the  union."  ^  But  the  new  government 
failed  to  work  harmoniously,  and  the  following  February 
(1863),  the  consuls  in  Bucharest,  representing  the  powers 
in  the  European  concert,  were  instructed  to  act  collectively 
for  the  purpose  of  preventing  all  acts  contrary  to  the  consti- 
tution. They  were  instructed  also  to  make  an  effort  to-  re- 
store harmony  and  to  induce  the  Assembly  to  give  first  im- 
portance to  questions  of  national  interest.^  A  month  later 
the  Assembly  addressed  a  lengthy  communication  tO'  the 
prince,  accusing  him  of  unbounded  caprice  and  with  insin- 
cerity in  relation  to  the  intended  constitutional  regime. 

The  deadlock  between  the  government  and  the  legislative 
body  led  the  prince,  on  May  14,  1864,  to  dissolve  the  As- 
sembly. At  the  same  time  he  called  011  the  army  tO'  preserve 
order  and  proposed  to  the  nation  a  series  of  ordinances, 
giving  to  the  prince  the  sole  initiative  in  proposing  laws,  and 
providing  for  universal  suffrage,  a  senate  and  an  elective 
assembly.^  The  Porte  reminded  him  that  he  had  exceeded 
his  authority ;  and  he  then  went  to  Constantinople  and  came 
to  an  agreement  with  the  Turkish  government  on  an  "  addi- 
tional act"  to  the  constitution  of  1858.  The  consent  of  the 
guaranteeing  powers  to  these  alterations  was  freely  given. 
By  these  authorized  changes  all  public  and  legislative  power 
was  vested  in  the  prince,  a  senate  and  an  elective  assembly. 
The  prince  now  acquired  the  right,  also,  to  name  each  year 
the  president  of  the  Assembly,  and  to  him  was  given,  as  well, 
the  power  to  originate  laws.  It  was  required,  nevertheless, 
that  before  any  measure  could  become  a  law  it  must  receive 
the  sanction  of  prince,  Assembly  and  Senate.    Moreover,  it 


'  De  Testa,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  ^51. 

^ Ibid.,  p.  450.  ^  Ibid.,  vol.  v,  pp.  465  et  seq. 


6;]      UNDER  PROTECTION  OF  EUROPEAN  CONCERT  67 

was  made  obligatory  for  every  public  functionary  on  enter- 
ing office  to  swear  submission  to  the  constitution  and  the  laws 
of  the  country,  as  well  as  fidelity  to  the  prince.  A  council 
of  state,  to  be  formed  by  the  prince,  was  also  provided  for. 
The  duties  of  this  council  were  to  study  and  frame  drafts 
of  such  proposed  laws  as  might  be  referred  to  it  by  the 
head  of  the  provinces.  In  addition  to  these  duties,  the  mem- 
bers were  empowered  to  represent  the  prince  in  the  two 
chambers,  where  they  would  have  the  right  to  explain  and 
defend  such  measures  as  they  had  proposed.  The  ministers 
were  to  have  the  right  likewise  of  speaking  in  the  senate  as 
often  as  they  might  wish ;  and  the  suffrage  was  now  made 
practically  universal. 

But  the  most  important  concession  of  all  in  this  connec- 
tion, perhaps,  was  the  right  now  given  to  the  Roumanians 
to  change  the  laws  governing  their  internal  administration 
without  any  intervention  from  without.  This  they  were  em- 
powered to  do  so  loiig  as  the  proposed  changes  should  not 
affect  the  ties  binding  the  principalities  to  Turkey,  or  violate 
the  treaties  between  the  Forte  and  other  powers.^ 

In  proclaiming  to  his  people  (July,  1864)  the  success  of 
his  mission  to  the  suzerain  court.  Prince  Couza  called  special 
attention  to  the  fulfilment  of  the  desire  of  the  Roumanians 
for  internal  autonomy.^  A  month  later,  he  issued  a  procla- 
mation liberating  the  peasantry  from  all  feudal  obligations, 
and  providing  a  way  whereby  they  might  buy  at  low  prices 
much  of  the  land  formerly  held  by  the  boyards  (nobles).^ 

The  Senate  and  the  Assembly  met  in  January,  1865,  and 
there  seems  to  have  been  a  better  feeling  than  formerly 

^Parliamentary  Papers  (1867),  vol.  Ixxiv,  pp.  639  et  seg.;  De  Testa, 
vol.  V,  p.  472. 
'De  Testa,  vol.  v,  pp.  482-98. 

'For  the  settlement  of  the  land  question,  see  Parliamentary  Papers 
1870,  vol.  64. 


.68 


THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES 


[68 


between  the  prince  and  the  legislators.^  But  the  boyards 
were  not  pleased  with  the  rural  laws  which  took  from  these 
former  large  landowners  so  many  of  their  fields  and  de- 
prived them  at  the  same  time  of  the  labor  of  the  peasantry. 
Accordingly,  Prince  Couza  was  severely  criticised,  and  he 
was  charged  with  being  as  despotic  as  he  had  been  demo- 
cratic.^ The  tobacco  monopoly  and  the  confiscation  of  the 
property  of  the  monasteries  helped  also  to  render  him  ex- 
tremely unpopular. 

The  feeling  against  the  prince  finally  became  so  strong 
that  a  number  of  conspirators  entered  the  palace,  February 
23,  1866.  and  forced  him  to  abdicate.^  The  same  day  a 
provisional  government  issued  a  proclamation  referring  to 
the  anarchy  and  corruption  "  that  had  existed  during  the 
seven  years  of  Prince  Couza's  reign.  This  proclamation 
reminded  the  Roumanians,  moreover,  that  the  election  of  a 
foreign  prince  would  be  the  consummation  of  their  wishes,  as 
expressed  to  the  powers  in  1857.^  The  same  day  the  two 
Assemblies  elected  Philip  of  Flanders,  a  brother  of  the  king 
of  Belgium,  as  prince  of  Roumania. 

In  view  of  the  situation,  the  Porte  communicated  at  once 
with  the  guaranteeing  powers,  and  asked  for  a  conference. 
Accordingly,  from  March  10  to  June  14,  1866,  ten  confer- 
ences were  held  in  Paris,  but  without  any  very  positive  re- 
sults.^ The  first  sitting  (March  10)  merely  resulted  in  a 
communication  being  sent  through  the  foreign  agents  at 
Bucharest  to  the  provincial  government  of  the  provinces, 
announcing  that  a  conference  of  the  powers — parties  to  the 
treaty  of  1856^ — had  been  held,  and  recommending  the  pro- 

^De  Testa,  vol.  v,  pp.  484-98.  Ibid.,  vol.  v,  p.  499. 

'De  Testa,  vol.  v,  p.  514.    Couza  went  to  Paris,  and  died  at  Heidel- 
berg in  1873. 
*Ibid.,  pp.  514-15. 

^ Parhamentary  Papers,  1867,  vol.  74,  pp.  547-619. 


69]      UNDER  PROTECTION  OF  EUROPEAN  CONCERT  69 


visional  government  to  maintain  order  and  the  administra- 
tion, and  "  to  abstain  from  any  act  that  would  prejudice  the 
decision  of  the  Conference." 

But  while  the  representatives  of  the  powers  at  Paris  con- 
tinued to  deliberate,  the  government  and  the  people  in 
Roumania  proceeded  to  act.  At  the  second  conference 
(March  19)  the  representatives  from  Turkey  explained  that 
the  Porte  could  not  admit  a  foreign  prince  to-  be  at  the  head 
of  the  principaHties,  because  that  would  be  tantamount  to 
declaring  the  independence  of  the  two  provinces."  Eng- 
land's representative  agreed  that  the  government  of  a  for- 
eign prince  there  would  be  "  incompatible  with  the  integrity 
of  the  Ottoman  Empire."  The  representative  of  France, 
however,  was  in  favor  of  allowing  the  Roumanians  to  choose 
their  own  leader,  and  he  did  not  hesitate  to  recommend  that 
as  the  best  way  out  of  the  difficulty.  Italy's  representative 
was  of  the  same  mind.  But  the  Russian  ambassador  stoutly 
opposed  the  idea  of  a  foreign  prince,  and  he  denied  altogether 
that  the  population  of  the  principalities,  at  that  time,  even 
desired  union  under  a  native  governor.^  It  was  finally 
agreed  that  the  question  of  allowing  a  foreign  prince  should 
be  reserved  until  the  conference  should  determine  whether 
or  not  the  union  of  the  principalities  ought  to  be  continued. 
Several  times  during  the  meetings  the  idea  was  advanced 
that  there  were  two  very  important  principles  to  be  con- 
ciliated— the  integrity  of  the  Ottoman  empire,  and  the  "  ac- 
complishment of  the  wishes  "  of  the  people  in  the  principali- 
ties.' 

The  Count  of  Flanders  having  declined  the  nomination 
tendered  him  on  February  23,  1866,  the  Roumanians  now 
proceeded  by  a  plebiscite  (April)  to  the  election  of  Prince 
Charles  Louis  of  Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen.*    As  a  result 

^Parliamentary  Papers,  1867,  vol.  74,  p.  560. 

Ibid.,  pp.  559,  583,  617.  'De  Testa,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v.  p.  628. 


yo  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [yo 

of  this  universal  male  suffrage  vote,  it  was  claimed  that 
Charles  Louis  was  elected  by  685,969  affirmative  votes 
against  224  negatives.  The  man  who  was  thus  called  to 
undertake  the  difficult  task  of  guiding  the  destinies  of  the 
principalities  was  related  to  the  royal  family  o^f  Prussia, 
and  at  that  time  was  an  officer  in  the  Prussian  army/  On 
hearing  of  his  election,  the  conference  at  Paris  merely  di- 
rected the  attention  of  the  provisional  government  at  Bucha- 
rest to  the  constitution  of  1858,  which  required  that  the 
prince,  who  must  be  a  native,  should  be  elected  by  the 
Assembly.^ 

Prince  Charles  sent  in  his  resignation  as  an  officer  in  the 
Prussian  army,  and  reached  Bucharest  May  22nd. ^  The 
Sultan  was  inclined  to  resort  to  military  intervention  but 
was  informed  that  he  could  not  do  that  without  the  consent 
of  the  signatories  of  the  treaty  of  Paris  (1856)/  In  this 
connection,  the  plenipotentiary  of  Great  Britain  called  the 
attention  of  the  conference  to  the  fact  that  there  were  in 
reality,  neither  disturbances  nor  troubles  in  the  principali- 
ties. Meanwhile,  however,  the  agents  of  the  powers  at 
Bucharest  were  instructed  to  refrain  from  doing  anything 
that  would  imply  the  recognition  of  Prince  Charles  as  hav- 
ing any  authority  in  The  United  Principalities. 

The  last  meeting  of  the  conference  (June  4)  was  called 
at  the  request  of  the  Russian  ambassador,  and  it  was  evi- 
dent that  Russia  and  Turkey  were  becoming  more  and 
more  impatient.  These  two  powers  were  now  prepared  to 
urge  immediate  diplomatic  intervention,  as  provided  for  in 

'De  Testa,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  pp.  604,  608.         '^Ibid.,  vol.  v,  p.  609. 

2  Prince  Bismarck  is  said  to  have  advised  Prince  Charles  to  accept  the 
election  and  go  to  Roumania.  Miller,  The  Balkans,  p.  108;  Dame, 
Histoire  de  la  Roumanie  (Paris,  1900),  p.  162. 

*  Parliamentary  Papers,  1867,  vol.  Ixxiv,  p.  608. 


yi]      UNDER  PROTECTION  OF  EUROPEAN  CONCERT  yi 


the  protocol  of  September,  1859.^  They  desired  that  the 
suzerain  court  should  send  to  the  principalities  a  commis- 
sioner, accompanied  by  representatives  of  the  powers,  for 
the  purpose  of  informing  the  provisional  government  that 
unless  the  request  of  the  guaranteeing  powers  should  be 
complied  with,  measures  of  coercion  would  be  considered. 
The  right  to  intervene  was  unanimously  conceded,  but  none 
of  the  powers  except  Turkey  and  Russia  were  convinced 
of  its  "  desirableness." 

When  it  was  intimated  in  the  conference  that  there  was 
reason  to  believe  that  Prince  Charles  of  HohenzoUern  in- 
tended to  free  himself  from  the  suzerain  court,  the  repre- 
sentative of  France  explained  that  the  Prince  had  already 
informed  the  Roumanian  agent  at  Constantinople  that  the 
rights  of  the  Porte  would  be  maintained.^  There  was  a 
general  agreement  among  the  five  powers  now  striving  to 
ward  off  intervention,  that  the  state  of  affairs  in  Europe, 
and  the  danger  of  insurrection  among  the  Christian  popula- 
tions in  Turkey,  rendered  it  hazardous  to  undertake  coercive 
measures,  and  made  it  seem  to  be  the  wisest  course  to  per- 
mit Prince  Charles  of  HohenzoUern  to  become  the  Prince 
of  Roumania.^    These  five  governments  went  so  far,  at  the 

'Hertslet,  op.  ciL,  vol.  ii,  p.  1378. 

'^Parliamentary  Papers,  1867,  vol.  Ixxiv,  p.  617;  De  Testa,  op.  cit., 
vol.  V,  p.  641. 

^  While  the  Paris  conferences  were  being  held  (March-June)  to 
determine  what  course  to  pursue  with  the  Roumanians,  relations  be- 
came very  much  strained  between  Prussia  and  Austria;  and  Italy  like- 
wise engaged  in  preparations  for  a  struggle  against  Austria.  Meanwhile, 
Russia,  England  and  France  were  endeavoring  by  peaceful  means  to 
bring  about  a  settlement  of  these  differences.  Hertslet,  vol.  iii,  pp. 
1655-85.    Staatsarchive ,  vol.  ii,  (1866),  p.  45. 

For  a  further  expression  of  the  extreme  disappointment  felt  in  the  St. 
Petersburg  cabinet  because  Russia  and  Turkey  were  not  supported  in 
their  desire  to  carry  out  the  stipulations  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris  and  the 
subsequent  agreement  of  the  guaranteeing  powers  in  1858,  see  De  Testa, 
vol.  V,  p.  660. 


72  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [72 

same  time,  as  to  intimate  that  it  might  be  well  to  recognize 
him  as  the  head  of  the  government  of  these  provinces,  so 
long  as  he  should  maintain  order  and  respect  the  rights  of 
the  suzerain  court  and  the  integrity  of  the  Ottoman  empire. 

Russia's  plenipotentiary  at  Paris  declined  to  refer  to  his 
government  the  question  of  the  desirableness  "  of  coercive 
measures  in  Roumania,  and  hinted  at  the  probability  that 
he  v^ould  be  instructed  to  retire  from  the  conference.  The 
sitting  of  June  4th  proved  to  be  the  last  meeting,  however, 
and  so  the  question  was  left  by  the  European  concert  with- 
out any  definite  settlement.^  Fortunately,  at  this  juncture 
the  Porte  opened  negotiations  with  the  Roumanians,  and 
within  ten  days  after  the  last  meeting  of  the  Paris  con- 
ference, there  were  trustworthy  rumors  that  the  Sultan 
was  disposed  to  come  to  an  agreement  with  Prince  Charles.^ 

The  Paris,  London  and  Berlin  cabinets  exerted  their  in- 
fluence in  order  to  secure  the  best  attainable  settlement  for 
the  Roumanians.^  A  little  later,  (July  11)  the  Turkish 
government  expressed  a  willingness  to  sanction,  under  cer- 
tain conditions,  the  choice  of  the  ruler  that  had  been  made 
in  the  United  Principalities;  and  after  three  months  of 
further  negotiations  a  complete  agreement  was  reached. 
Prince  Charles  now  engaged  on  his  own  part,  and  in  the 
name  of  his  successors,  to  respect  the  Sultan's  suzerain  rights 
over  the  two  provinces  as  an  integral  part  of  the  Ottoman 
empire,  and  to  accept  as  binding  on  these  provinces  Turkey's 
treaties  with  other  powers. 

Having  given  these  promises,  with  some  others  of  minor 

^ Parliamentary  Papers ,  1867,  vol.  Ixxiv,  pp.  615-18;  Martens,  Nou- 
veau  Recueil  Giniral  de  TraitSs  (Gottingue,  1826-),  vol.  xviii,  pp.  t66- 
220. 

^Parliamentary  Papers,  1867,  vol.  Ixxiv,  p.  619. 
De  Testa,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  pp.  680  et  seq. 


73]      UNDER  PROTECTION  OF  EUROPEAN  CONCERT  73 

importance,  the  foreign  prince — now  a  naturalized  Rou- 
manian— whom  the  people  had  selected  to  be  their  ruler, 
set  out  for  Constantinople.  There  he  was  at  once  received 
by  the  Sultan,  who  put  an  end  to  the  long  and  troublesome 
controversy  and  advanced  the  Roumanian  population  far 
on  the  way  toward  statehood,  by  conferring  on  Prince 
Charles  of  Hohenzollern  the  hereditary  title  of  Prince  of 
the  United  Principalities  of  Wallachia  and  Moldavia/ 
Shortly  afterwards  all  the  guaranteeing  powers  concurred 
in  this  settlement. 

From  that  time  (October,  1866)  the  people  of  these 
provinces  always  referred  to  their  country  as  "  Roumania;" 
but  it  was  more  than  a  decade  before  the  name  received 
diplomatic  recognition.^ 

During  the  time  that  the  question  of  recognizing  the 
foreign  prince  was  pending,  a  new  constitution  of  one  hun- 
dred thirty-two  articles,  signed  by  Charles,  had  been  pro- 
mulgated at  Bucharest  (June  30).  The  first  article  very 
significantly  declared  the  united  principalities  to  constitute 
"  one  inseparable  State,"  under  the  name  of  Roumania." 
The  country  was  divided  into  districts,  which  were  organ- 
ized on  the  French  system.  This  constitution  provided  for 
a  liberal  form  of  government  similar  to  that  in  most  con- 
stitutional monarchies,  with  a  responsible  ministry,  to  be 
selected  by  the  prince,  and  a  parliament  of  two  houses.  The 
Orthodox  religion  of  the  Orient  (Greek)  was  mentioned  as 
the  dominant  religion  of  the  state;  and  the  Roumanian 
Orthodox  Church,  remaining  with  the  ''ecumenical  Church" 
of  the  Orient  in  matters  of  dogma,  was  declared  indepen- 
dent of  all  outside  control.    Taken  all  in  all,  it  is  clearly 

^Parliamentary  Papers,  1867,  vol.  Ixxiv,  pp.  621-28. 
'  C/.  Holland,  The  European  Concert  in  the  Eastern  Question,  (Ox- 
ford, 1885).  p.  235. 


74  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [74 

evident  that  those  who  formulated  this  body  of  laws  thought 
of  Roumania  as  the  land  of  only  such  as  in  blood,  traditions 
and  sympathies,  should  prove  to  be  real  Roumanians.^ 

With  a  view  of  establishing  public  credit  and  of  encour- 
aging agriculture  and  foreign  commerce,  the  new  govern- 
ment set  about  the  task  of  reorganizing  the  financial  sys- 
tem.^ During  a  part  of  the  year  1867  Prince  Charles  was 
obliged,  however,  to  listen  to  repeated  and  somewhat  earn- 
est protests  from  several  of  the  great  powers  against  the 
persecution  of  the  Jews  in  his  territory.  The  higher  offi- 
cials in  the  principality  claimed  that  the  hardships  suffered 
by  that  part  of  the  population  were  due  to  the  lack  of  judg- 
ment on  the  part  of  subordinate  employees  in  carrying  out 
instructions  respecting  hygienic  measures  and  the  sending 
away  of  foreign  vagabonds.  It  appears  that  the  leaders 
in  the  persecution  were  not  numerous,  and  that  the  prin- 
cipal agitators  against  the  Israelites  as  a  people,  were,  ac- 
cording to  statements  by  some  of  the  persecuted,  ignor- 
ant professors,  briefless  barristers,  and  small  tradesmen." 
For  a  year  or  more  the  situation  presented  a  menacing  as- 
pect, principally  because  of  the  disposition  of  Roumanian 
officials  to  minimize  the  acts  of  violence  against  the  Jews 
and  to  emphasize  the  social  bearing  of  the  question  to  the 
exclusion  of  its  racial  and  religious  aspects.^  In  his  ad- 
dress to  the  Chambers,  in  January,  1868,  Prince  Charles 
made  it  very  clear  that  the  laws  of  the  country  furnished 
him  sufficient  means  to  learn  the  truth  in  relation  to  the 
whole  matter,  and  to  put  an  end  to  all  the  abuses  in  con- 
nection with  the  Jewish  population.    At  the  same  time  he 

^  De  Testa,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  pp.  664  et  seq. 
Ibid.,  vol.  V,  pp.  700  et  seq. 

^ Ibid  y  vol.  X,  pp.  419,  432,  436;  Parliamentary  Papers,  1867,  vol. 
Ixxiv,  pp.  509  et  seq. 


75]      UNDER  PROTECTION  OF  EUROPEAN  CONCERT  75 

called  the  attention  of  the  legislators  to  the  fact  that  be- 
cause of  the  economic  as  well  as  the  political  situation,  the 
time  had  come  to  reorganize  the  army.^  With  much  pres- 
sure from  without,  especially  from  England  and  Austria, 
the  Jewish  question  gradually  quieted  down  and  gave  place 
to  others. 

During  the  years  1868  and  1869  the  Turkish  govern- 
ment frequently  complained  that,  because  Roumania  failed 
to  guard  her  Danubian  frontier,  bands  of  Bulgarians  and 
others  were  being  organized  in  Roumanian  territory  for 
the  purpose  of  carrying  on  a  revolutionary  propaganda  in 
the  Sultan's  nearby  provinces.  It  was  urged,  moreover, 
from  Constantinople,  that  the  attitude  of  the  Roumanian 
government  already  contributed  towards  a  state  of  affairs 
that  must  soon  threaten  Turkish  interests  throughout  the 
Balkan  territory.^  In  reply,  Roumania  expressed  her  de- 
termination to  continue  the  traditional  hospitality  of  her 
territory ;  but  at  the  same  time,  the  government  at  Bucharest 
instructed  the  Roumanian  prefects  all  along  the  Danube  to 
maintain  order  there,  and  to  prevent  any  acts  in  that  re- 
gion hostile  to  the  Ottoman  government.^ 

Notwithstanding  the  determination  of  Prince  Charles, 
expressed  in  opening  the  Chambers  in  the  fall  of  1870,  to 
hold  his  government  to  the  maintenance  of  internal  order 
as  well  as  amicable  relations  with  the  Porte  and  the  guar- 
anteeing powers,  there  soon  began  to  be  very  threatening 
manifestations  of  party  spirit.*  The  great  land  owners — 
the  White  or  Conservative  party — were  open  to  Russian 
influence,  and  did  not  favor  either  the  foreign  prince  or  so- 

'  De  Testa,  op  cit.,  vol.  v,  pp.  704,  706. 
^  De  Testa,  vol.  x,  pp.  438  et  seq. 
^ Ibid.,  p.  471. 

^British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  vol.  Ixi  (1870),  p.  1277. 


76 


THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [y6 


cial  reforms.  Opposed  to  these  were  the  Liberals  (Red 
party)  who  looked  to  Germany  and  Austria  for  support, 
and  demanded  for  the  middle  and  lower  classes  a  larger 
share  in  the  government.  The  situation  was  still  further 
complicated,  meanwhile,  by  the  aggressive  attitude  of  some 
others,  who  boldly  championed  the  cause  of  the  French  in 
their  struggle  against  the  Germans  (1870-71). 

In  general,  both  of  the  leading  parties  openly  manifested 
their  disloyalty  to  Prince  Charles.  Indeed,  their  hostility 
became  so  pronounced  that  he  even  expressed  his  inclina- 
tion to  abdicate,  and  leave  the  country.  A  new  loyal  con- 
servative ministry  was  formed,  however,  (under  Catarji) 
and  the  influence  of  Germany  and  Austria,  together  with 
a  timely  reaction  among  his  own  people,  dissuaded  him.^ 

After  this  change  of  attitude  toward  the  prince,  the  Rou- 
manians turned  their  attention  more  than  ever  to  the  im- 
provement of  internal  conditions.  As  time  went  by,  the 
Porte,  although  with  the  ostensible  aid  of  the  guaranteeing 
powers,  failed  to  put  down  the  Herzegovinian  insurrec- 
tion.^ The  Roumanian  government  issued  a  circular  to  its 
agents  abroad  (April,  1876)  stating  that  the  Roumanian 
policy  was  summed  up  in  the  one  word  "  neutrality."  Pre- 
parations there,  however,  for  any  eventuality  were  not 
neglected.  The  neutral  attitude  (if  neutral  at  any  time) 
was  maintained  for  only  a  year,  and  then  Roumania  turned 
against  the  suzerain  court  and  helped  in  the  struggle  that 
resulted  in  so  many  important  changes  in  the  relation  be- 
tween all  the  Balkan  provinces  and  the  Ottoman  gov- 
ernment.^ 

^Annual  Register,  1871,  p.  28;  Setgnobos,  op.  cit.,  p.  645- 
^Cf.  infra,  p.  x. 

"^Parliamentary  Papers,  1876,  vol.  Ixxxiv,  p.  365. 


-r^]      UNDER  PROTECTION  OF  EUROPEAN  CONCERT  yy 


CHANGES  IN  SERVIA 

When  Servia  was  taken  under  the  protection  of  the  Euro- 
pean Concert  (Treaty  of  Paris,  1856)  that  principality  was 
already,  as  we  have  seen,  fairly  well  organized  under  a 
native  prince,  Alexander,  of  the  Karageorgevich  dynasty. 
Some  of  the  Servians  complained  that  Prince  Alexander 
was  too  submissive  to  Austrian  influence  and  he  soon  be- 
came unpopular  with  the  leaders  in  his  government.  He 
undertook  to  punish  those  who  were  accused  of  plotting 
against  him,  and  was  forced  to  abdicate  (December,  1858)/ 
By  recalling  now  the  aged  Milosh,  who,  twenty  years  be- 
fore had  been  driven  to  abdicate  and  to  leave  the  country, 
the  representatives  of  the  people  restored  the  Obrenovich 
dynasty.^ 

During  the  two  years  of  Milosh's  reign  (1858-60),  a  con- 
siderable effort  was  made  to  obtain  further  concessions 
from  the  Sultan.  In  May,  i860,  a  deputation  was  sent  to 
Constantinople  with  a  memorandum  requesting  the  Porte  to 
make  the  princely  dignity  in  Servia  hereditary  in  the 
Obrenovitcl\  family,  to  restrict  the  privileges  of  Mussulmans 
still  living  in  that  province,  and  to  give  to  the  Servians  the 
right  to  change  and  elaborate  the  laws  for  regulating  the 
internal  administration  of  their  country.^  Failing  to  re- 
ceive a  satisfactory  reply,  and  contending  that  what  was 
asked  for  had  already  been  promised,  the  Servians  then 
declared  that  they  would  regard  the  concessions  called  for 
in  the  memorandum  as  already  acquired,  and  as  being 
inviolable.* 

Prince  Milosh  died  in  the  fall  of  i860,  and  was  succeeded 
'  De  Testa,  op.  cit.,  vol.  vii,  p.  15. 

Supra,  ch.  i,  p.  44.  '  De  Testa,  vol.  vii,  p.  19. 

Ibid.,  vol.  vii,  p.  31.  As  far  back  as  1830,  and  again  in  1833,  the 
Sultan  had  promised  to  Servia  all  and  much  more  than  was  asked  for 
in  this  memorandum,    Cf.  Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  842,  929. 


78  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [yg 

by  his  son,  Michael,  who,  as  we  have  seen,  had  been  forced 
to  abdicate  in  1842,  to  make  way  for  the  restoration  of 
the  Karageorgevich  dynasty.  The  new  administration  now 
began  an  earnest  effort  with  the  Porte  to  bring  about  the 
removal  from  Servia  of  all  Turks  living  outside  the  for- 
tresses/ Firmans  issued  by  the  Sultan  thirty  years  back- 
had  provided  for  such  removal,  but  the  instructions  had 
never  been  carried  out.  The  correspondence  dragged  on  for 
more  than  a  year,  and  finally  it  was  agreed  that  a  mixed 
commission  (Turks  and  Servians)  should  arrange  for  in- 
demnifying the  Turks  who  would  be  dispossessed  by  the 
execution  of  these  old  firmans.  Quite  naturally  the  Servians 
became  more  and  more  exasperated  when  the  Porte  delayed 
the  sending  out  of  a  commissioner  ;  and  in  1862,  there  were 
serious  conflicts  in  Belgrade  between  the  two  races."  These 
disturbances  were  thought  by  some  of  the  foreign  consuls 
in  Servia  to  have  been  the  result  not  of  accident  but  of 
"  design  and  combination."  ^  The  English  consul  was  dis- 
posed to  place  a  large  share  of  the  blame  on  the  recently  in- 
creased Servian  police  force.  After  the  first  few  hours  of 
confusion  and  some  firing,  on  the  evening  of  June  15th,  the 
consuls  of  the  guaranteeing  powers  resident  in  Belgrade, 
were  instrumental  in  bringing  about  an  agreement  between 
the  Servian  and  the  Turkish  authorities  in  the  city.*  The 
Ottoman  police  retired  to  the  citadel,  and  such  other  Turks 
as  wished  to  do  so  were  also  allowed  to  take  refuge  there. 
Those  of  the  Turks,  however,  who  chose  to  remain  outside 
were  promised  security  of  person  and  property.    It  appears 

^  De  Testa,  vol.  vii,  pp.  22  ei  seq.;  Hertslet,  vol.  ii,  pp.  842  et  seq. 
There  was  an  uprising,  meanwhile,  among  people  of  the  same  races 
and  religions  in  Herzegovina  and  Bosnia. 
^  State  Papers,  vol.  Ivi,  p.  438. 

^ Ibid.,  pp.  409  et  seq.;  De  Testa,  op.  cit.,  vol.  vii,  pp.  81,  112. 


79]      UNDER  PROTECriON  OF  EUROPEAN  CONCERT  yg 

that  the  following  day  some  of  the  Servians  began  to  plun- 
der the  houses  of  those  who  had  gone  to  the  citadel,  and 
that,  as  a  consequence,  there  was  some  firing  on  both  sides. 
Then  followed,  without  just  provocation,  as  was  generally- 
held,  the  bombardment  of  the  town.  The  Turkish  garrison 
continued  to  fire  on  the  city  at  intervals  for  four  hours  and 
then  ceased  on  the  earnest  advice  of  the  Austrian  consul. 

These  events  in  the  Servian  capital  were  followed  by  con- 
ferences at  Constantinople  (July  23rd-September  4,  1862) 
at  which  all  the  contracting  powers  in  the  treaty  of  Paris 
(1856)  were  represented.^  The  result  of  these  confer- 
ences was  an  agreement  that  the  Porte  should  maintain  four 
fortresses  in  Servia  for  the  defense  of  the  country,  garri- 
soned with  only  the  number  of  men  necessary  for  their  de- 
fense," but  that  all  other  Turks  must  leave  the  principality. 
A  mixed  commission  of  Ottomans  and  Servians  was  pro- 
vided for  who  were  to  decide  questions  of  expropriation 
and  indemnity,  and  this  commission  was  allowed  only 
four  months  in  which  to  conclude  its  labors."  It  was  now 
expressly  stated,  moreover,  that  the  officials*  of  the  citadels 
and  the  Servian  authorities  were  not  to  interfere  with  each 
other  in  any  way.  Prince  Michael  was  reminded  by  the 
guaranteeing  powers  that  the  new  military  organization  of 
Servia  had  already  created  some  apprehensions  at  Con- 
stantinople ;  and  the  international  agreement  added  that  he 
would  find  it  easy  to  come  to  an  understanding  with  the 
Porte  as  to  the  usual  number  of  his  effective  force.  The 
"Arrangement  "  also  specified  that  the  Porte  would  listen  to 
demands  made  by  Servia  in  a  ''just  and  friendly  spirit," 
and  that  an  answer  to  Servian  requests  or  complaints  would 
be  returned  by  the  Porte  within  the  shortest  possible  time. 

'  Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  1515. 

^De  Testa,  op.  cit.,  vol.  vii,  p.  126.  (Aug.,  1864. — Work  of  the  com- 
mission not  yet  finished.) 


8o  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [80 

Under  the  constitution  which  had  been  forced  upon  Servia 
by  Turkey  and  Russia  in  1838,  the  senators  (17)  could  not 
be  legally  removed  without  the  consent  of  the  sultan,  and 
hence  they  were  often  able  to  set  the  prince  at  defiance.^ 
Soon  after  Michael's  reign  began  (i860),  however^  the 
Servian  government  sent  a  representative  to  consult  with 
the  leading  courts  of  Europe,  and  then  enacted  several  laws 
that  very  materially  modified  that  early  constitution.^  The 
senators  were  allowed  to  retain  all  their  legislative  functions, 
but  they  were  now  made  amxcnable  to  the  law  courts,  which 
were  empowered  to  remove  them  for  misconduct/  At  this 
time  also  a  distinctively  Servian  coinage  was  begun. 

The  Turks  failed  to  evacuate  two  positions  on  the  Servian 
side  of  the  frontier,  and  in  the  fall  of  1866  Servia  sent  a 
"  proper  and  conciliatory  "  note  to  the  Porte  requesting 
that  the  Turks  be  withdrawn  from  these  places.  The 
Sultan's  government  soon  admitted  that  the  right  of  the 
Turks  to  occupy  these  positions  was  not  entirely  clear;  but 
the  question  became  seriously  complicated  when  the  prince 
followed  (October  29,  1866)  the  first  request  by  soliciting 
the  Porte  either  to  make  over  to  the  Servians  or  demolish 
all  the  remaining  fortresses  in  their  territory.  There  were 
still  four  of  these,  and  all  were  garrisoned  by  Turks.* 
Prince  Michael  urged  that  a  peaceful  and  contented  Servia 
would  be  a  far  more  effectual  defense  of  the  frontiers  of  the 
empire  than  the  existing  fortresses;  and  the  Servian  agent 
at  the  Porte,  M.  Ristich,  declared  that  "  if  this  one  request 
were  granted  Servia  would  be  content  and  would  ask  the 
Porte  for  nothing  more."    In  the  same  communication,  it 

'See  supra,  ch.  i,  p.  46;  Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  938. 

Macmillan  s  Magazine  (London,  1863),  vol.  vii,  "Servia  in  1863." 
'Minchin,  Growth  of  Freedom  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula^  p.  73. 

Parliamentary  Papers,  1867,  vol.  Ixxv,  p.  6. 


8i]      UNDER  PROTECTION  OF  EUROPEAN  CONCERT  gl 

was  pointed  out  to  the  Turkish  authorities,  Hkewise,  that 
though  four  years  had  elapsed  since  the  bombardment  of 
Belgrade,  fear  and  the  feeling  of  insecurity  in  the  Servian 
capital,  had  not  subsided.  The  Servians  contended,  more- 
over, that  their  material  interests,  and  their  legitimate  feel- 
ings of  national  pride,  were  at  stake. 

The  protecting  powers  merely  came  to  a  sort  of  general 
agreement  that  the  interests  of  all  concerned  required  that  a 
right  feeling  should  be  established  between  the  Constanti- 
nople government  and  the  Servians,  and  the  Sultan  was  so 
advised.  It  was  well  understood  that  the  feeling  of  ani- 
mosity in  the  nearby  Christian  provinces  against  the  Turk- 
ish rule  there,  made  it  highly  advisable  that  the  Servians 
should  not  have  any  good  reason  for  concerting  with  their 
neighbors  against  the  Porte.  For  some  time,  however,  the 
Ottomans  felt  that  they  ought  not  to  yield  to  the  extent  of 
giving  up  the  fortress  of  Belgrade.  The  policy  of  the 
powers  throughout  was  to  refrain  from  making  any  col- 
lective or  formal  representations,  thus  leaving  to  the  Sultan 
the  possibility  of  winning  the  good  will  of  the  Servians  by 
spontaneously  satisfying  the  wishes,  for  the  time  being,  most 
dear  to  their  hearts. 

It  was  not  until  five  months  after  the  prince's  letter  was 
received  at  Constantinople,  that  the  Grand  Vizier  was  ready 
to  reply.  But  the  answer  was  most  welcome,  for  it  an- 
nounced the  willingness  of  the  Sultan  to  confide  the  custody 
of  all  the  Servian  fortresses  to  the  prince,  and  to  have 
Servian  soldiers  replace  the  Mussulman  garrisons.  This 
very  important  concession  was  granted  with  the  one  con- 
dition, that  the  fortress  should  continue  to  fly  the  Ottoman 
flag  together  with  that  of  Servia.'  The  Sultan's  firman  of 
April  lo,  1867,  confirming  these  concessions,  added  the  con- 

'  De  Testa,  op.  cit.,  vol.  vii,  pp.  138  et  seq. 


82  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [82 

dition,  however,  that  the  opinion  and  consent  of  the  Porte 
must  be  obtained  before  any  changes  should  be  made  in  the 
fortresses  now  given  over  to  the  Servians/ 

As  early  as  1861,  the  Servian  government  restricted  the 
rights  of  the  Jews  in  a  way  that  was  calculated  to  force 
them  ultimately  out  of  the  interior  of  the  country ;  and  down 
to  the  end  of  Michael's  reign  (1868),  an  unavailing  effort 
was  kept  up  by  the  Jews  in  different  parts  of  Europe  to  in- 
duce the  powers  to  force  Servia  to  modify  these  restrictions. 
This  persecution  was  claimed  by  the  Servians  to  be  on  the 
sole  ground  of  commercial  rivalry.^ 

Ever  since  Kara  George  fled  from  the  country  in  18 13, 
the  Servian  people  have  been  unfortunate,  it  would  seem,  in 
having  had  two  dynasties — the  Karageorgevich  and  the 
Obrenovich.  The  members  of  these  two  families  have  kept 
up  almost  a  constant  struggle  for  the  highest  office  in  the 
country.  Prince  Michael  failed  in  his  efforts  to  conciliate 
the  partisans  of  the  Karageorgevich  family,  consequently, 
only  a  year  after  his  government  had  been  so  triumphant  in 
having  the  last  Mussulman  garrison  withdrawn  from  his 
country,  he  was  assassinated  (1868).'  But  the  plans  of 
the  plotters  were  foiled,  and  the  National  Assembly  that 
was  promptly  summoned  decreed  that  no  member  of  the 
family  of  Kara  George  should  ever  again  be  eligible  for 
the  Servian  throne.  The  Assembly  then  proceeded  without 
delay  to  the  election  of  the  late  prince's  nephew,  Milan,  as 
hereditary  Prince,  under  the  title  of  Milan  Obrenovich  IV.* 

The  young  prince  was  then  but  fourteen  years  old,  conse- 

•  Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iii,  p.  1800;  Parliamentary  Papers,  1867,  vol. 
Ixxv,  pp.  3  el  seq. 

'^Parliamentary  Papers,  1867,  vol.  Ixxv. 
De  Testa,  op.  cit.,  vol.  vii,  pp.  172,  191;  7 he  Nation  (New  York, 
1868),  vol.  vii,  p.  108. 

^Fortnightly  Review  (London,  1870),  vol.  xiii;  (1873),  vol.  xix. 


83]      UNDER  PROTECTION  OF  EUROPEAN  CONCERT  83 

quently  a  Regency  was  formed.  Ristich,  the  able  leader 
of  the  Liberal  party,  was  one  of  its  three  members.  In  full 
accord  with  the  protecting  powers  the  Sultan  confirmed  the 
election  of  Prince  Milan,  and  also'  the  regency  as  established 
(July  16,  1868)  ;  and  a  little  later  (August  4th),  the  Porte 
also  confirmed  the  hereditary  rights  of  the  Obrenovich 
family. 

In  his  opening  address  to  the  Skouptschtina  (June,  i8$9) 
Ristich  called  attention  to  the  suggestions  made  by  the  Na- 
tional Assembly  the  previous  year,  and  to  the  work  of  the 
constitutional  committee.  He  pointed  out,  moreover,  that  the 
time  had  come  for  the  complete  constitutional  transforma- 
tion of  Servia.^  These  suggestions  were  promptly  acted 
upon,  and  before  the  end  of  the  year  a  constitution  of  one 
hundred  and  thirty-three  articles  had  been  framed  and 
adopted.  This  new  constitution  represented  an  attempt  to 
organize  the  Servian  government  on  the  plan  of  the  Euro- 
pean constitutional  monarchies.  The  Skoupschtina  now 
became  a  representative  assembly,  elected  every  three  years, 
and  holding  sessions  yearly.  The  voters  elected  the  mem- 
bers of  this  Assembly  on  the  general  basis  of  one  to  every 
3,000  population,  and  the  prince  was  empowered  to  appoint 
one  for  every  three  thus  elected.  Each  one  of  these  deputies, 
however,  was  charged  with  the  duty  of  acting  as  a  judge  of 
the  needs  of  the  whole  country,  in  accordance  with  his  own 
convictions  and  conscience.  All  legislative  power  was  vested 
in  the  prince  and  this  assembly,  but  every  official  act  signed 
by  the  prince  required  the  signature  also  of  the  competent 
minister.  The  Senate  that  originated  in  1859  was  now 
transformed  into  a  Council  of  State  composed  of  from 
twelve  to  fifteen  members,  appointed  by  the  prince.  Among 
other  duties,  this  Council  was  expected  to  elaborate  projects 

'  De  Testa,  op.  fit.,  vol.  vii,  pp.  18,  188.  202. 


84  ™£  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [84 

of  laws,  to  settle  conflicts  involving  administrative  law,  and  to 
have  general  supervision  over  public  expenditures.  All  ques- 
tions looking  toward  important  changes  in  the  laws  of  the 
country  were  required,  however,  to  be  brought  before  a 
Grand  National  Assembly,  made  up  of  four  times  as  many 
deputies  as  were  regularly  elected  to  the  Skoupschtina/ 

Under  this  constitution  Servia  began  to  have  a  more 
clearly  defined  political  TiTe.^  Parties  with  European  names 
now  ranged  themselves,  in  general,  on  the  side  of  one  or  the 
other  of  the  two  main  lines  of  national  policy.  The  young 
prince  had  been  a  student  in  Paris,  and  it  was  but  natural 
that  he  should  gather  about  him  men  who  favored  the  intro- 
duction O'f  Western  ways  and  the  speedy  development  of  the 
industrial  interests  of  the  principality.  But  there  was  a  far 
more  numerous  party  oi  those  who  cared  little  for  internal 
improvements,  and  who  strenuously  opposed  any  consider- 
able increase  in  taxation,  unless  the  money  were  to  be  used 
for  national  defense  or  in  the  interest  of  territorial  expan- 
sion.^ 

Back  at  the  beginning  of  "  New  Servia  ",  in  1804,  the 
Serb  populatioin  of  that  province  was  but  a  body  of  unlet- 
tered peasants.  Very  few  if  any  of  these  could  even  read  or 
write.  It  seems  probable  that  neither  of  the  two  native 
chiefs  whose  names  have  been  given  tO'  the  two-  so-called 
dynasties  of  Servia,  could  read  or  knew  how  to  write  his 
own  name.  Nevertheless,  both  Kara  George  and  Milosh 
ObrenO'vich  knew  how  to  organize  and  carry  forward  cam- 
paigns for  the  liberation  oi  their  people. 

Down  to  1840  there  were  not  yet  three  thousand  children 
in  all  the  schools  of  the  principality.    The  men  who  gave 

*For  the  text  of  the  Servian  constitution  of  1869,  see  De  Testa,  op. 
cit.y  vol.  vii,  pp.  204  ei  seq. 

'C/.  Seignobos,  op.  cit.,  p.  660;  Miiller,  Political  History  of  Recent 
Times,  p.  517. 


« 


85]      UNDER  PROTECTION  OF  EUROPEAN  CONCERT  85 

their  time  to  the  afifairs  of  the  government  came  to  be 
called  notables,  but  at  the  time  of  the  new  constitution 
(1869)  Servia  still  contained  an  essentially  peasant  popula- 
tion. Cultivation  of  the  soil,  however,  received  slight  atten- 
tion, for  the_p£0fik_st4il  found  it  profitable  to  supply  pigs, 
oxen  and  sheep  to  the  foreign  markets/  The  principality 
had  now  come  to-  have  an  area  of  about  sixteen  thousand 
square  miles,  with  a  population  of  nearly  one  and  a  half 
million,  almost  all  of  whom  were  Serbs  in  race,  and  mem- 
bers of  their  autocephalous  national  Church.'  There  were 
then  about  three  hundred  and  sixty  church  edifices,  and  a 
few  more  schools  with  upwards  of  twelve  thousand  pupils. 

The  condition  of  the  people  had  surely  changed  in  many 
respects.  But  as  yet  they  cared  but  little  for  material  im- 
provements ;  and  they  had  been  very  slow  about  giving  up 
their  former  ways  of  living.  They  regarded  themselves  as 
"  being  politically  tributary  to,  but  not  dependent  on  the 
Ottoman  Porte  Unfortunately,  it  must  be  admitted  that 
the  spirit  of  faction  had  been  all  too'  prevalent  in  their 
efforts  at  self-government,  and  had  sadly  marred  their 
political  life.  Many  of  them  cherished  a  lively  hope  of  a 
"  Greater  Servia  ",  and  as  they  constituted  a  branch  of  the 
Orthodox  Eastern  Church,  it  was  but  natural  perhaps  that 
they  should  continue  to  look  tO'  Slavic  and  Orthodox  Russia 
as  their  all  sufficient  source  of  future  aid  and  protection. 

Prince  Milan  reached  his  majority  in  1872,  and  his  peo- 
ple seem  ever  since  to  have  treasured  in  their  hearts  this 
statement  in  his  first  speech  from  the  throne :  "  It  would 
be  a  great  responsibility  tO'  lose  the  least  of  the  acquisitions 
of  our  fathers,  and  little  to  our  credit  to  add  nothing  to 
them."  ' 

^Macmillan's  Magazine,  1863,  "  Servia  in  1863." 
'Identical  in  creed  with  the  Orthodox  Greek  Church. 
'Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iv,  p.  2404. 


86  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [86 

As  we  turn  now  to  trace  the  afifairs  of  the  Montenegrins 
through  this  period  we  leave  the  Servians  under  the 
domination  of  the  party  of  the  people — the  Radical  Na- 
tionalists— and  ready  to  join  with  their  kinsmen  in  Bosnia, 
Herzegovina  and  Montenegro,  in  a  determined  struggle  to 
secure  further  concessions  from  the  Ottoman  government. 

THE  SITUATION  IN  MONTENEGRO  1856  TO  187O  ^ 

When  the  Sultan's  representative  declared  to  the  pleni- 
potentiaries of  the  powers  in  the  Paris  conference  (March 
26,  1856)  that  the  Porte  regarded  Montenegro  as  an  inte- 
gral part  of  the  Ottoman  empire,  the  Montenegran  ruler  ex- 
hibited solicitous  surprise  and  mild  indignation.^  Prince 
DanilO'  at  once  protested  to  the  powers,  that  the  claim  set 
forth  by  the  Sultan's  government  was  indefensible,  and  that 
Montenegro  had  a  better  claim  to  half  of  Albania  and  all  of 
Herzegovina  than  Turkey  had  to  Montenegro.^  At  the 
same  time  he  addressed  a  note  to  the  European  powers  call- 
ing attention  to  the  successful  struggles  of  the  Montenegrin 
people  during  four  hundred  and  sixty-six  years  to  hold  their 
territory  and  maintain  their  liberty.  He  also  asked  for  the 
diplomatic  recognition  of  the  independence  of  Montenegro, 
the  extension  of  the  frontiers  toward  Albania  and  Herze- 
govina, the  definite  settlement  of  the  boundary  towards 
Turkey  and  the  annexation  to  the  principality  of  the  port 
of  Antivari.^  Early  the  next  year  Prince  Danilo  visited 
Paris  and  presented  his  case  to  Emperor  Napoleon  HI ;  but 
on  his  return  to  MontenegTO  he  received  a  proposition  from 

^  The  Nineteenth  Century  (London,  1877)  contains  an  excellent  sketch 
of  Montenegro  by  W.  E.  Gladstone. 

^  Supra,  ch.  i,  p.  55;  Martens,  N.  G.  R.,  op.  cit.,  vol.  xv,  p.  738; 
State  Papers,  op.  cit.,  vol.  xlvi,  pp.  97,  104. 

^De  Testa,  op.  cit.,  vol.  x,  p.  374;  Edinburgh  Reviezv,  vol.  cix,  p.  484. 

*De  Testa,  vol.  vi,  p.  4;  Hertslet,  vol.  ii,  p.  1438. 


8^]      UNDER  PROTECTION  OF  EUROPEAN  CONCERT  87 

the  ambassadoi-s  of  the  great  powers  at  Constantinople  that 
as  an  offset  for  access  to  the  sea,  and  some  other  unimport- 
ant concessions  from  the  Sultan,  MontenegrO'  should  recog- 
nize the  supremacy  of  the  Porte.^  The  prince  was  ready 
to  follow  the  advice  of  the  powers,  but  the  Montenegrins 
refused  to  acknowledge  the  suzerainty  of  the  Sultan.^  Mean- 
while a  Turkish  force,  which  was  sent  ostensibly  to  restore 
order  on  the  frontier  of  Herzegovina,  undertook  to  occupy 
the  valley  of  Grahovo  ("the  Marathon  of  Montenegro"), 
which  was  then  in  the  possession  of  the  Montenegrins.  The 
Turks  were  at  once  attacked  and  those  of  their  number  who 
escaped  from  the  valley  left  behind  them  fourteen  guns,  their 
war  supplies,  and  several  thousand  dead.^ 

The  presence  of  Turkish  troops  in  territory  held  by  Mont- 
enegro at  the  time  of  the  Congress  of  Paris  (1856)  placed 
the  Porte  in  a  very  unfavorable  position,  considering  the 
virtual  promise  by  the  Turkish  government  at  that  time  to 
maintain  the  status  quo  in  that  province/  With  a  view  of 
preventing  future  conflicts  such  as  that  in  the  valley  of 
Grahovo,  France  invited  the  powers  tO'  join  in  a  conference 
for  the  purpose  of  considering  the  whole  situation  in  rela- 
tion to  Montenegro.^  The  result  was  that  the  ambassadors 
at  Constantinople  of  Austria,  France,  Great  Britain,  Prussia 
and  Russia  held  a  meeting  with  the  Turkish  authorities 
(November,  1858),  and  it  was  agreed  to  send,  in  the  follow- 
ing spring,  a  boundary  commission  of  engineers  to  assist 
in  placing  posts  that  should  fix  the  territorial  limits  of  Al- 
bania, Herzegovina  and  Montenegro.    The  boundaries  were 

'  Frilley  and  Wlahovitj,  Le  MonUn^gro  Contemporain,  p.  72;  Edin- 
burgh Review,  vol.  cix,  p.  47. 

'  De  Testa,  op.  cit.,  vol.  vi,  p.  10. 

'  Frilley  and  Wlahovitj,  op.  cit.,  p.  76. 

*  Supra,  ch.  i,  p.  55;  De  Testa,  op.  cit.,  vol.  vi,  p.  4. 

''Ibid.,  p.  12. 


88  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [88 

to  be  fixed  in  strict  accordance  with  the  Hnes  on  a  map 
previously  prepared  by  the  representatives  of  these  powers/ 
Despite  the  protests  of  Turkey,  a  Montenegrin  was  made 
a  member  of  this  international  Boundary  Commission  soon 
after  its  work  had  begun. ^ 

This  commission  reported  the  outcome  of  its  labors  in 
March,  i860,  and  the  Constantinople  ambassadors,  who 
originated  this  international  body,  then  held  another  con- 
ference at  the  Turkish  capital  and  agreed  that  if  any  further 
controversies  likely  to  trouble  the  peace  of  the  Montenegrin 
frontier  should  arise,  the  questions  at  issue  must  be  referred 
to  the  consuls  of  these  powers,  at  Scutari  (Albania).  It 
was  also  agreed  that  the  Montenegrin  prince  was  authorized 
to  send  a  representative,  in  case  the  consuls  at  Scutari  should 
have  occasion  to  consider  such  questions.^ 

During  the  summer  of  i860  Prince  Danilo  went  down  to 
the  hamlet  of  Persano  for  the  baths,  and  while  walking  on 
the  promenade  at  Cattaro  with  Princess  Darinka,  he  was 
shot  by  an  exiled  Montenegrin.  Without  delay,  and  in  con- 
formity with  a  decree  of  the  Assembly  passed  in  1855, 
Princess  Darinka  proclaimed  Nicholas  Petrovic,  a  nephew 
of  Danilo,  the  prince  of  Montenegro  (Nicholas  I).'' 

This  change  to  a  young  prince,  then  but  nineteen  years  of 
age,  made  very  little  difference  for  some  time,  however, 
in  the  policies  of  the  principality.  One  who  knew  the  young 
ruler  intimately  tells  us  that  Nicholas  I  set  out  with  two 
fixed  ideas — the  first  to  prosecute  the  civilizing  work  among 
his  people;  the  second,  to  liberate  the  sister  Servian  lands, 
still  in  servitude  ".^ 

^Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  i353- 
"^Nineteenth  Century  (1877),  vol.  i,  p.  372. 
^Hertslet,  vol.  ii,  p.  1439. 

*  Denton,  Montenegro — Its  People  and  Their  History  (London,  1877), 
p.  287. 

^Frilley  and  Wlahovitj,  op.  cit.,  p.  202. 


Sg]      UNDER  PROTECTION  OF  EUROPEAN  CONCERT  89 

The  next  year  (1861),  an  insurrection  in  the  sister  Ser- 
vian province  of  Herzegovina  called  to  the  neighborhood 
of  Montenegro  a  large  Turkish  force  under  Omer  Pasha. 
The  success  of  the  insurgents  during  the  fall  of  1861  so 
awakened  the  enthusiasm  and  quickened  the  sympathies  of 
the  Montenegrins,  that  the  Turkish  general  professed  to 
be  alarmed,  and  proclaimed  the  blockade  of  their  country. 
In  keeping  with  the  urgent  request  of  the  powers,  Prince 
Nicholas  assumed  a  neutral  attitude,  and  even  allowed  the 
Ottomans  to  pass  through  his  province  with  provisions  for 
a  needy  Turkish  garrison  in  Herzegovina. 

During  the  winter  re-enforcements  were  sent  to  Omer 
Pasha.  When  spring  opened,  Turkey  (March,  1862)  in- 
formed the  other  parties  to  the  treaty  of  Paris  (1856)  that 
Montenegro  was  in  a  state  o^f  revolt,  and  then  sent  to  the 
Montenegrin  capital  a  declaration  of  war.^  The  Monte- 
negrins made  a  valiant  resistance  against  the  invading  Otto- 
mans, but  this  time  they  were  no  match  for  the  Turkish  force 
sent  against  them.^  Realizing  after  a  time  that  their  capital 
was  in  danger,  they  bowed  tO'  the  inevitable  and  promised 
to  comply  with  the  demands  of  the  Turkish  ultimatum, 
which  was  issued  from  Scutari  (August  31,  1862)/^  The 
internal  administration  of  MontenegrO'  was  left  as  it  had 
been  before  the  invasion.  But  the  prince  was  obliged  to 
agree  that  his  warrior  father — Mirko' — should  be  exiled, 
and  that  the  road  from  Herzegovina  to  Scutari  passing 
through  the  interior  O'f  his  country,  should  be  kept  open  to 
commerce  by  Turkish  troops,  to  be  quartered  in  guard- 

^De  Testa,  op.  cit.,  vol.  vi,  p.  12. 

'In  the  words  of  William  E.  Gladstone:  "  It  was  then  found  that  an 
empire  of  30,000,000  could  gain  the  advantage  of  a  tribe  under  200,000." 
Nineieenlh  Century  (1877),  vol.  i,  p.  373. 

''Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  1512;  Archive  Diplomatique  {1^2^) ,  vol. 
iii,  p.  269. 


go  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [go 

houses  along  the  way.  All  senators,  chiefs  of  natives,  and 
other  dignitaries  in  Montenegro,  it  was  likewise  agreed, 
would  enter  into  a  written  agreement  that  the  people  of  the 
conquered  province  would  not  make  hostile  excursions  be- 
yond their  frontiers,  and  that  in  case  of  an  uprising  in  neigh- 
boring districts,  they  would  not  afford  either  moral  or  ma- 
terial assistance.  Furthermore,  without  a  Turkish  passport, 
no  family  was  to  be  allowed  tO'  enter  Montenegro;  but  the 
right  of  leasing  land  outside  the  province  for  agricultural 
purposes  was  accorded  to  the  Montenegrins.  Moreover, 
while  the  importation  of  war  supplies  was  strictly  prohibited, 
the  port  of  Antivari  was  opened  to  them  for  the  export  and 
import  of  merchandise,  free  of  duty. 

Russia  earnestly  advised  intervention  in  order  to  prevent 
the  above  conditions  being  imposed  upon  Montenegro.  Eng- 
land, however,  contended  that  the  guaranteeing  powers 
could  not  show  any  possible  justification  for  intervening.* 
Turkey  had  been  admitted,  it  was  contended,  as  an  inde- 
pendent state  to  participate  in  the  advantages  and  duties  of 
the  European  System  (Concert),^  and  Lord  Russell  argued 
that  therefore  the  Sultan  had  the  right  tO'  impose  upon  the 
prince  of  Montenegro  such  conditions  O'f  peace  as  would  be 
likely  to  deter  that  people  from  future  aggressions.^  There 
was  no  formal  intervention  in  this  connection  by  the  treaty 
powers.  Nevertheless,  the  most  offensive  stipulations  in 
the  terms  of  peace  were  never  enforced  against  Montenegro. 

^Archive  Diplomatique  (1863),  vol.  iii,  p.  271. 
'  By  the  Treaty  of  Paris  (1856),  art.  vii. 

'For  Russia's  objections  to  Lord  Russell's  views,  see  Archive  Diplo- 
matique (1863),  vol.  iii,  p.  273.  Russia  maintained  that  the  Montene- 
grins had  never  recognized  the  suzerainty  of  the  Sultan,  and  that  there- 
fore the  terms  of  peace  that  Turkey  was  being  permitted  to  impose  upon 
Montenegro  effected  a  radical  change  in  the  status  quo  there,  and  really 
resulted  in  subjecting  a  Christian  State  to  Turkish  dominion. 


91  ]      UNDER  PROTECTION  OF  EUROPEAN  CONCERT  gi 

The  Porte  soon  withdrew  the  demand  for  the  exile  of  Mirko 
and  eventually  abandoned  the  idea  of  establishing  guard- 
houses along  the  route  through  the  interior  of  the  province.^ 

During  their  fourteen  years  of  peace,  following  the  war 
of  1862,  the  Montenegrins  entered  upon  a  new  life  in  the 
matter  of  schools  and  military  organization.  Up  to  this 
time,  almost  no  attention  had  been  given  there  to  educa- 
tion, and  the  soldier's  preparation  had  consisted  in  un- 
bounded patriotism  and  the  art  of  shooting,  supplemented 
now  and  then  by  experience  on  the  held  of  battle.^  In  con- 
nection with  Prince  Nicholas'  visit  to  Paris,  St.  Petersburg, 
Berlin  and  Vienna  (1868-9),  ^  start  was  made  in 

Montenegro  in  establishing  schools  for  elementary  instruc- 
tion, and  in  providing  the  male  population  between  the  ages 
of  seventeen  and  sixty  with  modern  guns  and  with  some 
niilitary  training. 

In  1868  Prince  Nicholas  promulgated  a  new  constitution, 
which,  at  least,  made  it  convenient  for  him  when  he  so 
desired,  to  leave  with  the  senate  the  care  of  a  considerable 
part  of  the  internal  affairs.  Three  years  later,  under  the 
direction  of  a  Professor  from  Odessa,  there  was  a  laudable 
effort  also  to  bring  the  laws  of  the  principality  more  into 
harmony  with  other  European  systems.  Meanwhile,  the 
Montenegrins  rejoiced  in  the  birth  of  a  hereditary  prince; 
and  by  naming  this  infant  son  Alexander  (Danilo- 
Alexander)  the  parents  afforded  the  Tsar  of  Russia,  Alex- 
ander II,  one  more  reason  for  interesting  himself  in  behalf 
of  this  little  mountain  principality. 

Thus  did  the  Montenegrins  make  ready,  in  a  measure, 

'  Frilley  et  Wlahovitj,  Le  Moniink,Q:ro  Contemporain ,  op.  cit.,  p.  311; 
Nineteenth  Century  {i^yy) ,  vol.  i,  pp.  707-752.  (Article  by  Lord  Strat- 
ford de  Radcliffe) . 

'A  Montenegrin  adage  says:  "Take  my  gun  or  take  my  brother,  it's 
all  one."    Frilley  et  Wlahovitj,  Le  Monthiigro  Coniemporain ,  p.  433. 


92 


THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES 


for  the  Balkan  struggle  against  the  Porte;  and  they  need 
not  claim  our  further  attention  until  we  find  them  joined 
with  their  "  sister  Servian  peoples  "  in  forcing  forward  the 
contest  (1876-78),  which  dealt  so  many  death-blows  to 
the  Sultan's  suzerainty.^ 

THE   BULGARIANS  AND  THEIR  RE-AWAKENING 

Until  the  treaty  of  Paris  (1856)  was  superseded,  for  the 
most  part,  by  the  treaty  of  Berlin  (1878),  as  the  public  law 
of  Europe  in  relation  to  the  Ottoman  empire,  the  Bulgarians 
had  not  secured  any  of  the  political  rights  and  privileges 
that  had  been  accorded  from  time  to  time,  as  we  have  seen, 
to  the  Roumanians,  Servians  and  Montenegrins.  While 
the  territory  inhabited  by  the  latter  peoples  was  contiguous 
to  other  European  states,  the  Bulgarians  dwelt  in  the  in- 
terior of  European  Turkey,  and  were  almost  entirely  shut 
off  from  contact  with  foreigners.^  Being  nearer,  moreover, 
to  the  seat  of  the  sultan's  government,  their  subjection  to 
Ottoman  rule  was,  from  the  first,  more  unreservedly  de- 
manded and  more  uniformly  enforced.  ^ 

The  original  Bulgarians  (''dwellers  by  the  Volga") 
were  mainly,  it  appears,  members  of  an  Ugrian  tribe  of 
Finnish  stock.  About  680  A.  D.  they  left  their  homes  in 
the  Volga  region  and  found  a  new  abiding-place  along  the 

^  Frilley  et  Wlahovitj;  op.  ciL,  chs.  xii,  xiii;  Miller,  The  Balkans  (New 
York,  1896),  ch.  vii.  See  the  Nineteenth  Century  (1877),  vol.  i,  for 
'^Montenegro,''  a  sonnet,  by  Tennyson,  in  which  the  poet-laureate  sings: 

"  O  smallest  among  peoples!  rough  rock-throne 

Of  Freedom  !   

 never  since  thine  own 

Black  ridges  drew  the  cloud  and  brake  the  storm 
Has  breathed  a  race  of  mightier  mountaineers." 

*  Ranke,  History  of  Servia,  p.  7. 

^ Ibid.y  p.  33,  and  ch.  vi;  Odysseus,  Turkey  in  Europe,  op.  cit.,  p.  75; 
Freeman,  Historical  Geography  of  Europe,  p.  431. 


93]      UNDER  PROTECTION  OF  EUROPEAN  CONCERT  93 

south  side  of  the  lower  Danube.  This  territory  they  found 
already  in  the  possession  of  Slavic  tribes,  nominally  under 
the  rule  of  Constantinople.  As  time  went  on,  the  Bul- 
garians seem  to  have  established  a  good  degree  of  political 
unity  among  both  populations.^  About  two  hundred  years 
after  the  migration  of  the  dwellers  by  the  Volga  to  the 
Danubian  territory,  the  Slavic  (Servian)  apostles,  Cyril 
and  Methodius,  taught  the  Christian  religion  throughout 
that  region.  By  the  middle  of  the  thirteenth  century  the 
two  peoples  there  had  become  practically  amalgamated  into 
one  nation,  retaining  the  language  and  the  traditions  of 
the  Slavs,  but  calling  themselves  Vulgars  or  Bulgars.^ 

Under  the  leadership  of  the  first  great  king  (Simeon, 
892-927)  of  these  Slavo-Bulgarian  peoples,  they  forced  Con- 
stantinople to  accept  humiliating  terms  of  peace,  and  Bul- 
garia came  to  include  a  large  part  of  the  Balkan  peninsula.^ 
But  a  hundred  years  later  the  Greeks  were  the  victors,  and 
they  continued  for  one  hundred  and  fifty  years  afterwards 
to  hold  the  Bulgarians  in  subjection.  As  time  went  on  and 
no  relief  was  granted  from  burdensome  taxation  for  the 
support  of  the  Constantinople  Court,  the  Bulgarians  re- 
belled. The  strife  between  Eastern  and  Western  Chris- 
tians (so  called)  soon  afforded  the  Bulgarian  king  an  oppor- 
tunity to  strengthen  his  position,  for  a  time,  by  seeming  to 
espouse  the  cause  of  the  Western  Church.^  So  when  Assen 
II  (1218-1240)  came  to  the  throne  of  Bulgaria,  he  found 
his  kingdom  free  from  Greek  rule.  However,  he  soon 
fell  out  with  the  Latin  authorities  in  possession  of  Constanti- 

'  Bernard,  The  Shade  of  the  Balkans  (London,  1904),  pp.  263,  292, 
312-326;  Journal  of  the  Anthropological  Institute,  vol.  viii,  "Bulgar- 
ians": vol.  xxxvi,  p.  189. 

'Bernard,  Shade  of  the  Balkans,  p.  260;  Finlay,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iii,  p. 
337;  vol.  iv,  p.  28. 

*  Odysseus,  Turkey  in  Europe,  p.  32.  ^  Ibid.,  pp.  35-36. 


94  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [94 

nople  and  allied  himself  with  the  Greeks,  receiving  in  re- 
turn for  this  new  alliance  the  creation  of  the  Patriarchate 
of  Bulgaria/  The  autocephalous  Bulgarian  Church  thus 
established  was  not  wholly  overthrown  until  1767.  During 
the  reign  of  Assen  II,  ancient  Bulgaria  reached  the  zenith 
of  her  power  and  splendor,  and  after  his  death  (1241)  the 
empire  rapidly  declined. 

Then  came  the  Servian  ascendency  in  the  Balkan  country, 
which  resulted  in  the  Bulgarians  being  held  for  some  de- 
cades under  Servian  domination.^  At  different  times  Bul- 
garians, and  also  a  party  among  the  Greeks,  joined  with 
the  Turks  against  the  Servians.  And  only,  when  it  was 
too  late,  did  the  Balkan  peoples  unite  against  the  Osmanlis, 
to  suffer  the  fatal  defeat  of  1389,  at  Kossovo. 

With  this  general  defeat  of  the  Christians  in  1389,  and 
the  burning  of  the  Bulgarian  capital  (Tirnovo)  four  years 
later,  the  Bulgarians  entered  on  their  five  centuries  of 
existence  as  the  Sultan's  submissive  subjects.''  Most  for- 
tunately for  them,  however,  they  were  long  permitted  to 
retain  their  native  hierarchy.  That  was  an  important  fac- 
tor in  keeping  alive  their  language,  their  traditions,  and 
their  sense  of  nationality.  It  was  not  until  1766-7  that  the 
Phanariots,  seeing  the  opportunity  for  extending  hellenizing 
influences,  and  of  replenishing  the  treasury  of  the  Con- 
stantinople Patriarchate,  successfully  used  their  patronage 
at  the  Porte  to  bring  about  the  overthrow  of  the  Bulgarian 
Patriarchate,  as  well  as  that  of  Servia.* 

After  the  Ottoman  victory  at  Kossovo  (1389)  the  term 
Bulgaria,  as  occasionally  used,  could  not  have  had  any  very 

'  Finlay,  History  of  Greece,  vol.  iii,  p.  308;  cf.  supra,  ch.  i,  p.  22. 
*  Odysseus,  op.  cit.,  p.  37. 
'Odysseus,  Turkey  in  Europe,  p.  75. 
Ibid.,  pp.  274-5^  Ranke,  History  of  Servia,  p.  37. 


95]      UNDER  PROTECTION  OF  EUROPEAN  CONCERT  95 


fixed  and  definite  signification  until  Russia  announced 
(1878)  her  specifications  for  a  greater  Bulgaria,  which  were 
promptly  modified^  as  will  be  seen  later,  by  the  European 
creation  of  a  diminutive  Bulgaria/ 

Following  their  incorporation  with  the  Ottoman  empire 
(1389),  the  Bulgarians  seem  gradually  to  have  become 
more  or  less  reconciled  to  living  simple  peasant  lives,  which 
appear  to  have  been,  for  the  most  part,  uneventful.  Con- 
sequently we  may  take  a  long  leap,  so  to  speak,  and  direct 
our  attention  next  to  the  re-awakening  of  the  Bulgarian 
people,  during  the  half-century  preceding  their  political 
liberation  (1878).^  That  re-awakening  among  these  peo- 
ple first  manifested  itself  almost  wholly,  for  a  period  of 
nearly  fifty  years,  in  a  strenuous  effort  to  obtain  again  for 
themselves  ecclesiastical  autonomy.  Native  control  over 
their  own  churches,  and  all  that  it  signified,  came  to  mean 
to  them  the  all-important  means  for  national  development. 

The  important  bearing  of  the  determined  efforts  of  the 
Bulgarians  to  regain  the  management  of  their  own  ecclesias- 
tical affairs,  and  consequently  of  their  educational  institu- 
tions, was  largely  due  to  the  outcome  of  the  unique  method 
adopted  by  the  sultans  for  the  control  and  oversight  of  their 
non-Moslem  subjects.  Mohammet  II — "  The  Conqueror  " 
— had  not  been  in  possession  of  Constantinople  many  days 
(1453)  before  he  proclaimed  himself  the  protector  of  the 

^Selected  Writings  of  Viscount  Strangford,  vol.  i  (London,  1869),  p. 
222;  Freeman,  Historical  Geography  of  Europe,  vol.  i,  pp.  423  et  seq. 
Old  Bulgaria  had  comprehended  little  or  much  territory,  according  to 
the  fortunes  of  war.  Later,  that  part  of  Turkey  bounded,  roughly 
speaking,  by  the  Danube,  the  Black  Sea,  the  Balkan  Mountains  and 
Servia  was  often  conventionally  called  Bulgaria. 

^  After  the  formation  of  Eastern  Roumelia  and  the  principality  of  Bul- 
garia in  1878,  however,  there  were  many  Bulgarians  in  European  Tur- 
key who  were  left  as  much  as  ever  under  the  domination  of  the  Moslems. 


96  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [96 

Orthodox  Eastern  Church  ( Greek He  confirmed  the 
election  of  the  Greek  patriarch,  to  whom  he  granted  im- 
portant immunities,  empowering  him,  at  the  same  time,  to 
decide  among  his  co-rehgionists,  according  to  Greek  cus- 
toms, questions  of  both  civil  and  ecclesiastical  law.^  From 
that  time  on,  sultans  have  continued  to  recognize  the  divis- 
ion of  then-  non-Moslem  subjects  into  separate  religious 
communities,  or  millets.  The  ecclesiastical  head  of  each 
one  of  these  millets  (Orthodox  Greek,  Roman  Catholic, 
Armenian,  etc. — now  eight)  has  ordinarily  been  held  re- 
sponsible, both  by  the  members  of  his  millet  and  by  the 
sultan,  as  the  official  representative  of  his  Community.^ 
These  highest  church  officials  in  the  various  religious  or- 
ganizations, have  often  been  able  to  exert  a  considerable 
influence  over  the  projects  of  the  Porte;  and  until  within 
the  last  half-century  some  of  them  could  exercise  almost 
absolute  power  over  those  under  their  jurisdiction.*  The 
Mussulman  Code,  being  at  once  both  civil  and  religious  in 
its  nature,  is  not  easily  applicable  to  those  of  other  religions ; 
and,  generally  speaking,  the  Turks  have  been  quite  willing 
that  the  Christians  and  the  Jews  inhabiting  the  Ottoman 
dominions  should  settle  many  of  their  own  affairs  among 
themselves.  As  a  consequence,  especially  in  times  when 
the  European  countries  were  not  intimately  concerned  in 
Ottoman  affairs,  so  long  as  the  head  of  any  of  these  re- 

*  Odysseus,  Turkey  in  Europe ,  p.  267;  Menzies,  Turkey  Old  and  New , 
pp.  86-87. 

'Von  Hammer,  Geschichte  des  Osmanischen  Retches  (Pest,  1828), 
vol.  ii,  pp.  2-3;  Finlay,  History  of  Greece,  vol.  iii,  p.  522. 

^  It  has  been  suggested  that  for  more  than  four  centuries  Turkey  came 
near  being  a  "  federation  of  theocracies  under  the  sceptre  of  the  Sultan." 
Cf.  Selected  Writings  of  Viscount  Strangford,  vol.  i,  p.  224. 
Odysseus,  op.  cit.,  ch.  vi;  Seignobos,  op.  cit.,  p.  618. 


gy]      UNDER  PROTECTION  OF  EUROPEAN  CONCERT  97 

ligious  communities  kept  on  good  terms  with  the  Mohamme- 
dan government,  he  could  usually  carry  out  his  own  policies 
in  relation  to  his  millet.^ 

For  centuries  nearly  all  of  the  Bulgarians  remained  true 
to  the  Orthodox  Eastern  Church  (Greek),  and  since  1767 
they  had  been  ecclesiastically  under  the  Greek  patriarch  of 
Constantinople.^  Consequently  their  few  schools  and  prac- 
tically all  of  their  churches  were  in  charge  of  Greeks,  who, 
as  a  rule,  either  could  not  or  would  not  make  any  use  of  the 
Bulgarian  language.  Moreover,  as  neither  the  Turks  nor 
the  Greeks  were  inclined  to  distinguish  between  Greek  Or- 
thodoxy and  Greek  nationality,  the  Bulgarians  came  to  be 
generally  referred  to  as  Greeks.^  It  is  easy  to  see  how 
their  relation  to  the  Greek  Patriarchate  became  more  and 
more  strained.  During  the  first  half  of  the  past  century, 
there  was  a  gradual  growth  of  feeling  and  agitation  among^ 
them,  against  the  exactions  and  even  the  presence  of  Greek 
ecclesiastics  and  teachers.* 

Soon  after  1835  the  Bulgarians  in  the  Balkan  territory 
began  to  open  schools  and  to  make  their  complaints  and 
wishes  known  at  Constantinople.^  This  growing  desire  for 
national  schools  was  concurrent  with  their  increasing  deter- 
mination to  have  a  national  hierarchy.  Earlier  in  the  cen- 
tury, the  realization  of  a  free  Greece  and  an  autonomous 
Servia,  had  no  doubt  started  the  revival  of  a  national  spirit 
among  the  Bulgarians.  They  very  soon  discovered,  how- 
ever, that  even  an  effort  to  bring  about  the  general  use  and 

'Creacy,  History  of  the  Ottoman  Turks  (New  York,  1877),  p.  207; 
Finlay,  History  of  Greece,  vol.  v,  pp.  209-210. 

'  C/.  supra,  p.  22.  'Finlay,  vol.  vi,  pp.  1-12. 

^The  People  of  Turkey,  ed.  by  S.  L.-Pool,  London,  1878,  vol.  ii,p  p. 
208  ei  seq. 

^Cf.  Miller,  The  Balkans,  ch.  v;  Odysseus,  Turkey  in  Europe,  passim. 


98  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [98 

the  development  of  their  own  language  would  be  almost 
hopeless  while  they  remained  under  the  domination  of  a 
foreign  hierarchy.  But  down  to  1870,  at  least,  there  does 
seem  to  have  been  among  the  Bulgarians,  any  very  general 
feeling  of  disloyalty  toward  the  sultan/ 

Shortly  before  the  outbreak  of  the  Crimean  War,  how- 
ever, the  Tsar  of  Russia  tried  to  make  it  appear  that  the 
Bulgarians  were  even  then  ready  for  revolt.  In  his  con- 
fidential talk  at  that  time  with  the  British  ambassador  at 
St.  Petersburg  (April,  1853),  ^^e  Tsar  Nicholas  I  is  re- 
ported to  have  afifirmed  that  only  his  efforts  to  check  the 
manifestation  of  feelings  of  discontent  among  the  Bul- 
garians had  kept  them  from  insurrection.^  Nevertheless, 
their  grievances  against  the  Turks  were  generally  attributed 
to  the  maladministration  of  the  laws;  and  doubtless  few 
among  that  essentially  peasant  people,  even  down  into  the 
seventies,  were  antagonistic  towards  the  supreme  Ottoman 
authority.*''  But  they  did  determine  to  rid  themselves  of  the 
domination  and  the  burdens  of  what  they  felt  more  and 
more  keenly  to  be  a  wholly  foreign  and  unsympathetic 
hierarchy.*  There  were,  in  the  meantime,  quite  active  ef- 
forts by  the  Bulgarians  along  educational  lines.  In  this 
work  they  were  greatly  aided  by  the  services  of  some  of 
their  youths  who  were  now  beginning  to  be  trained,  especi- 
ally in  the  schools  of  France  and  Germany,  as  well  as  in 
the  near-by  American  institutions.  ° 

^The  People  of  Turkey,  pp.  208-214;  Finlay,  History  of  Greece,  vol. 
vii,  p.  126;  Good  Words  (1865),  pp.  197-205. 

Parliamentary  Papers ,  1854,  vol.  Ixxi,  p.  846. 

^ Ibid.,  1861,  vol.  Ixvii,  pp.  560,  597;  1867,  vol.  Ixxv,  p.  647;  Contem- 
porary Review,  vol.  xxxv,  "The  New  Bulgaria,"  loc.  cit. 

^Selected  Writings  of  Viscount  Strangford,  vol.  i,  p.  223. 

^The  People  of  Turkey,  p.  219;  St.  Clair  and  Brophy,  The  Eastern 
Question  in  Bulgaria  (London,  1877),  p.  290.  A  considerable  number 
attended  schools  in  Russia  also. 


99]      UNDER  PROTECTION  OF  EUROPEAN  CONCERT  99 

The  sultan's  decree  in  1856  (noted  in  the  treaty  of  Paris) 
of  sweeping  reforms  and  of  an  equal  status  for  his  subjects 
of  whatever  religion,  had  provided  that  the  various  ecclesi- 
astical taxes  should  be  replaced  by  regular  salaries  to  all 
church  officials/  The  following  year  several  Bulgarian 
towns  petitioned  the  Ottoman  government  for  the  privilege 
of  availing  themselves  of  this  part  of  the  promised  reforms ; 
and  they  asked  also  for  the  appointment  of  a  Bulgarian 
bishop.  The  Greek  Patriarch,  however,  refused  to  sanction 
any  such  innovations.  With  a  view  of  settling  the  con- 
troversy, an  assembly,  intended  to  be  representative  of  the 
Orthodox  community  (Greek),  was  then  called  by  the  Porte. 
Of  the  twenty-eight  representatives  who  assembled,  how- 
ever, only  four  were  Bulgarians.  Under  these  conditions, 
the  Patriarch's  party  could  not  fail  to  win.  So  the  assem- 
bly closed  in  i860,  after  having  particularly  affirmed  that  in 
the  appointment  of  bishops  the  Church  could  not  take  any 
account  of  the  matter  of  race  or  nationality.^ 

Throughout  the  next  decade,  nevertheless,  the  Bulgarians 
kept  up  the  struggle  for  ecclesiastical  autonomy.^  By  1867 
there  was  a  wide  breach  between  the  Greek  clergy  and  the 
Bulgarian  population.  Many  places  were  then  without 
bishops  because  the  Bulgarians  would  no'  longer  recognize 
the  Greek  ecclesiastics  who  were  sent  among  them.  It  was 
not  in  any  sense  a  question  of  doctrine  or  denomination,  for 
the  Bulgarians  were  merely  seeking  to  free  themselves  from 
the  tutelage  of  the  Greeks,  and  to  have  a  national  synod  with 
a  representative  at  Constantinople.* 

Meanwhile,  apparently  with  a  view  of  giving  the  non- 

'Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  1243. 
'Odysseus,  Turkey  in  Europe,  p.  283. 

^Selected  Writings  of  Viscount  Strangford,  vol.  i,  pp.  218  ei  seq. 
^Parliamentary  Papers,  1867,  vol.  Ixvii,  p.  597,  and  passim. 


lOO  T'HE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [iqo 

Mussulman  element  in  the  empire  some  share  in  judicial  pro- 
ceedings, the  Porte  made  preparations  for  important  changes 
in  provincial  administration.  The  reorganized  pashaliks, 
or  districts,  were  now  (1864)  called  vilayets.  By  this  new 
arrangement  the  large  "  vilayet  of  the  Danube "  was,  in 
respect  to  population,  a  sort  of  Bulgarian  province.  Despite 
all  obstacles,  this  part  of  the  Balkan  territory  reaped  some 
benefit  from  the  new  regulations  relating  to  provincial  ad- 
ministration. Under  its  first  governor,  the  eminent  Turkish 
reformer  and  statesman,  Midhat  Pasha, ^  a  good  start  was 
made  in  that  vilayet  along  several  lines  of  reform.  But,  un- 
fortunately for  the  Bulgarians,  before  his  reform  measures 
could  be  established  there  on  a  firm  basis,  he  was  called  to 
Constantinople  to  preside  over  the  Council  of  State.^ 

The  continued  opposition  of  the  Greek  hierarchy  to  the 
Bulgarian  demands  for  ecclesiastical  liberty,  inclined  some 
of  the  Bulgarians  to  favor  a  union  with  the  Western  Church 
(Catholic).  The  prospect  of  such  a  movement  at  that  time 
very  naturally  roused  the  apprehensions  of  Orthodox  Russia. 
Finally,  after  the  failure  of  a  number  of  compromise  meas- 
ures, and  with  the  full  accord  of  England  and  France,  and 
the  active  support  of  Russia,  the  Sultan  issued  a  firman 
(February,  1870)  establishing  the  Bulgarian  Exarchate, 
thus  creating  an  autonomous  Bulgarian  Church.^  Two 
years  passed,  however,  before  the  first  exarch  was  elected; 
and  then  the  Patriarchate  declared  the  new  Church  schis- 
matic and  pronounced  the  sentence  of  excommunication 
against  all  who  should  desert  the  Orthodox  Greek  Commu- 
nity and  place  themselves  under  the  ecclesiastical  authority 
of  the  new  Bulgarian  Exarchate.    Nevertheless,  nearly  all 

^  Ali  Midhat,  Life  of  Midhai  Pasha  (London,  1903),  pp.  37  seg. 
'St.  Clair  and  Brophy,  op.  cU.,  chs.  xii,  xiii. 

'Odysseus,  Turkey  in  Europe,  pp.  283-85.  For  the  English  text  of 
this  firman,  see  Baker,  Turkey  (New  York,  1879),  pp.  435  et  seg. 


lOi]    UNDER  PROTECTION  OF  EUROPEAN  CONCERT  loi 

of  the  Bulgarians  determined  to  brave  the  possible  conse- 
quences of  excommunication,  and  resolutely  supported  their 
native  church  organization. 

The  Bulgarians  had  now  won  what  they  at  once  regarded 
as  ecclesiastical  freedom,  and  in  so  doing  they  had  gained 
the  means  and  the  inspiration  for  more  general  and  effective 
efforts  towards  securing  some  degree  of  political  liberty/ 
In  creating  the  Bulgarian  Exarchate,  the  Sultan  had  formed 
within  his  empire  another  religious  community,  or  millet; 
and  it  was  but  natural,  perhaps,  that  such  a  move  should  be 
regarded  in  the  Balkans  as  a  formal  recognition  of  the  Bul- 
garian nationality.  When  we  remember  the  extent  to 
which  the  affairs  of  each  one  oi  these  religious  communities 
were  administered  by  its  ecclesiastical  head,  we  get  some 
notion  of  what  this  victory  meant  to  the  Bulgarians.  It  is 
so  common  in  the  Orient  for  political  and  ecclesiastical  au- 
thority to  go  hand  in  hand,  that  the  right  to  manage  their 
own  Church,  together  with  the  accompanying  civil  jurisdic- 
tion, could  not  have  failed  to  arouse  and  to  sustain  ardent 
desires  among  the  Bulgarians,  and  to  give  to  them  anxious 
hopes  for  a  still  wider  field  of  self-government.  There  are 
most  conflicting  accounts  of  the  general  feeling  of  the  Bul- 
garians toward  the  Sultan's  government,  previous  to  the 
time  when  the  approach  of  the  Russian  army  became  a  cer- 
tainty (1877).  Nevertheless,  there  seems  to  be  but  little 
reason  to  doubt,  that  without  the  work  of  agitators,  operat- 
ing in  Bulgaria  from  their  headquarters  in  Servia,  Roumania 
and  Russia,  the  Bulgarian  population  would  not,  for  some 
time  at  least,  have  risen  in  insurrection.  The  attempted 
revolt  of  some  of  the  Bulgarians  in  1876  was  but  a  part  of 
the  general  insurrectionary  movement  in  the  Balkans.  That 

*  Minchin,  Growth  of  Freedom  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  p.  365;  Fin- 
lay,  History  of  Greece,  vol.  ii,  p.  126. 


THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [102 


being  the  case,  all  that  need  be  said  in  reference  to  what  has 
come  to  be  known  as  the  "Bulgarian  atrocities"  (1B76) 
very  naturally  has  a  place  in  the  more  general  account  of  the 
Balkan  uprising  (1875-78).^ 


^Cf.  Beaman,  Stambuloff  (London,  1985),  ch.  i. 


CHAPTER  III 


International  Complications,  and  the  Outcome  in 
THE  Balkans — 1870-1878 

The  quarter  of  a  century  following  the  signing  of  the 
treaty  of  Paris  (1856)  brought  to  Europe  political  trans- 
formations of  far-reaching  significance.  Much  of  that 
eventful  period,  it  will  be  remembered,  was  taken  up  with 
the  final  conflicts  which  cleared  the  field  for  the  unification  of 
both  Italy  and  Germany. 

Austria  had  but  lately  been  defeated  and  humiliated,  and 
the  attention  of  Europe  was  absorbed  by  the  Franco-German 
struggle,  when  in  1870,  Tsar  Alexander  announced  to  the 
other  signatory  powers  of  the  treaty  of  1856,  that  he  could 
no  longer  consent  to  be  bound  by  such  clauses  of  that  treaty 
as  were  inimical  to  the  interests  of  his  empire.  At  the  same 
time  the  Tsar  pointed  out  that  the  powers  had  allowed  parts 
of  the  agreement  of  1856  to  be  disregarded,  to  the  detriment 
of  Russia.  He  contended  that  because  the  treaty  had  not 
stood  the  test  of  time,  its  neutralization  of  the  Black  Sea 
should  not,  and  could  not,  by  him,  be  accepted  as  any  lomger 
constituting  a  pledge  of  security  to  Russia's  interests  along 
her  Black  Sea  frontier.^  In  short,  the  Tsar  announced  his 
intention  to  exercise  Russia's  sovereign  rights  in  that  sea, 
and  to  allow  the  Sultan  to  resume  there  whatever  rights  may 
have  belonged,  before  1856,  to  the  Ottoman  empire. 

Without  discussing  the  merits  oif  Russia's  reasons  for 
being  unwilling  to  stand  by  the  stipulations  in  question,  the 
British  government,  seconded  by  Austria,  vigorously  pro- 

'Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iii,  p.  1892. 
103I  103 


I04 


THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [104 


tested  against  the  Tsar's  assumption  that  one  of  the  signa- 
tory powers  could  alone  release  herself  and  others  from 
treaty  obligations.  The  upshot  of  the  controversy  was 
that  conferences  of  the  treaty  powers  were  held  in  London 
(January-March,  1871),  and  that  all  the  restrictions  in  the 
treaty  oi  Paris  bearing  on  the  military  arrangements  of 
Russia  and  Turkey  in  the  Black  Sea,  were  abrogated/  At 
the  same  time,  however,  all  of  the  signatory  powers  recorded 
their  recognition  of  the  proposition  that  "  it  is  an  essential 
principle  of  the  law  of  nations,  that  no  power  can  liberate 
itself  from  the  engagement  of  a  treaty,  nor  modify  the  stipu- 
lations thereof,  unless  with  the  consent  of  the  contracting 
powers."  ^  Moreover,  by  renewing  and  confirming  all  the 
stipulations  of  the  treaty  of  Paris  not  annulled  by  their  new 
agreement — the  treaty  of  London — it  will  be  seen  that  the 
contracting  powers  attempted  in  1871  to  give  a  new  lease 
of  life  to  all  that  was  left  of  the  treaty  of  1856.^ 

At  a  meeting  in  Berlin  of  the  emperors  of  Austria-Hun- 
gary, Germany,  and  Russia,  a  year  after  the  treaty  of  Lon- 
don settled  the  Black-Sea  incident,  most  intimate  relations 
were  once  again  established  between  these  three  eastern  gov- 
ernments. Although  there  was  no  formal  alliance,  as  it 
appears,  between  these  monarchs,  there  was,  nevertheless, 
an  understanding  that  the  three  courts  would  act  in  common 
in  the  settlement  of  questions  subsequently  arising  in  the 
East.*  Only  three  years  passed  before  this  agreement  was 
to  be  put  to  the  test.    The  Balkan  insurrection  that  p/oved 

^The  protocols  of  these  six  conferences  may  be  seen  in  Martens, 
Nouveau  Recueil  GinSral,  vol.  xviii;  also  in  Parliamentary  Papers, 
1871,  vol.  Ixxii.  The  correspondence  relating  to  the  Black  Sea  incident 
is  also  in  this  volume  of  Parliamentary  Papers. 

'Hertslet,  vol.  iii,  p.  1901.  ^ Ibid.,  p.  1922. 

^ Bismarck' s  Autobiography,  trans,  by  Butler  (New  York  and  Lon- 
don, 1899),  vol.  ii,  p.  251. 


I05]  INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS 


SO  fatal  to  the  territorial  integrity  of  the  Ottoman  empire 
broke  out  in  1875,  and  for  more  than  a  year  these  three 
powers  took  the  initiative,  collectively,  in  three  successive 
plans,  ostensibly  intended  to  put  an  end  to  the  disturb,ances. 

In  connection  with  reform  projects  looking  towards  the 
execution  of  the  Hatti-Humayoun  of  1856,  Turkey  had  taken 
some  steps,  notably  in  1862  and  in  1867,  to  better  her  system 
of  assessing  and  collecting  taxes  in  the  European  provinces 
still  wholly  under  Ottoman  rule.^  The  plan  of  farming 
the  tithes,  however,  had  been  allowed  to  go  on  in  those 
districts  without  any  satisfactory  modifications.  It  was 
in  connection  with  the  working  of  that  system,  that  a 
few  peasants  in  Herzegovina  commenced  an  armed  resist- 
ance, in  1875,  what  they  represented  to  be  the  unjust  ex- 
actions of  local  Ottoman  officials.  The  beginnings  of  that 
very  eventful  contest  of  1875-78  thus  have  reference  to 
Turkish  provinces  not  under  consideration  in  this  paper; 
but  the  European  Concert  soon  became  involved  in  the  con- 
flict; and,  from  its  very  beginning,  Servia  and  Montenegro 
played  important  parts. 

Under  the  lead  of  the  signatory  powers  of  the  treaty  of 
Paris,  successive  efforts  were  made  to  bring  about  an  ad- 
justment satisfactory  to  the  insurgents,  as  well  as  to  the 
Porte.  Most  generous  promises  and  detailed  projects  of 
reforms,  were  announced  from  time  to  time  by  the  Sultan's 
government;  but  there  was  suicidal  delay  in  their  execution. 
Month  by  month  the  number  of  insurgents  increased,  and 
Slavic  sympathy  became  more  and  more  demonstrative. 
Servian  and  Montenegrin  armies  battled  with  the  Ottoman 
forces  that  had  been  waiting  near  the  boundaries  of  these 
two  principalities.  And  all  this  time  the  insurgents  in  Her- 
zegovina and  Bosnia  steadfastly  refused  to  lay  down  their 

^  State  Papers,  op.  cit.,  vol.  Ixiii,  p.  1251. 


.  Io6  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [io6 

arms  until  they  should  receive  some  satisfactory  guarantee 
for  the  execution  of  promised  reforms.  Within  two  years 
after  the  insurrection  started  in  Herzegovina,  it  had  in- 
volved all  the  Balkan  provinces ;  and  inside  of  another  year, 
the  Russian  armies  terminated  the  contest,  as  is  well  known, 
and  Turkey  practically  lost  all  of  that  territory. 

About  a  month  after  the  beginning  of  the  insurrection  in 
Herzegovina  (1875),  Austria-Hungary,  Russia  and  Ger- 
many, presented  to  the  Porte  a  modus  operandi.  The  plan 
was  to  have  these  three  courts  send  representatives  into  the 
disturbed  districts  for  the  purpose  of  informing  the  insur- 
gents that  no  help  would  be  given  to  them  by  either  of  these 
countries,  or  by  Servia  or  Montenegro.  A  Turkish  "  High 
Commissioner  "  was  to  go  along  at  the  same  time,  and  the 
foreign  delegates  were  to  advise  the  insurgents  to  make  all 
their  grievances  known  to  this  special  representative  of  the 
Sultan.  The  duty  of  the  Turkish  commissioner  would  con- 
sist in  hearing  complaints  and  in  correcting  abuses;  and 
thus  he  would  be  expected  to  carry  forward  the  work  of 
pacification.  This  project  which  originated  with  the  three 
eastern  courts  was  carried  out  (August),  except  that  France, 
Italy  and  England  also  sent  representatives,  and  the  insur- 
gents were  accordingly  told  that  they  must  not  expect  help 
or  coiuntenance  from  any  source  whatever.^ 

This  undertaking  by  the  European  powers,  however,  was 
doomed  to  failure.  The  insurgents  absolutely  refused  to 
put  any  trust  in  Turkish  promises,  and  required,  before  lay- 
ing down  their  arms,  either  the  execution  of  the  most  urgent 
reforms,  or  a  guarantee  for  their  execution  from  the  foreign 
powers. 

^The  correspondence  in  connection  with  the  various  movements  at 
this  time  may  be  found  in  Parliamentary  Papers ,  1876,  yol.  Ixxxiv,  pp. 
143  et  seq. 


loy]  INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS 


The  desired  guarantee  was  hopelessly  out  of  the  question; 
and  the  Turkish  commissioner  demanded,  as  a  preliminary 
to  any  step  towards  the  redress  of  grievances,  that  the  in- 
surgents should  lay  down  their  arms  and  return  to  their 
homes.  Hence  a  deadlock  ensued.  Meanwhile,  sym- 
pathy with  the  uprising  grew  apace  in  the  surrounding  ter- 
ritory. The  situation  became  more  and  more  threatening, 
and  the  Sultan  issued  decrees  (October  and  December)  or- 
dering judicial  and  financial  reforms,  and  granting  certain 
immunities  and  favors  to  all  Ottoman  subjects.^  But  the 
officials  in  the  disturbed  districts  either  could  not  or  would 
not  gO'  very  far  in  carrying  out  the  policies  enunciated  in 
these  Imperial  decrees. 

The  Turkish  government  was  making  so  Httle  progress  in 
Herzegovina,  either  in  reforming  the  administration  or  in 
subduing  the  insurgents,  that  Austria-Hungary,  Russia  and 
Germany  again  led  the  way  in  proposing  a  plan  for  helping 
forward,  ostensibly,  the  work  of  pacification.  By  this  time 
these  three  cabinets  understood  full  well  that  it  would  be  of 
no  avail  simply  to  enjoin  Servia  and  Montenegro,  or  any 
of  the  Sultan's  Christian  subjects  in  that  vicinity,  to  refrain 
from  hostilities.  Therefore,  the  purpose  of  this  second  pro^- 
ject  was  to  have  the  Porte  "  pledge  itself  to  Europe  "  to 
execute  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  certain  specified  re- 
forms.^ Count  Andrassy,  the  Austro-Hungarian  minister, 
drew  up  the  proposals,  and  they  received  a  ready  assent  at 
Paris  and  Rome,  but  there  was  delay  in  London.  The 
British  government  had  protested  at  first  against  the  earlier 
plans  for  sending  representatives  to  Herzegovina,  and  had 
finally  maintained  the  unity  of  the  European  Concert  after 

^Hertslet,  op.  cii.,  vol.  iv,  pp.  2407,  2409. 

'The  text  of  the  Andrassy  Note,  as  this  communication  was  afterward 
called,  may  be  found  in  Parliamentary  Papers,  1876,  vol.  Ixxxiv,  p.  216; 
and  in  Hertslet,  vol.  iv,  p.  2418. 


Io8  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [io8 


being  strongly  urged  by  Turkey  to  do  so/  The  Porte  im- 
portuned the  London  government  to  give  its  support  Hke- 
wise  to  the  Andrassy  Note.  It  v^as  the  poHcy  of  England 
all  along  to-  grant  more  time  to  the  Ottomans  in  which  to 
suppress  the  insurrection,  and  to  thus  avoid  the  possible 
dangers  connected  with  the  outside  interference.  Neverthe- 
less, after  a  month's  delay,  the  British  ambassador  at  Con- 
stantinople, Sir  Henry  Elliot,  was  instructed  (January, 
1876)  to  give  a  general  support  to  the  proposals. 

The  note  was  then  communicated  to  the  Porte  by  the  am- 
bassadors from  the  three  courts  that  originated  the  plan, 
and  the  ambassadors  from  France,  England  and  Italy  gave 
verbal  assurances  that  their  governments  were  in  accord.^ 
The  Andrassy  Note,  as  the  communication  has  come  to  be 
called,  demanded  that  the  Porte  establish  religious  liberty  and 
abolish  tax-farming  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  employ  in 
these  provinces  the  taxes  collected  there,  ameliorate  the  con- 
dition of  the  rural  populations  and  provide  for  the  election, 
by  the  inhabitants  there,  of  an  equal  number  of  Christians 
and  Mussulmans,  to  watch  over  the  execution  of  all  reforms 
thus  far  promised. 

The  primary  object  of  these  identic  representations  to 
the  Porte  had  been  to  obtain  from  the  Turkish  government 
a  written  promise  to  the  guaranteeing  powers,  that  these  spe- 
cific reforms  would  be  promptly  executed.  Such  a  formal 
agreement  as  that,  some  of  the  powers  asserted,  would  en- 
able the  European  Concert  to  induce  the  insurgents  and  their 

^Parliamentary  Papers,  1876,  vol.  Ixxxiv,  p.  239. 

^  Sir  Henry  Elliott  reported  to  his  home  government  that  none  but 
the  Austro-Hungarian  ambassador  read  the  communication  to  the  Turk- 
ish foreign  minister.  On  the  other  hand  the  Turkish  minister  reported 
that  it  was  read  to  him  by  the  ambassadors  of  Austria-Hungary,  Ger- 
many and  Russia.  Parliamentary  Papers,  1876,  vol.  Ixxxiv,  pp.  248, 
251-3. 


I09]  INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS 


sympathizers  to  open  the  way  for  reforms  by  completely 
abandoning  hostilities.  The  English  government,  however, 
did  not  agree  with  the  other  five  cabinets  in  regarding  the 
Andrassy  Note  as  being  in  the  nature  of  a  demand,  but 
chose  to  refer  to  the  communication  that  had  been  made  to 
the  Porte,  by  the  use  of  such  terms  as  "  suggestions  "  ad- 
vice and  the  like.  In  view  oi  this  attitude  in  London,  it 
is  not  strange,  perhaps,  that  Turkey  adopted  the  same  view 
of  the  Note,  and  framed  a  reply  accordingly.^  All  the  repre- 
sentations that  were  made  to  the  Sultan's  government  in 
connection  with  the  presentation  of  the  Andrassy  Note  were 
received  by  the  Porte  without  the  least  show  of  impatience 
or  disapproval.  And  the  brief  response,  communicated  to 
the  powers  a  little  later,  clearly  indicated  that  the  Note  was 
regarded  at  Constantinople  as  a  bit  of  friendly  counsel.* 
The  reply  merely  informed  the  powers  that  an  irade  ^  had 
just  been  issued  for  the  immediate  execution  of  four  out  of 
the  five  proposed  reforms.  At  the  same  time  it  was  pointed 
out  that  the  proposition  for  the  local  use  of  the  revenues 
collected  in  the  insurgent  provinces  could  not  well  be  adopted, 
but  that  a  certain  sum  would  be  added  to  what  had  usually 
been  allotted  to  these  two  districts. 

This  second  plan  (Jan.,  1876)  for  putting  an  end  to  the 
insurrection  proved  to  be  the  last  concerted  effort  in  this 
connection  that  received  even  a  provisional  acceptance  by 
all  parties  concerned.  The  communication  of  this  note  to 
the  Porte  was  followed  by  no  lack  of  orders  and  instructions 
from  Constantinople  to  Ottoman  authorities  in  the  insurgent 
territory.  But  the  officials  there  were  changed  so  often, 
and  there  were  so  many  obstacles,  that  scarcely  a  beginning 

^Parliamentary  Papers,  1876,  vol.  Ixxxiv,  p.  239. 
*/bid.,  1876,  vol.  Ixxxiv,  p.  251. 

'A  document  expressing  the  Sultan's  will  and  orders. 


no  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [no 

was  made  in  these  provinces  towards  the  execution  of  any 
of  the  Imperial  edicts.  The  time  had  gone  by,  however, 
when  liberal  promises  or  reform  projects,  as  such,  could 
have  any  favorable  bearing  on  the  situation.  So  the 
Andrassy  note,  of  January,  1876,  was  followed,  as  spring 
came  on,  by  a  much  more  general  hostile  attitude  towards 
Turkish  authority  throughout  all  of  the  Slavic  provinces.^ 

At  the  very  commencement  of  this  insurrection,  the 
Turkish  government  had  been  impressed  with  its  seriousness, 
and  had  looked  upon  it  as  but  the  beginning  of  a  carefully 
worked  out  design.^  The  British  government  counseled 
Turkey,  at  that  time,  to  regard  the  disturbance  as  a  local 
affair,  and  to  deal  with  it  promptly  and  effectively,  without 
any  appeal  for  the  support  of  the  guaranteeing  powers.  At 
that  time  the  central  government  at  Constantinople  already 
was  weakened,  it  is  true,  by  the  approaching  crisis  that  re- 
sulted in  the  dethronement  of  Sultan  Aziz,  in  May,  1.876. 
Nevertheless,  Turkey's  appeals  to  the  guaranteeing  powers 
when  the  insurrection  was  confined  to  a  very  limited  area, 
may  be  taken  to  mean  that  the  Porte  was  disposed  to  throw 
the  responsibility  of  a  settlement  on  the  powers  that  had 
declared  in  such  strong  terms,  that  the  sovereignty  of  the 
Sultan  and  the  integrity  of  his  empire  must  be  maintained. 
Indeed,  in  the  light  of  subsequent  events,  also,  it  becomes 
quite  apparent  that,  all  through  this  contest,  the  treaty  of 
Paris  and  the  declarations  relating  to  certain  parts  of  it, 
were  stumbling-blocks  to  the  Turks.  The  Ottomans  had 
been  led  by  these  representations  of  the  powers,  it  would 
appear,  to  feel  far  too  sanguine  respecting  the  ultimate  se- 
curity of  their  empire.^ 

^Parliamentary  Papers,  1876,  vol.  Ixxxiv,  pp.  284,  290-305,  361. 
^ Parliamentary  Papers ,  1876,  vol.  Ixxxiv,  p.  147. 
*  Musurus  Pasha,  the  Turkish  ambassador  at  London  during  this  crisis, 
had  held  the  post  for  about  thirty  years.    "  His  great  mistake,"  wrote 


Ill] 


INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS 


III 


As  the  spring  of  1876  advanced,  Servia  and  Montenegro 
assumed  a  more  hostile  attitude  toward  the  Ottoman  govern- 
ment, and  there  were  also  threatening  signs  of  an  insur- 
rection among  the  Bulgarians  in  the  Adrianople  district/ 
In  April,  the  insurgent  chiefs  in  Herzegovina  made  known 
their  requests.  No  change  in  the  political  status  of  their 
people  was  even  suggested;  but  they  asked  that  a  third  of 
the  land  in  that  province  be  given  to  the  Christians,  that 
Turkey  should  rebuild  their  houses  and  churches  that  had 
been  burned,  and  supply  them  with  agricultural  implements 
and  food  for  at  least  a  year.  And  they  demanded,  more- 
over, that  a  European  commission  should  receive  all  money 
and  supplies,  and  should  have  full  charge  in  making  use  of 
the  same,  for  these  purposes.^ 

The  cabinets  of  Russia,  Austria-Hungary  and  Germany 
were  engaged  in  preparing  a  third  series  of  propositions  to 
the  Porte  (the  Berlin  memorandum),  when  two  startling 
events  happened  (May,  1876),  which  lessened  Turkey's 
chances  for  favorable  consideration  at  the  European  courts. 
A  Mussulman  mob  at  Salonica  assassinated  the  French  and 
German  consuls  (the  latter  an  Englishman),  and  an  insigni- 
ficant insurrection  among  the  Bulgarians  was  suppressed 
by  irregular  Turkish  troops  (Bashi-Bazouks),  with  fright- 
ful and  indiscriminate  slaughter.  Nearly  fifteen  thousand 
Bulgarians  were  killed,  and  upwards  of  sixty  villages  were 
burned.^    Two  months  after  this  atrocious  affair,  Disraeli, 

the  Austro-Hungarian  ambassador  at  London,  "was  that  he  still  looked 
upon  England  as  the  England  of  the  Crimean  War,  twenty  years  after 
that  event."  Memoirs  of  Count  Beust  (London,  1887),  vol.  ii,  p.  309. 
Parliamentary  Papers,  1876,  vol.  Ixxxiv,  p.  417. 

'^Parliamentary  Papers,  1876,  vol.  Ixxxiv,  p.  361. 

''For  reports  based  on  investigations  made  by  Turkish,  English  and 
American  representatives,  see  Parliamentary  Papers ,  1877,  vol.  xc,  pp. 
143  et  seq. 


112  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [112 

England's  prime  minister,  was  still  not  ready  to  give  to  the 
House  the  information  that  he  had  received  concerning  the 
uprising.  His  replies  to  inquiries,  moreover,  were  lacking 
in  seriousness ;  and  he  suggested  that  what  had  happened  to 
the  Bulgarians  might  be  found  to  be  merely  the  usual 
accompaniment  of  a  war  of  insurrection."  ^  Yet,  even  before 
Mr.  Gladstone's  impassioned  utterances  in  pamphlets  and 
speeches  against  Disraeli's  policy  in  supporting  the  Ottoman 
government,  the  British  ambassador  at  Constantinople  had 
been  informed  for  his  guidance,  that  the  late  events  in  Bul- 
garia had  completely  destroyed  all  sympathy  in  England 
with  Turkey.  In  fact,  the  London  Foreign  Office  went  so 
far  at  that  time  (August,  1876)  as  to  admit  that  if  Russia 
were  to  declare  war  against  Turkey,  the  British  govern- 
ment would  find  it  practically  impossible  to  interfere  in  de- 
fense of  the  Ottoman  empire.^  In  fact,  back  in  May,  when 
England  refused  to  give  her  sanction  to  the  Berlin  memor- 
andum, the  British  government  had  suggested  to  Turkey 
that  the  feeling  in  England  had  changed  since  the  Crimean 
War,  and  that  the  Sultan's  government  could  not  "  count 
upon  more  than  the  moral  support "  of  the  London  govern- 
ment.^ In  September  of  the  same  year,  however.  Ambassa- 
dor Elliot  wrote  from  Constantinople  urging  his  Home  gov- 
ernment against  allowing  whatever  number  of  Bulgarians 
had  perished  in  connection  with  the  insurrection  to  affect 
the  policy  of  England  in  upholding  her  own  interests,  by 
firmly  standing  for  the  status  quo  in  Turkey.* 

^Hansard's  Debates  (1876),  vol.  ccxxx,  p.  1181. 

'Morley,  Life  of  Gladstone  (New  York,  1903),  vol.  ii,  ch.  iv;  Parli- 
amentary Papers,  1877,  vol.  xc,  p.  243;  vol.  xci,  p.  405. 

^  Parliamentary  Papers,  1876,  vol.  Ixxxiv,  p.  464;  1877,  vol.  xci,  p. 
393. 

Ibid,,  1877,  vol.  xc,  p.  197. 


113]  INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS  113 

The  proposal  (commonly  called  the  Berlin  Memorandum)  ^ 
which  the  governments  of  the  three  powers  mentioned 
above  had  already  agreed  upon,  was  communicated  to  the 
English,  French  and  Italian  ambassadors  at  Berlin,  on  May 
13,  1876.  The  desire  of  the  three  courts  that  had  taken  the 
initiative  was  that  the  guaranteeing  powers  should  make 
this  a  collective  communication  to  the  Porte.  The  first 
demand  was  to  be  for  an  armistice  of  two  months.  Then 
Turkey  was  to  be  asked  to  aid  the  returning  refugees,  and 
to  provide  for  the  election  of  the  mixed  commission,  men- 
tioned in  the  Andrassy  note,  so  soon  as  hostilities  were  sus- 
pended. It  was  now  required  also  that  the  president  of 
this  commission  should  be  a  Herzegovinian  Christian.  The 
particularly  new  departures,  in  this  document,  were  the  pro-* 
visions  for  surveillance  by  the  consuls  or  delegates  of  the 
powers  over  the  application  of  reforms  and  the  return  of 
refugees;  and  there  was  also  an  intimation,  that  if  some- 
what satisfactory  results  were  not  worked  out  during  the 
period  of  the  armistice,  the  powers  would  then  undertake 
more    efficacious  measures."  ^ 

The.  French  and  Italian  governments  at  once  signified 
their  readiness  to  support  these  propositions;  but  the  Eng- 
lish government,  while  having  no  plan  to  propose,  stead- 
fastly refused  to  take  any  part  whatever  in  presenting  the 
Berlin  memorandum  to  the  Porte.^  Within  a  few  days,  the 
purport  of  this  document  became  known  in  some  way  at 
Constantinople,  and  the  Porte  let  it  be  known  in  London 
that  Turkey  would  not  accept  any  propositions  beyond  those 
that  had  been  agreed  to  by  all  parties  only  five  months 
earlier  (contained  in  the  Andrassy  note).  The  confusion 
at  Constantinople,  consequent  upon  the  deposition  of  Sultan , 


'  Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iv,  p.  2459. 

^  Parliameniary  Papers,  1876,  vol.  Ixxxiv,  pp.  45,  428,  447. 


114  ™^  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [114 

Aziz,  May  30,  1876,  put  an  end,  it  would  seem,  to  what- 
ever confidence  the  five  powers  in  accord  may  still  have  had 
in  the  Berlin  proposals.  At  any  rate,  only  a  few  days  after 
that  event,  the  three  powers  that  had  originated  the 
memorandum  "  concluded  to  postpone  its  presentation  to 
the  Porte.' 

There  was  a  disposition  on  the  part  of  some  of  the  treaty 
powers  to  defer  any  further  collective  action  until  it  should 
be  seen  what  the  new  government  under  Murad  V  would  be 
able  to  accomplish.  Affairs  with  the  insurgents  moved  on, 
however,  much  as  before;  and  at  the  beginning  of  July, 
Servia  and  Montenegro  declared  war  against  Turkey.  Fear 
for  the  safety  of  their  own  territory  and  the  sympathy  of 
their  people  for  their  brothers  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina, 
were  the  reasons  that  both  princes  assigned  for  this  step.^ 
A  few  days  later  the  emperors  of  Russia  and  Austria-Hun- 
gary met  and  agreed,  among  other  things,  according  to 
Count  Bismarck,  that  in  case  Russia  should  go  to  war  with 
Turkey,  Austria-Hungary  should  acquire  Bosnia,  as  an  off- 
set for  Austro-Hungarian  neutrality.^ 

The  Montenegrins  attacked  the  Turkish  army  in  Her- 
zegovina, and  were  victorious  for  the  most  part;  but  the 
Servian  army  was  not  strong  enough  to  cope  with  the  Otto- 
man forces.  Consequently,  on  August  24th,  the  prince  of 
Servia  requested  the  guaranteeing  powers  to  use  their  in- 
fluence towards  the  re-establishment  of  peace  between  his 
people  and  the  Turks.'* 

^Parliamentary  Papers,  1876,  vol.  Ixxxiv,  pp.  460,  479,  571. 
•Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iv,  pp.  2471,  2475. 

^Bismarck's  Autobiography,  op.  cii.,  vol.  ii,  p.  235;  cf.  Rose,  The 
Development  of  the  European  Nations  (New  York,  1905) »  vol.  ii,  pp. 
214,  218. 

^Parliamentary  Papers,  1877,  vol.  xc,  p.  89. 


115]  INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS  115 

The  tragic  death  of  Aziz,  a  few  days  after  his  deposition, 
and  the  trying  situation  at  Constantinople  during  the  three 
months  that  followed,  made  a  mental  wreck  of  Murad,  and 
on  August  31st  he  was  set  aside,  and  his  brother,  Abdul 
Hamid,  was  called  to  the  throne.  On  the  loth  of  Septem- 
ber, Sultan  Abdul  Hamid  II  issued  a  decree  in  which  he 
frankly  admitted  the  pressing  need  of  administrative,  finan- 
cial and  judicial  reforms,  and  he  attributed  all  of  Turkey's 
troubles,  at  the  time,  to  one  cause — that  the  laws  had  not 
been  regularly  and  constantly  observed/  He  also  drew 
the  attention  of  his  government  to  the  need  of  effective 
measures  for  putting  an  end  to  the  bloodshed  in  Bosnia, 
Herzegovina  and  Servia. 

In  keeping  with  the  appeal  of  Prince  Milan,  of  Servia,  for 
the  mediation  of  the  powers,  Sir  Henry  Elliot  was  in- 
structed on  September  ist  to  propose  to  the  Porte  at  least 
a  month's  armistice,  with  the  understanding  that  discussion 
by  the  treaty  powers  of  the  conditions  of  peace  should  im- 
mediately follow.  Four  days  later,  the  Constantinople  am- 
bassadors of  the  other  guaranteeing  powers  communicated 
to  the  Porte  the  support  of  their  governments  to  this  pro- 
posal. The  Turks,  however,  thought  that  an  armistice 
would  be  too  favorable  to  Servia,  and  were  unwilling  to 
suspend  hostilities  before  knowing  what  the  terms  of  peace 
would  be.  Ambassador  Elliot  was  then  instructed  to  warn 
the  Turkish  ministers,  that  if  they  rejected  the  proposal  for 
an  armistice,  the  British  government  could  do  no  more  to 
avert  the  ruin  that  the  Porte  would  thus  have  brought  upon 
the  Turkish  empire.  On  its  own  behalf,  France  also  com- 
municated to  the  Porte  the  same  kind  of  warning."  All 
combatants  also  were  now  to  be  included  in  the  armistice. 


*  Hertslet,  op.  cii.,  vol.  iv,  p.  2478. 

^  Parliamentary  Papers,  1877,  vol.  xc,  pp.  91,  ro8. 


Il6  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [ii6 

On  September  nth,  the  prince  of  Montenegro  likewise 
requested  the  powers  to  demand  a  suspension  of  hostihties. 
The  same  da}^  the  London  government  suggested,  as  bases 
for  discussion  by  the  European  concert,  peace  with  the 
status  quo  ante  in  Servia  and  Montenegro,  something  like 
local  administrative  autonomy  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina^ 
and  some  kind  of  a  guarantee  against  future  maladminis- 
tration in  Bulgaria.  Austria,  however,  explained  that  be- 
cause of  the  mixed  population  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina, 
an  attempt  at  anything  like  local  administrative  autonomy 
there  would  be  almost  sure  to  break  down.^ 

The  Porte  allowed  two  weeks  to  pass  without  making  any 
reply  to  the  proposition  of  the  powers  for  an  armistice. 
Russia  and  Austria  then  urged  that  the  powers  should  sim- 
ply demand  a  general  armistice,  for  a  month  or  six  weeks. 
On  September  14th,  nevertheless,  Turkey  was  so  presump- 
tuous as  to  present  to  the  powers  terms  of  peace,  according 
to  which  Montenegro  was  to  be  left  as  before,  but  Servia 
was  to  be  punished  by  being  thrown  back  under  the  con- 
ditions that  existed  there  in  1862.^  At  the  same  time  the 
Porte  communicated  to  the  powers  through  the  Austrian 
ambassador,  that  confidential  orders  had  been  issued  to  all 
Turkish  military  commanders  to  remain  strictly  on  the  de- 
fensive, up  to  the  25th  instant.  This  period  was  later 
somewhat  prolonged.  Turkey  finally  accepted  (October 
1 2th)  England's  proposed  bases  for  a  European  conference 
looking  towards  pacification,  but  offered  at  the  same  time  to 
accept  an  armistice,  not  for  six  weeks,  but  for  six  months.^ 

It  was  at  this  time  that  the  Sultan  announced  his  intention 
to  convoke,  at  Constantinople,  a  General  Assembly,  to  be- 

^  Pat liamentary  Papers,  1877,  vol.  xc,  pp.  129,  205. 
Supra,  p.  78.    See  also  Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iv,  p.  2482. 
*  Parliamentary  Papers,  1877,  vol.  xc,  p.  512. 


11^]  INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS  ny 

elected  by  the  people,  and  a  Senate,  to  be  nominated  by  the 
Porte.  Everything  would  be  done,  it  was  promised,  to 
bring  about  a  "  radical  amelioration  "  and  a  "  good  adminis- 
tration," throughout  the  provinces.  Russia  and  Italy  re- 
fused to  sanction  so  long  an  armistice  as  six  months,  and 
steadfastly  held  for  one  of  a  month  or  six  weeks. ^  Neither 
Servia  nor  Montenegro  would  listen,  either,  to  a  suspension 
of  hostilities  for  six  months;  and  so  little  by  little  fighting 
v/as  resumed.  The  Servians  were  being  hard  pressed  by 
the  Ottoman  armies,  and  on  October  31st  the  Russian  am- 
TDassador  at  the  Porte,  General  Ignatieff,  gave  Turkey  only 
forty-eight  hours  in  which  to  reply  to  his  proposition  for  an 
unconditional  armistice  of  six  weeks  or  two  months.  Under 
these  circumstances,  the  Porte  abandoned  its  policy  of  de- 
lay and  counter  proposals,  and  promptly  communicated  its 
acceptance.  General  Ignatieff  then  telegraphed  the  princes 
of  Servia  and  Montenegro,  and  they  likewise  accepted  the 
armistice.^ 

For  some  months  there  had  been  unmistakable  evidences 
that  the  Servians  were  receiving  no  little  aid  in  men  and 
money,  from  Russian  sources.  So  on  October  30th,  Lord 
Loftus,  the  British  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  was  in- 
structed from  London  to  obtain,  if  possible,  definite  infor- 
mation from  the  Tsar's  government  in  regard  to  this  mat- 
ter.^ Accordingly,  on  the  second  of  November,  the  am- 
bassador had  an  audience  with  the  Tsar  Alexander.  Lord 
Loftus  reported  that  Alexander  deeply  deplored  the  "  in- 
veterate suspicion  "  in  England  respecting  Russia's  policy ; 
and  that  the  Tsar  wished  the  British  government  to  be  as- 
sured that  he  did  not  "  entertain  either  the  wish  or  the 
intention  "  to  possess  Constantinople.    Alexander  was  re- 

^  Parliamentary  Papers,  1877,  vol.  xc,  pp.  480-81,  559. 

*/bid.,  pp.  562-3,  56s,  573.  ^  Ibid.,  i^yj,  vol.  xc,  p.  554. 


Il8  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [ng 

ported,  likewise,  to  have  referred  at  the  same  time  to  the 
ineffectual  attempts  of  collective  Europe,"  thus  far,  to 
bring  the  war  in  Turkey  to  a  close,  and  to  have  added  that 
"  he  should  be  obliged  to  act  alone,  unless  Europe  was  pre- 
pared to  act  with  firmness  and  energy."  The  Tsar  ad- 
mitted, wrote  Lord  Loftus,  that  in  order  to  quiet  the  agita- 
tion in  Russia  in  behalf  of  the  Servians,  he  had  permitted 
some  of  his  officers  to  leave  the  Russian  service  and  go  to 
Servia/ 

Four  days  after  the  Russian  ultimatum  of  October  31st 
brought  about  the  two  months'  armistice,  England  proposed 
a  conference  of  the  powers  to  settle  the  terms  of  peace,  and 
suggested  now  that  the  bases  for  the  deliberations  in  the  con- 
ference should  be  (a)  "  the  independence  and  the  territorial 
integrity  of  the  Ottoman  empire;"  (b)  a  declaration  that 
none  of  the  guaranteeing  powers  would  seek  for  exclusive 
influence  or  advantages  for  themselves;  (c)  and  the  pro- 
posals for  pacification  that  had  been  suggested  by  the 
British  government  back  in  September.^  A  clue  to  the  fore- 
cast in  St.  Petersburg  of  the  final  outcome  of  these  com- 
plications may  be  gathered  from  the  Tsat-'s  expressed  wish 
that  the  term  territorial,"  as  here  used,  should  be  omitted.^ 
Somewhat  earlier,  the  Russian  government  had  suggested 
that,  for  the  purpose  of  restoring  order,  there  might  be  a 
provisional  occupation  of  Bosnia  by  Austria,  and  of  Bul- 
garia by  Russia.  And  the  Russian  authorities  still  believed 
in  the  "  ultimate  necessity,"  as  they  expressed  it,  of  such 
occupation. 

Being  well  aware,  by  this  time,  of  the  unfavorable  feeling 
among  the  powers  towards  the  Ottomans,  the  Sultan's  gov- 

^  Parliamentary  Papers,  1877,  vol.  xc,  pp.  642,  736. 

Ibid.,  vol.  xc,  p.  708;  cf.  supra,  p.  116. 
^  Ibid.,  1877,  vol.  xc,  p.  705. 


IIC)J  INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS  119 

ernment  appealed  tO'  England,  with  the  idea  of  avoiding 
if  possible  a  European  conference.  The  attitude  of  Russia 
was  so  well  understood  in  London,  however,  that  it  was 
neither  a  guess  nor  a  threat  when  the  British  government 
met  these  appeals  by  assuring  the  Porte  that  a  settlement, 
either  by  such  a  conference  or  by  Russia  -alone,  was  in- 
evitable/ 

The  plenipotentiaries  of  the  signatory  powers  tO'  the  treaty 
of  Paris  (not  including  Turkey)  now  proceeded  to  mature 
their  plans  for  the  conference.  They  held  nine  preliminary 
meetings  in  Constantinople  (December  11-22,  1876),  and 
agreed  on  a  somewhat  elaborate  plan  for  administering  the 
Sultan's  disturbed  provinces,  and  for  settling  all  the  ques- 
tions at  issue.  Then  the  full  conference  (including  Ottoman 
representatives),  likewise  held  nine  meetings  (December  23- 
January  20),  during  which  the  pre-arranged  scheme  un- 
derwent some  modifications.  For  our  present  purpose,  how- 
ever, we  shall  need  tO'  notice  only  two  requirements  which 
the  guaranteeing  powers  regarded  as  the  most  vital  part  of 
their  plan,  and  which  the  Ottoman  government  would  not 
accept. .  Although  several  of  the  plenipotentiaries  warned  the 
Sultan's  government  of  the  extreme  dangers  connected  with 
its  refusal,  still  Turkey  would  not  consent  that  the  proposed 
Governors-General  (one  for  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  and 
one  for  each  of  the  two  proposed  Bulgarian  vilayets)  should 
be  nominated  by  the  Porte,  with  the  previous  approval  of  the 
six  powers,  and  that  the  European  Concert  should  nominate 
two  international  commissions,  to  inspect  and  assist  in  con- 
nection with  the  execution  of  proposed  provincial  regula- 
tions.^   The  Ottoman  plenipotentiaries  now  referred  to  the 

^Parliamentary  Papers,  1S77,  vol.  xc,  pp.  659,  672,  709. 
^/6id.,  1877,  vol.  xci,  gives  the  correspondence  and  the  documents 
relating  to  these  developments. 


120  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [120 

rights  unanimously  accorded  to  Turkey  in  the  treaty  of 
Paris,  and  to  the  first  point  in  the  bases  for  the  dehberations 
of  the  conferences;  and  then  they  added,  as  a  final  word, 
that  the  Sublime  Porte  could  not  allow  foreign  interfer- 
ence in  connection  with  the  administration  of  its  provinces. 
Thus  the  conference  ended,  having  totally  failed  to  accom- 
plish its  purpose/ 

Meanwhile,  Turkey  had  been  transformed,  for  the  time 
being,  into  a  constitutional  monarchy.  The  Ottoman  au- 
thorities had  hoped  that  their  new  constitution  might  be  ac- 
cepted as  a  substantial  guarantee  for  reforms,  and  that  the 
powers  would  be  content  now  to  allow  Turkey  another 
period  of  probation.^  But  the  failure  of  the  conference  was 
no  sooner  known,  than  the  Russian  cabinet  addressed  a  cir- 
cular despatch  to  the  other  guaranteeing  powers  inquiring 
for  the  limits  within  which  these  governments  were  willing 
to  act,  in  meeting  the  refusal  of  the  Porte  tO'  be  governed  by 
the  wishes  of  Europe.'"^  Being  disposed  to  allow  the  new 
constitutional  regime  in  Turkey  sufficient  time  to  deal  with 
the  situation  in  the  disturbed  provinces,  the  British  govern- 
ment delayed  some  weeks  in  sending  a  reply  tO'  St.  Peters- 
burg. Meanwhile,  the  Porte  settled  its  difficulties  with 
Servia  by  re-establishing  the  status  quo  ante  in  that  princi- 
pality and  was  in  a  fair  way  to  make  peace  with  Monte- 

'  Parliamentary  Papers,  1877,  vol.  xci,  p.  382;  Turkish  view  of  the 
outcome  of  the  conference,  p.  517.  The  first  point  in  the  bases  was, 
"the  independence  and  the  territorial  integrity  of  the  Ottoman  em- 
pire."   Cf.  supra,  p.  118. 

'The  Ottoman  constitution  of  December,  1876,  may  be  seen  in  Eng- 
lish (not  complete)  in  Hertslet,  vol.  iv;  and  in  French— complete— in 
State  Papers,  op.  cit.,  vol.  Ixvii. 

^The  special  representative  of  England  to  the  Conference,  the  Marquis 
of  Salisbury,  said  that  the  principal  object  of  his  mission  had  been  "  the 
conclusion  of  a  peace  between  Russia  and  Turkey."  Pari.  Papers,  1877, 
vol.  xci,  pp.  387,  410. 


I2l] 


INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS 


121 


negro;  and  some  reform  measures  were  likewise  put  into 
operation.^ 

Through  the  initiative  of  the  Russian  cabinet,  representatives 
of  Austria-Hungary,  England,  France,  Germany,  Italy  and 
Russia  signed  at  London  (March  31,  1877)  a  fatal  protocol. 
In  keeping  with  this  new  agreement,  these  allies  notified  the 
Porte  that  they  proposed  to  have  their  representatives  in 
Turkey  watch  over  the  execution  of  reforms  there;  and  they 
added,  moreo-ver,  that  if  their  hopes  were  tO'  be  "  once  more 
disappointed  they  might  then  seek  in  concert  some  further 
means  of  looking  after  the  interests  of  peace  and  of  the 
Christians  inhabitating  the  Sultan's  dominions.^  These 
declarations  by  the  representatives  of  the  six  powers  were 
met  with  an  indignant  reply  from  Constantinople.  Appeal- 
ing now  to  the  guarantees  in  the  treaty  of  Paris  (1856),  the 
Sultan's  government  branded  the  protocol  as  being  "  de- 
void of  all  equity  ",  and  unconditionally  refused  to'be  placed 
under  any  form  of  surveillance  (April  9th . 

Representing  that  the  Porte's  rejection  of  the  London 
protocol  put  an  end  tO'  every  means  and  to  all  hope  of  con- 
ciliation, the  Tsar  promptly  arranged  with  the  Roumanians 
for  the  passage  of  his  troops  through  their  territory  (April 
i6th),  and  notified  the  treaty  powers  that  his  armies  had 
been  ordered  to  invade  Turkey/  The  Russian  charge  d'af- 
faires was  at  once  ordered  by  his  government  to  leave  Con- 
stantinople, and  to  cause  all  Russian  consuls  in  Turkey  to 
leave  also.  The  Porte  then  appealed  to  the  other  powers  for 
their  mediation,  under  article  viii  of  the  treaty  of  Paris. 
None  of  the  replies,  however,  held  out  any  hope  to  the  Otto- 

'  Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iv,  p.  2553;  Parliamentary  Papers,  1877,  vol. 
xci,  pp.  477,  483. 

^  Ibid.,  vol.  xci,  p.  421.  ^  Ibid.,  vol.  xci,  p.  429. 

*Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  iv,  p.  2576. 


122  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [122 

mans.^  On  the  other  hand,  Russia  was  assured  after  a  little 
time  of  the  somewhat  conditional  neutrahty  of  the  other 
guaranteeing  powers.  The  British  government  strongly  re- 
monstrated against  Russia's  action  in  breaking  away  from 
the  concert  of  the  powers  and  precipitating  hostilities,  but 
finally  stipulated  that  England's  neutrality  would  continue 
so  long  as  her  interests  in  the  Suez  Canal,  in  Egypt,  and  in 
the  Persian  Gulf,  were  let  alone;  and  while  the  Russians 
kept  out  of  Constantinople.^ 

Because  the  Roumanians  had  permitted  the  Russian  troops 
to  pass  through  their  country,  Turkey  refused  to  keep  up 
diplomatic  relations  with  the  government  of  that  princi- 
pality; and  in  June,  Roumania  declared  her  independence, 
and  turned  her  army  against  the  Ottoman  forces. 

The  Sultan  appealed  to  all  "  zealous  Mussulmans  "  to 
join  in  the  "  Holy  War  "  tO'  protect  their  country  (June 
30th)  ;  ^  and  it  was  not  until  well  into  December,  that  the 
invaders  were  able  to  make  headway  against  the  Turkish 
forces.  The  peace  negotiations  being  carried  on  between 
Montenegroi  and  the  Porte,  at  the  time  of  the  London  pro- 
tocol (March),  having  proved  futile,  the  Montenegrins 
were  likewise  advancing  against  those  Turks  who  were  in 
their  vicinity.  In  December,  Servia  found  a  reason  for  de- 
claring war,  and  she  too  set  her  army  in  motion  against  the 
Ottomans.* 

How  valiantly  the  Turks  fought,  especially  in  the  Shipka 
Pass  and  at  Plevna,  and  how  they  finally  lost,  is  a  familiar 
story.  In  despair  because  of  her  isolation  and  defeats,  Tur- 
key opened  communications  with  the  Russians  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  next  year  (1878),  and  within  a  month  the 


^Parliamentary  Papers,  1S77,  vol.  xci,  pp.  101-105. 
'Hertslet,  op.  ciL,  vol.  iv,  p.  2615. 

^ Ibid.,  vol.  iv,  p.  2643.  Ibid.,  vol.  iv,  p.  2648. 


INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS 


123 


preliminaries  of  peace  were  signed  at  Adrianople/  It  will 
be  remembered  that  the  Russian  forces  did  not  halt  then,  but 
that  they  moved  on  slowly  until  they  were  within  sight  oi 
Constantinople.  It  was  to  be  expected,  no  doubt,  that  Eng- 
land would  send  troops  and  a  fleet,  as  she  did,  to  save  Con- 
stantinople from  the  Russians;  though  it  does  not  seem 
very  clear  yet  that  there  was  much  reason  for  such  extreme 
precautionary  measures.^ 

Even  before  the  preliminaries  were  signed  at  Adrianople, 
England  notified  the  Russian  government  that  she  would 
not  regard  any  settlement  between  Turkey  and  Russia,  that 
should  modify  European  treaties,  as  having  any  validity 
until  it  should  be  formally  accepted  by  the  parties  to  the 
treaty  of  Paris.  Russia,  on  the  other  hand,  was  only  will- 
ing that  questions  bearing  on  European  interests  should  be 
submitted  to  the  deliberation  O'f  the  powers.  Only  four  days 
after  the  preliminaries  had  been  signed,  Austria-Hungary 
invited  the  powers,  signatories  oi  the  treaty  of  Paris,  to 
ho'ld  a  conference  at  Vienna  for  the  purpose  of  determining 
what  modifications  should  be  made  in  relation  to  that  treaty, 
and  also  to  the  treaty  of  London  (1871).^ 

Notwithstanding  this  attitude  of  the  other  governments, 
however,  Russia  kept  up  her  negotiations  with  Turkey,  and 
on  March  third  these  two-  powers  signed,  in  the  treaty  of 
San  Stefano,  their  complete  settlement  of  the  whole  matter. 
Austria-Hungary  then  withdrew  her  proposal  for  a  con- 
ference, and  suggested,  instead,  a  congress  tO'  be  held  at 

^  Parliamentary  Papers ,  1878,  vol.  Ixxxi,  p.  704;  Menzies,  7 ur key  Ola 
and  New,  chs.  iv,  v. 

'  For  the  substance  of  various  confidential  communications  between 
London  and  St.  Petersburg  in  reference  to  Russia's  desire  to  either  oc- 
cupy or  possess  Constantinople,  see  Parliamentary  Papers  (1854),  vol. 
xxi,  pp.  835-868;  (1877),  vol.  xc,  pp.  642,  705,  736. 
Ibid.,  1878,  vol.  Ixxxi,  p.  756. 


124  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [124 

Berlin.^  For  some  time,  the  British  government  refused 
to  take  part  in  a  congress,  unless  it  were  understood  that 
every  part  oi  the  treaty  of  San  Stefano  would  be  brought 
up  for  consideration.  Russia  was  unyielding  her  de- 
termination that  only  such  terms  in  the  treaty  should  be  dis- 
cussed as  affected  European  interests  ".  Finally,  aftei; 
opposing  each  other  up  to  the  very  verge  of  war,  these  two 
powers  came  to  a  secret  agreement,  in  which  Russia  con- 
sented to  some  important  modifications  of  her  treaty  with 
the  Porte  in  relation  to  European  Turkey,  and  England 
withdrew  her  opposition  to  a  part  of  the  arrangement  re- 
specting Asiatic  Turkey.^ 

The  way  being  now  clear  for  collective  action,  it  was  time 
for  the  European  Concert  to  perform  its  part.  Accordingly, 
in  the  twenty  sessions  of  the  Berlin  congress  (June  13- July 
13,  1878),  representatives  of  the  seven  powers  took  up  the 
Russo-Turkish  agreement — the  treaty  of  San  Stefano — and 
made  it  over  into  the  European  settlement — the  now  well- 
known  treaty  of  Berlin. 

At  the  time  of  the  Crimean  War  (1853-56),  Russia  had 
found  herself  isolated.  She  was  defeated  and  humili- 
ated. Turkey's  allies,  it  will  be  remembered,  undertook  to 
make  the  outcome  of  that  struggle  far  more  than  a  military 
victory  over  the  Russian  armies.  For  the  European  treaty, 
at  the  close  of  that  war,  was  intended  to  release  Turkey 

^The  Prime  Ministers  of  the  powers  would  be  expected  to  take  part 
in  a  congress,  but  not  in  a  conference. 

^Parliamentary  Papers,  1878,  vol.  Ixxxi,  pp.  757-771-  Because  Rus- 
sia was  expected  to  retain  Batoum,  Ardahan  and  Kars  (in  Asiatic  Tur- 
key) England  entered  into  a  defensive  alliance  with  Turkey  in  order  to 
prevent  Russia  from  making  other  conquests  in  that  vicinity.  The  right 
to  occupy  and  administer  Cyprus  was  now  granted  to  England  by  Tur- 
key, so  that  the  former  might  be  better  prepared  for  carrying  on  military 
operations  against  Russia,  if  necessary,  in  Asia  Minor.  Pari.  Papers, 
1878,  vol.  Ixxxii,  pp.  3-23. 


125]  INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS  125 

from  Russia's  grasp.  ^  Moreover,  the  Ottoman  government 
was  then  for  the  first  time  admitted  to  participate  in  the 
advantages  of  the  Public  Law  and  System  (Concert)  of 
Europe  Furthermore,  the  avowed  object  of  the  treaty 
of  1856  was  tO'  render  the  peace  more  enduring  by  insuring 
the  independence  and  integrity  of  the  Ottoman  empire.^ 
Russia  had  been  compelled  at  that  time  to  promise  the  great 
powers  of  Europe  that  she  abandoned  every  pretension  to 
an  exclusive  protectorate  over  any  of  the  Sultan's  subjects.^ 
The  European  Concert  then  assumed  the  guardianship  of 
the  civil  and  religious  privileges  already  accorded  by  the 
sultans  to  their  Christian  provinces.  But  this  new  pro- 
tectorate, it  will  be  observed,  was  expressly  on  the  basis  of  a 
guaranteed  respect  for  the  independence  and  the  territorial 
integrity  of  Turkey. 

Three  of  the  Sultan's  so-called  Christian  provinces,  it 
will  be  remembered,  were  then  already  well  advanced  on 
their  way  towards  statehood.  And  near  to  these,  were  other 
peoples  of  like  faith  and  race  (in  general),  who  were  more 
than  anxious  to  hurry  forward  their  liberation,  likewise, 
from  local  Turkish  misrule.  Under  these  conditions,  dis- 
content, racial  sympathies  and  national  ambitions,  made  it 
inevitable  that  the  Eastern  question  would  not  stay  regu- 
lated. Up  to  the  very  end  of  the  regime  (if  we  may  call  it 
such)  of  the  treaty  of  Paris,  the  guaranteeing  powers  found 
it  more  convenient,  to  say  the  least,  to  induce  the  sultans  to 
confirm  successive  changes  in  the  Balkan  provinces,  than 

*  For  the  text  of  the  treaties  under  which  Russia  exercised  so  much 
control  in  Turkey,  from  1774  to  1856,  see  Parliamentary  Papers,  1854^ 
vol.  Ixxii,  pp.  39-77. 

'See  the  preamble  and  art.  vii,  Treaty  of  Paris  (1856). 

^  For  the  bases  of  conferences  with  Russia  for  re-establishment  of 
peace,  submitted  by  England,  Austria  and  France  (1854),  see  Hertslet, 
op.  fit.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  1216,  1269. 


126  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [126 


to  hold  the  discontented  people  there  in  restraint.  And 
Turkey  appeared,  all  this  time,  to  stand  so  much  in  fear  of 
dangers  from  within  and  from  without,  that  she  dared  not 
undertake  to  fight  these  people  to  a  finish. 

There  came  a  time,  however,  as  we  have  seen,  when  the 
Porte  would  not  be  persuaded  by  peaceful  means  to  accept 
the  collective  counsel  of  the  other  treaty  powers.  Even 
though  these  governments  warned  Turkey  in  the  most  solemn 
manner,  she  at  last  defiantly  rejected  their  final  proposals.^ 
Russia  was  ready  for  just  such  an  exigency.  The  advance 
of  her  armies  led  the  Ottoman  government  to  sue  for  peace, 
and  the  outcome,  as  already  noted,  was  the  peace  treaty  be- 
tween Russia  and  Turkey,  signed  at  San  Stefano,  and  the 
political  settlement,  worked  out  a  little  later,  in  the  Congress 
of  Berlin.' 

Although  the  conclusions  of  this  congress  superseded, 
for  the  most  part,  the  agreement  between  Russia  and 
Turkey  at  the  close  of  the  war  (1878)  still  the  European 
Concert  accepted  and  affirmed  the  fundamental  bases  of  the 
treaty  of  San  Stefano — the  recognition  of  the  independence 
of  Servia,  Roumania  and  Montenegro,  and  the  creation  of 
an  autonomous  tributary  principality  of  Bulgaria.  The 
European  settlement,  to  be  sure,  required  that  religious 

'For  Turkey's  protest  against  the  London  Protocol  (Apr.,  1877),  her 
Manifesto  in  answer  to  the  Russian  declaration  of  war,  and  her  appeal 
to  Mussulmans  to  fight  in  the  "  Holy  War"  against  Russia,  see  Herts- 
let,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iv. 

'As  might  have  been  expected,  the  powers  sent  their  leading  diplo- 
mats to  this  congress.  Italy  sent  two,  and  Austria-Hungary,  England, 
France,  Germany,  Russia  and  Turkey  sent  three  each.  The  leaders  of 
the  congress  appear  to  have  been  its  president  and  "pacificator,"  Prince 
Bismarck,  Disraeli  (Lord  Beaconsfield),  Gortchakofif  (Russian),  An- 
drassy  (Austrian),  and  Waddington  (French).  The  minutes  of  the 
meetings,  as  well  as  the  treaty,  may  be  found  in  both  English  and 
French  in  Parliamentary  Papers,  1878,  vol.  Ixxxiii. 


127] 


INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS 


i2y 


equality  should  be  assured  in  Servia,  Roumania  and  Monte- 
negro, before  their  independence  should  be  fully  recognized/ 
That  condition,  however,  was  soon  satisfied,  and  all  three 
took  their  places  in  the  European  family  of  nations,  as  in- 
dependent states.  Though  the  Berlin  congress  permitted 
Montenegro  to  acquire  only  about  half  of  the  new  territory 
that  the  abortive  Russo-Turkish  agreement  would  have 
given  to  her,  still  her  area  was  more  than  doubled,  and  she 
was  now  to  have  an  outlet  to  the  sea.^  After  the  changes 
by  the  European  congress,  Servia  still  received  an  increase 
in  territory,  equal  to  about  one-fourth  of  her  former  area. 
Roumanian  deputies  were  even  permitted  by  the  Berlin  con- 
gress to  express  their  protests  there  in  person  against  the 
Russian  plan  to  take  Bessarabia  from  the  Roumanians,  and 
to  give  tO'  them  in  return  territory  which  they  did  not  want. 
The  powers,  however,  added  a  little  to  what  Russia  had 
oflfered,  and  Roumania  was  forced  to  submit.' 

The  Berlin  congress  made  provision  for  Bosnia  and  Her- 
zegovina, by  simply  arranging  that  these  provinces  should 
be  "  occupied  and  administered "  by  Austria-Hungary.* 
Servia  had  to  be  threatened  by  the  Dual  Monarchy  before  she 
would  abandon  her  active  opposition  to  that  arrangement. 
In  1880  the  Servian  ministry  changed,  however,  and  her 
resentment  at  what  her  people  even  then  looked  upon  as  the 
loss  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  quieted  down.    In  1882, 

'Holland,  European  Concert  in  the  Eastern  Question,  pp.  220-241. 

'  For  maps  showing  the  territorial  changes  provided  for  in  the  treaty 
of  San  Stefano,  and  the  final  settlement  in  this  connection  in  the  Berlin 
treaty,  see  Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iv. 

•'The  views  expressed  by  the  Russian  plenipotentiaries  and  by  the 
Roumanian  delegates,  in  the  Congress,  in  reference  to  that  exchange 
may  be  read  in  Parliamentary  Papers,  1878,  vol.  Ixxxiii,  pp.  527,  543. 

*  See  Protocol  No.  8  of  the  Congress  of  Berlin.  Parliamentary 
Papers,  1878,  vol.  Ixxxiii,  pp.  504  el  seq. 


128 


THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [128 


.with  general  consent,  Prince  Milan  assumed  the  title  of 
king;  and  since  that  time,  this  little  monarchy  has  gone  on 
playing  her  not  always  enviable  part  in  the  affairs  of  Europe. 
Roumania  took  the  rank  of  a  kingdom  in  1881  and  her 
history  since  has  been  marked  by  a  gradual  internal  improve- 
ment. 

The  autonomous  principality  of  Bulgaria,  provided  for  by 
the  European  powers  in  the  treaty  of  Berlin,  was  not  much, 
like  the  one  that  had  been  arranged  for  in  the  Russo-Turkish 
agreement/  The  greater  Bulgaria  of  the  San  Stefano 
treaty  was  divided  by  the  European  concert  into  three  parts. 
The  southern  or  Macedonian  section  was  simply  given  back 
to  Turkey,  and  the  remainder  was  to  constitute  a  Turkish 
province  with  "  administrative  autonomy  " — Eastern  Rou- 
melia — and  an  "  autonomous  and  tributary  principality  " — 
Bulgaria.^  The  course  of  events  in  relation  to  these  two 
partly  liberated  districts  will  be  followed  up  in  a  separate 
chapter. 

^  McCarthy,  History  of  Our  Own  Times,  vol.  ii,  ch.  xv. 

^The  interesting  discussions  in  four  sessions  of  the  Congress,  respect- 
ing the  formation  of  the  Bulgarian  principality,  may  be  found  in  Parli- 
amentary Papers,  vol.  Ixxxiii,  pp.  438-486. 


CHAPTER  IV 


Organization  of  Bulgaria  and  Eastern  Roumelia  and 
THE  Movements  Leading  to  their  Union 
AND  Independence — 1878-1909 

The  agitation  of  more  than  three  decades,  which  culmin- 
ated in  the  creation  of  the  Bulgarian  national  church 
(1870),  was  an  important  movement  towards  the  unity  of 
the  Bulgarian-speaking  race.  It  was  principally  in  connec- 
tion with  that  struggle  for  ecclesiastical  liberation,  accom- 
panied as  it  was  by  an  educational  awakening,  that  the 
Bulgarians  in  the  Balkans  gained  what  little  preparation 
they  possessed  for  assuming  the  momentous  responsibilities 
that  were  so  soon  to  devolve  upon  them. 

The  principal  battles  of  the  war  of  1877-78  were  fought 
on  what  was  considered  Bulgarian  soil,  and  the  Bulgarian 
peasants  helped  the  invading  army  in  such  ways  as  they 
could.  There  was  not,  however,  any  general  rallying  of 
Bulgarians  to  the  aid  of  the  armies  sent  against  the  Turks,, 
though  the  five  thousand  and  more  volunteers  who  fought 
with  the  Russians  and  the  Roumanians  were  not  found 
wanting  in  sustained  valor. 

All  Bulgarians  had  abundant  reason  for  rejoicing  over 
the  concessions  in  their  behalf  which  Russia  obtained  from 
Turkey  in  the  treaty  of  peace  (March,  1878).  That  agree- 
ment provided  for  a  semi-independent  Bulgaria  with  a  terri- 
tory considerably  larger  than  that  of  any  of  the  other 
Balkan  states.  And  most  ample  provisions  were  made,  like- 
129]  ,  129 


130  THE  MAKING  OF  THt.  BALKAN  STATES  [130 

wise,  for  organizing  and  inaug-urating  the  government  of 
this  new  and  greater  Bulgaria,  under  the  guidance  and  the 
protection  of  Russian  authorities.^ 

But  the  Russo-Turkish  settlement,  as  we  have  seen,  was 
not  accepted  by  the  European  concert,  and  the  Berlin  con- 
gress decreed  modifications  that  sadly  disappointed  the 
hopes  and  the  expectations  of  the  Bulgarians. 

At  the  first  sitting  of  the  Congress,  Prince  Bismarck,  as 
its  president,  suggested  that  in  taking  up  the  work  of  San 
Stefano  "  for  "  free  discussions  "  it  would  be  well  to  con- 
sider first  the  questions  of  greatest  importance — the  de- 
limitation and  the  organization  of  Bulgaria."  As  this  pro- 
posal met  the  approval  of  all  the  members,  Lord  Salisbury 
proposed  at  the  second  sitting  that  the  new  Bulgaria  should 
be  restricted  to  the  part  of  Turkey  lying  between  the  Danube 
and  the  Balkan  mountains,  and  that  the  territory  south  of 
the  line  of  the  Balkans  should  remain  under  the  authority  of 
the  Sultan.  He  proposed  at  the  same  time,  however,  that 
some  precautionary  measures  should  be  taken  to  secure  the 
welfare  of  the  populations  in  the  latter  territory.  Again  at 
the  suggestion  of  Prince  Bismarck,  it  was  agreed  that  the 
representatives  of  Austria-Hungary,  England  and  Russia 
— the  powers  specially  interested  in  the  Bulgarian  question 
— should  hold  private  meetings  and  try  to  prepare  a  plan 
that  could  be  taken  up  in  the  congress  as  a  basis  for  a 
settlement.  Their  report  was  ready  for  the  fourth  sitting; 
and  at  that  time  (June  2)  it  was  determined  that  the  prin- 
cipality of  Bulgaria  should  be  limited  to  the  part  north 
of  the  Balkans,  and  that  a  province  should  be  formed  south 


^  Pari.  Papers,  1878,  vol.  Ixxxiii,  pp.  394  et  seq.  For  the  Treaty  of  San 
Stefano,  see  Holland,  The  European  Concert  in  the  Eastern  Question 
(Oxford,  1885). 


131  ]       MOVEMENTS  LEADING  TO  THEIR  UNION  131 

of  the  Balkans  under  the  name  of  Eastern  RoumeHa/  The 
latter  territory  had  usually  been  referred  to  as  "  South  Bul- 
garia," and  when  Count  Schouvaloff  spoke  in  reference  to 
this  part  of  the  agreement  he  said : 

...  the  plenipotentiaries  of  Russia  have  accepted  the  division 
of  Bulgaria  by  the  line  of  the  Balkans,  in  spite  of  the  serious 
objections  which  this  division,  objectionable  for  many  reasons, 
presents;  the  substitution  of  the  name  Eastern  Roumelia  for 
that  of  South  Bulgaria,  reserving,  at  the  same  time,  to  them- 
selves on  this  point,  which  has  been  conceded  by  them  with 
regret,  full  liberty  of  subsequent  discussion  at  the  congress ;  the 
retention  of  the  word  "  Bulgaria  "  has  been  considered  as  a 
watchword  or  rallying  point  for  dangerous  aspirations.  .  . 

The  population  of  the  new  "  Eastern  Roumelia  "  had  been 
deprived,  he  argued,  of  a  name  that  rightfully  belonged  to 
them.  And  he  likewise  charged  the  congress  with  seeking 
to  replace  ethnographical  frontiers  "  by  those  that  were  in- 
tended to  be  "  commercial  and  strategical." 

The  questions  relating  to  the  Bulgarians  which  occasioned 
the  most  discussion  were  those  relating  to  the  liberty  that 
Turkey  should  have  for  using  her  troops  in  the  new  pro- 
vince of  Eastern  Roumelia,  and  to  the  duration  of  the 
Russian  military  occupation  of  that  province  and  of  the 
Bulgarian  principality.  The  extent  and  plan  of  collective 
action  to  be  followed  in  connection  with  the  provisional  con- 
trol and  the  organization  of  the  governments  in  these  two 
provinces  were  also  points  on  which  an  agreement  was  not 
easily  reached.    That  one  of  the  Russian  plenipotentiaries, 

'  The  Greeks  and  the  Servians  had  strongly  protested  against  the  for- 
mation of  such  a  large  Bulgarian  province  as  was  provided  for  in  the 
Treaty  of  San  Stefano.    Cf.  Rose,  The  Development  of  the  European 
Nations  (New  York,  IQ05),  vol.  i,  p.  273. 
Pari.  Papers,  1878,  vol.  Ixxxiii,  p.  439. 


132  'THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [132 

Count  Schouvaloff.  felt  called  upon  to  affirm  that  Bulgaria 
would  not  become  a  Russian  annex  "  is  somewhat  significant 
of  the  general  trend  in  all  of  these  discussions/ 

The  Bulgarians  were  sadly  disappointed,  if  not  thor- 
oughly exasperated,  by  the  way  in  which  their  interests, 
according  to  their  view,  had  been  sacrificed  in  the  Berlin 
congress.  The  territory  of  the  new  Bulgarian  principality 
had  there  been  cut  down  to  but  little  more  than  a  third  of 
what  Turkey  had  ceded  to  it  in  the  San  Stefano  treaty. 
And,  what  was  evidently  still  more  grievous  to  them,  the 
populations,  mostly  Bulgarians,  in  the  part  that  was  now 
seemingly  lost  to  the  principality,  were  to  be  left  under  the 
direct  political  and  military  authority  of  the  Sultan."  In 
this  new  province  of  Eastern  Roumelia,  to  the  south  of  the 
principality,  the  people  were  to  have  a  certain  amount  of 
self-government,  it  is  true,  under  a  Christian  governor; 
but  the  congress  had  stipulated  that  the  Sultan  might  keep 
as  many  Ottoman  troops  as  he  wished  along  the  boundary 
between  these  two  provinces.^ 

Although  perhaps  the  Bulgarians  did  not  then  realize  it, 
still  there  was  for  them  another  side  to  the  work  of  the 
Berlin  congress.  Their  affairs  were  thereby  released  from 
an  exclusively  Russian  or  Russo-Turkish  control  and  over- 
sight, and  placed  under  the  collective  guardianship  of  the 
great  powers  of  Europe.^    The  best  that  can  be  said,  per- 

^Parl.  Papers,  1878,  vol.  Ixxiii,  p.  451. 

''The  treaty  of  Berlin  gave  to  Bulgaria  an  area  of  24,360  square  miles 
with  a  population  of  1,100,000  Bulgarians,  50,000  Greeks,  9,000  Jews, 
400,000  Moslems;  and  to  Eastern  Roumelia  an  area  of  13,500  square  miles 
with  a  population  of  571,000  Bulgarians,  42,500  Greeks,  175,000  Moslems, 
19,324  Gypsies,  4,177  Jews,  1,300  Armenians  (approximately).  Cf. 
Pari.  Papers,  1880,  vol.  Ixxxii,  p.  195;  Muller,  Political  History  of 
Recent  Times,  p.  566. 

^See  the  fifth  and  sixth  Protocols,  Pari.  Papers  (1878),  vol.  Ixxxiii, 
pp.  454-473. 


133]       MOVEMENTS  LEADING  TO  THEIR  UNION  133 

haps,  of  the  treaty  of  Berlin  is  that  the  signatory  powers 
thereby  asserted  and  assumed  collective  authority  and  re- 
sponsibility for  the  entire  settlement  at  the  close  of  the 
Russo-Turkish  War/  It  is  significant  that  before  the  final 
formulation  of  that  treaty  Prince  Gortchakoff,  following 
the  Tsar's  instructions,  asked  the  Congress  "  by  what  prin- 
ciples and  in  what  manner  "  it  proposed  "  to  insure  the 
execution  of  its  high  decisions."  ^  Finally  a  Russian  pro- 
posal was  offered  which,  being  slightly  changed  by  an  Aus- 
trian amendment,  called  for  a  clause  in  the  final  agreement 
stating  that  the  Congress  would  undertake  to  "  control  and 
superintend  the  execution  "  of  all  the  stipulations  of  the 
treaty.  Germany  was  favorable  to  the  adoption  of  this  pro- 
posal; but  it  was  not  accepted  by  the  congress.  The  pleni- 
potentiaries of  England,  France,  Italy,  and  Turkey  reserved 
their  vote,  expressing  the  conviction  that  the  signatures  to 
the  treaty  would  furnish  a  sufficient  guarantee  for  its  exe- 
cution. 

But  the  extent  to  which  the  treaty  of  Berlin,  as  a  whole, 
has  stood  the  test  of  time  does  not  fall  within  the  scope  of 
this  chapter.  It  is  desirable  here  merely  to  trace  in  some  de- 
tail the  process  by  which,  under  the  protection  of  that  treaty 

^Up  to  the  present,  no  one  could  be  more  competent,  it  would  seem, 
to  pass  judgment  on  the  work  of  the  Berlin  congress  than  Dr.  George 
Washburn.  Having  been  president  of  Robert  College  (American),  at 
Constantinople,  for  more  than  thirty  years,  his  duties  and  opportunities 
have  enabled  him  to  gain  an  intimate  personal  knowledge  of  what  the 
Berlin  treaty  has  meant  to  all  parties  concerned.  "The  Treaty  of  Ber- 
lin," he  writes,  "...  humiliated  Russia  without  helping  Turkey,  while 
it  ignored  the  rights  of  the  people  of  the  provinces  of  which  it  disposed. 
It  was  a  triumph  for  Lord  Beaconsfield,  but  it  was  a  misfortune  for 
England,  and  has  been  a  source  of  trouble  in  Europe  ever  since.'' 
Washburn,  Fifiy  Years  in  Constantinople  (Boston,  1909),  Introduction. 

Pari.  Papers,  1878,  vol.  Ixxxiii,  pp.  624  et  seg.  The  protocols  of  the 
twenty  sittings  of  the  Berlin  Congress,  together  with  the  Treaty  of 
Berlin,  may  be  found  in  Parliamentary  Papers,  1878,  vol.  Ixxxiii. 


134  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [134 

and  yet  in  spite  of  some  of  its  stipulations,  the  principality 
of  Bulgaria  and  the  province  of  Eastern  Roumelia  as  con- 
stituted by  the  Congress  of  Berlin  (1878)  have  united  and 
have  come  to  form  the  present  kingdom  of  Bulgaria. 

The  Berlin  congress  left  ample  directions  according  to 
vi^hich  representatives  of  the  powers  in  the  European  con- 
cert were  to  attend  to  the  work  of  organizing  Bulgaria  and 
Eastern  Roumelia.  It  was  stipulated  that  within  a  period 
of  nine  months  after  the  ratification  of  the  treaty,  these 
provinces  should  be  duly  prepared  in  respect  to  their  or- 
ganization to  enter,  within  the  limits  of  the  treaty,  upon 
the  administration  of  their  own  affairs.  During  that  time, 
Russian  troops,  not  to  exceed  fifty  thousand  men,  were  to 
remain  there  as  an  army  of  occupation.  Meanwhile  the 
provisional  direction  of  affairs  in  Bulgaria  was  entrusted  to 
a  Russian  Commissioner,  who  was  to  be  assisted  by  an 
Ottoman  Commissioner  and  the  resident  consuls  of  the 
great  powers.  In  case  there  should  be  a  disagreement  be- 
tween this  consular  commission  and  either  the  Russian  or 
Turkish  Commissioner,  the  Constantinople  representatives  of 
the  signatories  would  have  the  power  of  deciding  the  course 
of  action.  The  organization  of  Eastern  Roumelia,  how- 
ever, as  well  as  the  provisional  financial  administration  of 
that  province,  was  given  over  to  a  European  Commission, 
that  was  expected  to  work  in  concert  with  the  Porte.  It 
was  also  provided  that  the  boundaries  of  the  two  provinces 
should  be  traced  by  European  commissioners  representing 
the  signatory  powers. 

Up  to  the  very  end  of  the  provisional  regime  in  the  two 
districts,  the  Bulgarians  of  both  provinces  resorted  to 
every  means  except  open  warfare  to  induce  the  powers  to 
place  the  two  sections  under  one  government.  In  fact,  so 
pronounced  was  the  opposition  to  the  separation  of  Eastern 


135]       MOVEMENTS  LEADING  TO  THEIR  UNION  135 

Roumelia  from  the  principality  that  the  work  of  organizing" 
the  two  provinces  was  greatly  hampered.^  The  London 
government  did  not  hesitate  to  accuse  the  Russian  authori- 
ties in  these  provinces  of  acting  in  such  a  way  as  to 
cause  the  inhabitants  to  believe  that  the  separation  would 
not  be  carried  out.  Great  Britain  steadfastly  held  for  the 
enforcement  of  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  and  refrained,  in 
general,  from  any  discussion  with  the  Bulgarians  respecting 
the  possibility  of  union.^ 

However,  as  the  time  drew  near  when  the  Russian  occu- 
pation of  Bulgaria  and  Eastern  Roumelia  must  come  to  an 
end,  London  and  St.  Petersburg  came  to  an  understanding 
respecting  the  latter  province  (March-April,  1879).^  In 
accordance  with  this  agreement,  the  two  governments  urged 
upon  the  Porte,  in  writing,  the  necessity  of  maintaining 
inviolate  the  administrative  rights  and  privileges  that  were 
to  belong  to  that  province  under  its  constitution.  Russia 
added  the  assurance,  moreover,  that  she  would  not  sup- 
port the  Bulgarian  Roumeliotes  in  their  opposition  to  the 
institutions  which  the  treaty  of  Berlin  provided  for  Eastern 
Roumelia,  and  that  all  the  influence  of  the  Russian  govern- 
ment would  be  brought  to  bear  upon  these  people  in  order 
to  bring  about  their  submission  to  the  promised  regime.* 

The  Bulgarians,  however,  still  continued  their  unwavering 
oppositipn  to  one  clause  in  the  Berlin  treaty.  The  apparent 
certainty  that  Ottoman  troops  would  be  strung  along  the 
boundary  separating  the  two  provinces  was  unbearable  to 
the  Bulgarian  population  on  both  sides.  So  they  kept  up 
their  appeals  to  the  powers  for  some  arrangement  that 

'  Pari.  Papers,  1878-79,  vol.  Ixxix,  pp.  88,  441,  447;  vol  Ixxx,  passim. 

Ibid.,  1878-79,  vol.  Ixxx,  pp.  3  et  seq.;  vol.  Ixxxi,  p.  127. 
^ Ibid.,  1878-79,  vol.  Ixxx,  Turkey,  Nos.  i,  4. 
*■  Parliamentary  Papers,  1878-79,  vol.  Ixxx,  pp.  291-95. 


136  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [136 

would  hinder  the  Sultan  from  exercising  his  right,  under 
the  treaty,  to  place  Turkish  garrisons  along  that  boundary/ 
It  is  not  easy  to  determine  how  the  matter  was  adjusted,  but 
shortly  before  the  time  came  for  the  Russian  troops  to 
leave  these  provinces  (May,  1879)  the  Russian  authorities 
were  prepared  to  assure  the  Bulgarians  that  the  Porte  did 
not  "  see  the  immediate  necessity  of  garrisoning  the  Bal- 
kans." And  at  the  same  time  it  was  suggested  to  them 
that  the  strategical  advantages  of  maintaining  Turkish 
troops  along  the  boundary  between  the  two  provinces  were, 
seemingly,  no  longer  thought  of,  and  that  it  remained  for 
the  Roumeliotes  to  show  by  their  future  conduct  that  the 
presence  of  such  garrisons  was  not  politically  necessary.^ 

Meanwhile,  the  stipulations  of  the  Berlin  congress  were 
being  carried  out  in  respect  to  the  organization  of  both  pro- 
vinces. The  treaty  set  down  as  the  basis  of  public  law  in 
Bulgaria  that  religious  creeds  were  to  have  no  bearing  on 
the  civil  and  political  rights  of  the  inhabitants.  There  was 
to  be  freedom  for  the  exercise  of  all  forms  of  worship ;  and 
there  was  to  be  no  interference  in  relation  to  the  hierarchical 
organization  of  the  various  religious  communities.  The 
treaty  also  made  it  inadmissible  to  select  the  prince  from 
among  the  members  of  any  of  the  reigning  dynasties  of  the 
great  powers  of  Europe.^ 

It  will  be  remembered  that  the  treaty  of  Berlin  intrusted 
the  provisional  administration  of  Bulgarian  affairs  to  a 
Russian  commissioner,  although  consular  delegates  repre- 
senting the  signatory  powers  and  a  Turkish  Commissioner 
were  expected  to  exercise  some  control  over  the  working  of 
^Parl.  Papers,  1878-79,  vol.  Ixxx,  p.  299. 

'For  the  Tsar's  proclamation,  and  the  address  of  his  representative, 
see -Par/.  Papers,  1878-79,  vol.  Ixxxi,  p.  1046;  cf.  infra,  p.  144. 
F  » Art.  iii  and  Art.  v  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin.    Pari.  Papers,  1878,  vol. 
Ixxxiii,  or  Hertslet,  op.  cii.,  vol.  iv. 


137]       MOVEMENTS  LEADING  TO  THEIR  UNION  137 

the  provisional  regime/  The  Tsar  selected  Prince  Don- 
doukoff  to  carry  on  the  provisional  government  in  Bul- 
garia; and  it  was  not  long  before  this  Imperial  commissioner 
concentrated  within  himself  the  supreme  civil  and  military 
authority  in  both  Bulgaria  and  Eastern  Roumelia.^  He  or- 
ganized local  militias,  and  had  the  recruits  from  both  prov- 
inces drilled  practically  as  a  combined  force  under  Russian 
officers.  In  fact,  the  whole  procedure  of  the  Tsar's  agents 
in  the  two  provinces  must  have  had  an  unmistakable  bear- 
ing on  the  desire  and  the  efforts  of  the  Bulgarian  popula- 
tions there  for  union.  From  time  to  time  the  British  gov- 
ernment strongly  protested  to  the  St.  Petersburg  Cabinet 
against  the  methods  employed  by  the  provisional  Russian 
authorities.  Their  entire  civil  and  military  system  was  of 
a  nature,  it  was  contended,  to  render  more  and  more  diffi- 
cult and  hopeless  the  task  of  putting  into  operation  the  de- 
cisions of  the  Berlin  congress,  which  called  for  the  entire 
separation  of  Eastern  Roumelia  from  Bulgaria.^ 

The  upshot  of  all  the  correspondence  between  the  two 
cabinets  on  these  matters,  was  the  promise  from  St.  Peters- 
burg (April,  1879)  that  the  influence  of  the  Russian  gov- 
ernment would  be  exerted  towards  the  peaceful  organization 
of  Eastern  Roumelia  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the 
Berlin  treaty.*    Under  the  direction  of  the  Russian  gov- 

^The  treaty  specified  that  the  provisional  regime  should  not  extend 
beyond  a  period  of  nine  months  after  the  ratifications  were  exchanged. 
During  the  month  of  August  (1878)  all  the  contracting  powers  ex- 
changed ratifications  at  Berlin. 

^General  Stolypin  was  nominally  the  Russian  governor  of  the  latter 
district. 

^ Pari.  Papers,  1878  9,  vol.  Ixxxi,  pp.  103,  127,  passim.  For  the  atti- 
tude of  the  European  commission,  engaged  in  drafting  the  Eastern 
Roumelian  Constitution,  see  ibid.,  p.  183. 

^Cf.  supra,  p.  135;  also  Pari.  Papers,  vol.  Ixxx,  Turkey,  Nos.  i,  4; 
also  Annual  Ref^ister,  1879,  p.  179. 


138  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [138 

ernor-general  of  Bulgaria,  Doncloukoff,  a  national  assembly 
was  convened  (February  26,  1879)  at  the  old  Bulgarian 
capital,  Tirnovo.^  In  opening  the  assembly  Prince  Don- 
doukoff  presented  for  its  consideration  the  draft  of  a  con- 
stitution for  the  prospective  principality.  But  with  the  Bul- 
garian representatives  other  matters  claimed  first  attention. 
Sofia  was  determined  upon  as  being  the  most  suitable  place 
for  the  new  capital.  Then,  after  about  three  weeks  of 
speech-making,  a  vote  was  finally  taken  expressing  the 
thanks  of  the  Bulgarians  to  the  Russian  Emperor.  It  is 
somewhat  significant,  also,  that  this  expression  of  gratitude 
to  the  Tsar  was  accompanied  with  a  declaration  of  fears 
for  the  future  in  case  Turkish  troops  were  to  be  stationed 
along  the  boundary  between  the  principality  and  Eastern 
Roumelia."  At  this  juncture,  however,  a  mild  reprimand 
from  Prince  Dondoukoff  (conveyed  through  a  messenger) 
brought  his  ''skeleton  constitution,"  as  he  called  it,  up  for 
consideration  (April  2).^  A  committee  of  fifteen  then 
spent  about  two  weeks  in  revising  the  Russian  project;  and 
the  assembly  completed  the  work  in  about  three  weeks  more. 
A  number  of  important  modifications  were  made  in  the 
original  draft.  A  clause  stating  that  the  relations  of  the 
prince  to  the  Porte  should  be  those  of  a  vassal,  was  re- 
jected. Articles  providing  for  a  Council  of  State,  and  pro- 
hibiting any  change  in  the  constitution  within  five  years, 
were  likewise  cut  out.  Articles  were  also  added  prohibiting 
slavery,  and  the  giving  of  titles  of  rank  in  the  principality. 
In  closing  the  assembly.  Prince  Dondoukoff  intimated  that 

^Beaman,  M.  Statnbuloff,  London,  1895,  ch.  i. 

^ Appleton  s  Annual  Cyclopedia  (New  York,  1879). 

'The  imperial  commissioner  had  appointed  a  substitute  to  preside 
during  the  discussion  of  the  constitution.  The  former  exarch  was 
elected  the  regular  president  of  the  Assembly. 


139]       MOVEMENTS  LEADING  TO  THEIR  UNION  139 

the  work  accomplished  by  the  deputies  signified  the  posses- 
sion of  quaHties  that  had  not  been  known  hitherto  among 
Bulg'arians. 

Having  now  a  constitution  for  Bulgaria,  the  next  day 
(April  29th)  a  new  assembly  proceeded  to  elect  a  prince. 
Three  candidates  were  named,  and  the  deputies  unanimously 
elected  the  one  best  known  to  them — Prince  Alexander 
of  Battenberg/ 

The  constitution  declared  the  principality  of  Bulgaria  a 
hereditary  and  constitutional  monarchy  with  a  national  rep- 
resentation. The  prince  was  to  be  the  chief  representative 
of  the  state,  and  to  bear  the  simple  title  of  Highness."  He 
was  to  have  his  permanent  residence  within  the  principality, 
and  both  he  and  his  heir-apparent  were  to  be  exempt  from 
all  taxes,  state  dues  and  fines.  A  sum  equal  to  about  $120,- 
000  was  to  be  granted  yearly  by  the  Assembly  to  the  prince 
and  his  court.  It  is  interesting  to  note  in  this  connection 
that  the  constitution  declared  that  "  neither  the  prince  nor 
his  relatives  "  could  derive  personal  profit  from  any  of  the 
state  property. 

In  the  prince  was  vested  the  right  of  appointment  to  all 
government  employments ;  and  each  appointee  was  to  swear 
fidelity  to  the  prince,  as  well  as  to  the  constitution.  The  exe- 
cutive authority,  "  under  the  high  superintendence  and  di- 
rection of  the  prince,"  was  vested  in  the  six  Ministers  of 
State  and  their  council.  No  official  document  signed  by 
the  prince  was  to  be  valid  without  the  signature  of  one  or 
more  of  his  ministers.    These  ministers,  to  be  appointed  or 

^  The  Assembly  that  revised  the  Russian  draft  of  the  constitution  con- 
sisted of  286  members.  The  majority  were  elected  by  the  inhabitants, 
and  the  remainder  were  deputies  ex  officio  and  appointees  of  the  govern- 
ment. The  Assembly  that  elected  Prince  Alexander  consisted  of  250 
members,  22  of  whom  were  Mohammedans.  Cf.  Miiller,  Political  His- 
tory of  Recent  Times,  trans,  by  Peters  (New  York,  1882),  p.  556. 


ft 


I40  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [140 

discharged  by  the  prince,  were  declared  to  be  responsible 
"  conjointly  "  to  him  and  to  the  representative  Assembly. 

Representation  in  the  government  was  confined  to  one 
House — the  National  Assembly,  or  Sobranje.  Its  members, 
one  for  every  ten  thousand  of  the  population  of  either  sex, 
were  to  be  elected  for  three  years,  by  universal  manhood 
suffrage ;  and  the  constitution  made  it  the  duty  of  each  mem- 
ber to  represent  the  entire  nation.  It  was  definitely  stated, 
also,  that  each  member  was  to  be  entirely  free  to  act  in  that 
capacity  in  accordance  with  "  his  own  conscience  and  con- 
viction." 

Provision  was  likewise  made  for  the  election  and  con- 
vocation of  a  Grand  Sobranje.  This  assembly  was  to  be 
chosen  like  the  other,  except  that  it  would  contain  double  the 
number  of  the  ordinary  one.  It  was  to  be  the  only  com- 
petent body  to  elect  three  regents  when  necessary,  to  select 
a  new  prince,  or  to  settle  questions  involving  a  change  in  the 
constitution  or  in  the  territorial  boundaries  of  the  prin- 
cipality. 

Bulgaria  has  been  called  the  most  democratic  country  in 
the  world.  It  had  neither  an  aristocracy  nor  a  plutocracy; 
and  it  was  made  a  part  of  the  fundamental  law  that  titles  of 
nobility  or  rank,  and  likewise  orders  and  decorations,  could 
not  be  constituted  in  the  principality.  It  is  noteworthy, 
also,  that  while  education  had  not  yet  become  general  out- 
side the  larger  towns  and  villages,  the  constitution  specified 
that  primary  education  should  be  gratuitous  and  compulsory 
for  all  subjects.  The  constitution  provided,  moreover,  for 
the  freedom  of  the  press,  and  the  right  of  public  assembly; 
and  it  proclaimed  the  inviolability  of  the  rights  of  person 
and  property.  While  the  "  Orthodox  Eastern  Confession  " 
was  mentioned  as  being  the  state  religion,  still  full  religious 
liberty  was  to  be  accorded  to  all.^ 

*For  the  full  text  of  the  constitution,  see  Pari.  Papers  (1878-79)  > 
vol.  Ixxx,  Turkey,  No.  8. 


141  ]       MOVEMENTS  LEADING  TO  THEIR  UNION  141 

One  of  the  most  important  features  of  the  new  constitu- 
tion seems  to  have  been  the  nice  balance  that  was  worked  • 
out  in  it  between  the  representative  assembly  and  the  exe- 
cutive branch  of  the  government.  It  has  even  been  sug- 
gested that  this  relationship  was  due  to  the  forethought  of 
the  Tsar's  agents;  their  plan  being,  perhaps,  to  leave  a 
way  open  whereby  Russia  could  control  the  situation  by 
maintaining  a  paramount  influence  over  either  the  prince, 
the  cabinet,  or  the  people/  This  system  of  checks  and 
balances  surely  rendered  it  very  difficult  to  make  any  head- 
way in  the  government  without  the  mutual  agreement  of 
these  three  governmental  forces. 

From  the  outset,  the  fortunes  of  Bulgaria  and  Eastern 
Roumelia  were  so  closely  interwoven  that  it  will  be  well  to 
watch,  in  going  along,  the  progress  of  affairs  in  both  pro- 
vinces. The  international  commission,  called  for  in  the 
treaty  of  Berlin  to  work  out  a  plan  for  organizing  Eastern 
Roumelia,  continued  its  sittings  from  September,  1878,  to 
the  end  of  April  of  the  following  year.  This  commission 
was  also  charged  with  the  duty  of  provisionally  administer- 
ing the  financial  affairs  of  that  district. 

The  eleven  commissioners  representing  the  signatory 
powers  of  the  treaty  did  nearly  all  of  their  work  at  Philip- 
popolis,  where  they  could  readily  familiarize  themselves  with 
every  phase  of  the  situation.^  The  lengthy  "  Organic 
Statute  "  which  they  succeeded  in  elaborating  was  promptly 
and  unhesitatingly  accepted  by  all  parties  concerned.^  This 

^Miller,  T/nr  Balkans  (New  York,  1896),  p.  216. 

'Of  the  sixty-four  sittings  of  the  commission,  while  the  statute  was 
being  drafted,  only  the  last  four  were  held  in  Constantinople.  For  a 
full  account  of  these  meetings,  see  Pari.  Papers,  1878-79,  vol.  Ixxxi. 

•''The  text  of  the  495  Articles,  and  as  much  more  in  "Annexes,"  may 
be  seen  in  Pari.  Papers,  1878-79,  vol.  Ixxx,  Turkey,  No.  6. 


142  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [142 

document  bears  evidence  of  having  been  most  carefully 
worked  out  in  every  detail.  And  it  is  not  too  much  to  add  in 
this  connection,  that  it  proved  to  be  peculiarly  adapted,  as  we 
shall  see,  to  suit  the  shifting  relations  of  the  people  whose 
affairs  were  intended  to  be  administered  according  to  its 
provisions. 

The  treaty  of  Berlin  had  specified,  as  we  have  seen,  that 
Eastern  Roumelia  should  enjoy  administrative  autonomy, 
while  remaining  under  the  "  direct  political  and  military  au- 
thority of  the  sultan."  It  fixed  the  term  of  the  governor- 
general  (belonging  to  the  Christian  faith)  at  five  years. ^  It 
provided,  likewise,  that  Eastern  Roumelia  should  have  a 
native  police  and  a  local  militia.  The  chief  officers  of  these 
two  bodies  were  to  be  nominated  by  the  sultan,  but  he  was 
enjoined  to  pay  due  heed  in  his  appointments  to  the  religion 
of  the  people  in  the  different  localities.  The  org-anic  statute 
empowered  the  sultan  to  select  the  Minister  of  the  Interior 
from  a  list  of  three  candidates  (Christians)  to  be  presented 
by  the  governor-general.  The  many  other  nominative 
ofifices  were  to  be  filled  by  appointees  of  the  governor-gen- 
eral, subject  to  the  approval  of  the  sultan.  It  was  provided, 
however,  that  the  local  appointments  should  be  valid  in 
case  the  Imperial  decision  were  delayed  for  a  month. 

The  statute  provided  as  well  for  the  usual  departments  of 
state,  and  for  a  Provincial  Assembly.  It  contained  ample 
provisions  for  safe-guarding  within  the  province  such 
liberties  as  are  common  under  constitutional  government. 
Primary  and  secondary  schools  were  left,  for  the  most 
part,  to  the  direction  and  maintenance  of  the  various  re- 
ligious organizations.  In  case  a  community  should  be  too 
poor  to  maintain  schools  the  government  was  directed  to  sup- 

*  The  governor-general  to  be  nominated  by  the  Sultan  with  the  assent 
of  the  treaty  powers. 


143]       MOVEMENTS  LEADING  TO  THEIR  UNION  143 

ply  certain  grants  from  the  national  treasury;  but  schools 
receiving  such  aid  were  to  be  wholly  under  the  control  of 
the  government.  In  fact  the  Director  of  Public  Instruc- 
tion was  charged  with  the  general  oversight  of  all  schools, 
public  and  private.  Instruction  to  all  children  between  the 
ages  of  seven  and  thirteen,  inclusive,  was  made  obligatory. 
Five  years  after  the  promulgation  of  the  constitution,  young 
men  becoming  twenty-one  were  not  to  be  permitted  to  vote 
if  unable  to  read  and  write  Turkish,  Bulgarian,  or  Greek. 

The  manufacture  of  gunpowder  in  Eastern  Roumelia  was 
strictly  prohibited.  The  supply  for  the  provincial  maga- 
zines was  to  come  from  other  Turkish  provinces,  and  could 
not  be  imported  without  special  authorization  by  the  pro- 
vincial assembly.  The  attention  given  by  the  framers  of 
the  organic  statute  to  minor  details  is  noticeable  in  the  speci- 
fication that  such  authorization  should  be  given  gratuitously.^ 
A  study  of  this  extremely  long  and  detailed  constitution, 
worked  out  for  the  new  and  autonomous  province  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  treaty  of  Berlin,  causes  one  to  feel  that 
scarcely  any  question  could  arise,  connected  with  the  com- 
plicated affairs  in  that  province,  that  would  not  be  covered 
by  some  provision  in  that  document. 

At  the  end  of  their  prospective  constitution,  the  European 
commissioners  added  a  "  disposition  finale "  intended  to 
limit  the  activity  of  the  provincial  government  in  the  matter 
of  law-making.  According  to  this  final  provision  changes 
in  the  constitution,  excepting  in  relation  to  two  chapters 
bearing  on  the  militia  and  the  gendarmerie,  could  not  be 
made  without  the  consent  of  the  seven  governments  con- 
cerned in  the  formulation  of  the  statute. 


'There  was  a  strong  impression  in  London  and  Vienna  that  the  com- 
mission entered  too  much  into  detail  respecting  the  internal  administra- 
tion of  the  province.    Pari.  Papers  (1878-79),  vol.  Ixxxi,  p.  573. 


144  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [144 

While  the  organic  statute  was  nearing  completion,  a  dele- 
gation representing  some  of  the  Bulgarian  leaders  in  East- 
ern Roumelia  and  Bulgaria  was  visiting  the  capitals  of  the 
signatories  of  the  Berlin  treaty.  By  this  time  many  of  the 
principal  agitators  for  the  immediate  union  of  these  two 
provinces  had  abandoned  the  hope  of  bringing  about  that 
result.  The  avowed  purpose  now  was  to  obtain  a  sufficient 
modification  of  the  treaty  to  allow  Eastern  Roumelia  a 
European  governor,  and  to  prevent  the  placing  of  strictly 
Turkish  garrisons  along  the  boundary  between  the  two 
provinces.  In  fact,  there  appears  to  have  been  all  along  an 
unwavering  determination  among  the  Bulgarians,  especially 
those  in  Eastern  Roumelia,  never  to  submit  to  the  exercise 
of  the  sultan's  right  respecting  the  Balkan  garrisons.^ 

It  was  at  this  juncture  that  the  Tsar  may  be  said  to  have 
come  to  the  rescue.  He  now  sent  a  special  messenger.  Gen- 
eral Obrutcheff,  to  the  Sultan  and  to  the  Bulgarians.^  Gen- 
eral Obrutcheff's  mission  to  Constantinople  was  successful 
to  the  extent  that  the  Sultan  pledged  himself  "  provision- 
ally," not  to  exercise  his  treaty  right  of  garrisoning  the 
roadways  between  Eastern  Roumelia  and  Bulgaria.^ 

Having  received  this  most  comforting  promise  from  the 
Turkish  government,  the  Tsar's  envoy  hurried  on  in  order 
to  deliver  his  messages  to  the  Bulgarians.  In  various  cen- 
ters throughout  Eastern  Roumelia  he  read  to  the  people  his 
master's  Proclamation  to  the  Bulgarians."  He  told  his 
hearers,  likewise,  of  his  audience  with  the  Sultan,  and  as- 

^Parl.  Papers  (1878-79),  vol.  Ixxxi,  pp.  734  et  seq. 
^ Ibid.,  p.  995;  also  vol.  Ixxx,  p.  299. 

^It  is  said  that  the  Sultan's  pledge  was  obtained  as  an  offset  to  the 
Tsar's  pledge  for  the  maintenance  of  order  in  Eastern  Roumelia,  and 
for  the  remission  of  about  four  million  dollars  of  Turkey's  indebtedness 
to  Russia.  Miiller,  Political  History  of  Recent  Times,  p.  557.  Cf. 
supra,  p.  136. 


145]       MOVEMENTS  LEADING  TO  THEIR  UNION  145 

sured  them  that  they  had  nothing  to  fear  from  Turkish 
troops.  He  pointed  out  to  them,  moreover,  that  with  the 
exception  of  their  governor-general — one  of  their  own  race 
— no  Turkish  official  would  be  seen  in  their  country.  These 
assurances,  taken  in  connection  with  the  Tsar's  expressed 
disapproval  of  any  disorderly  opposition  to  the  organization 
being  worked  out  for  them,  did  much  to  clear  the  way  for  a 
fair  trial  in  Eastern  Roumelia  under  the  statute  about  to  be 
presented  by  the  International  Commission.^ 

The  Organic  Statute  "  was  completed  and  signed  by  the 
commissioners  on  April  26,  1879,  at  Constantinople.  The 
Sultan's  nomination  (April  14th)  of  Alexander  Vogorides 
(Aleko  Pasha)  as  governor-general  of  Eastern  Roumelia 
for  five  years,  had  already  been  accepted  by  the  governments 
in  the  European  Concert.^  It  will  be  seen  that  the  first 
governor's  name  clearly  indicates  that  he  had  a  Greek  an- 
cestry; but  frequent  reference  is  found  to  him  as  being  of 
Bulgarian  blood.  ^  He  recognized  the  ecclesiastical  author- 
ity of  the  Bulgarian  Exarch,  and  thus  he  is  commonly  called 
a  Bulgarian  Christian.  Aleko  Pasha  spoke  both  Bulgarian 
and  Greek,  and  he  had  formerly  been  Turkish  ambassador, 
at  Vienna.* 

The  disappointment  of  the  Bulgarians  in  Eastern  Rou- 
melia over  this  separation  from  Bulgaria,  and  the  racial  and 
religious  prejudices,  all  too  apparent  throughout  the  pro- 
vince, rendered  the  situation  there  anything  but  promising.^ 
Russia's  army  of  occupation  was  expected  to  withdraw  as 

^  Pari.  Papers,  1878-79,  vol.  Ixxxi,  pp.  1044  et  seq.  Cf.  supra,  i>.  136. 
^Ibid.,  pp.  877,  944. 

'Washburn,  Fifty  Years  in  Constantinople,  p.  148.    Pari.  Papers, 
1878-79,  vol.  Ixxxi,  p.  1059,  passim. 
^Ibid.,  p.  [013. 

^ Pari.  Papers,  1878,  vol.  Ixxxii,  Turkey,  No.  49. 


146  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [146 

soon  as  the  new  government  should  be  organized.  Under 
these  circumstances,  it  became  evident  to  the  powers  that  it 
would  not  be  advisable  to  leave  the  responsibility  of  in- 
augurating the  new  regime  solely  to  the  authorities  provided 
for  in  the  constitution.  Austria  and  Great  Britain  were 
quite  determined  that  the  Russian  occupation  should  not  be 
prolonged.  Finally,  in  accordance  with  the  Sultan's  pro- 
position, the  international  commission,  just  finishing  the 
draft  of  the  constitution,  was  continued  for  another  year. 
The  commissioners  were  then  instructed  by  their  govern- 
ments to  proceed  to  the  capital  of  the  new  province  (Philip- 
popolis),  and  to  act  there  in  conjunction  with  their  asso- 
ciates as  an  advisory  council  to  the  governor-general.  It 
was  well  understood,  at  the  same  time,  that  the  administra- 
tive head  of  the  provincial  government  was  to  pay  due  heed 
to  the  advice  of  this  international  body.^  The  Sultan  issued 
firmans  (May  i8th),  with  rather  unusual  promptness,  con- 
firming the  appointment  of  Aleko  Pasha,  and  sanctioning 
the  constitution.'^  As  the  governor  was  about  to  leave  for 
Philippopolis,  it  appears  that  the  Sultan  ordered  him  to  wear 
the  Turkish  fez,  at  his  installation.  Owing  to  the  feeling  in 
the  province,  however,  it  seems  that  after  crossing  the  fron- 
tier he  discarded  the  fez  for  the  Bulgarian  cap. 

On  Aleko  Pasha's  arrival  (May  27)  at  Philippopolis,  he 
was  greeted  by  a  band  playing  the  Bulgarian  hymn,  which 
was  also  sung  by  boys  from  the  Bulgarian  school.  Two 
days  later,  when  the  ceremony  connected  with  the  reading  of 
the  Sultan's  firman  took  place,  the  governor  felt  obliged  to 
defer  to  the  popular  desire  and  did  not  display  the  Turkish 
flag.--' 

^Parl.  Papers,  1878-9,  vol.  Ixxxi,  pp.  1020  et  seq. 

*For  the  texts  of  the  imperial  firmans,  see  idid.,  vol.  Ixxx,  p.  423. 

^ Pari.  Papers,  1878-79,  vol.  Ixxxi,  pp.  1061  et  seq.  The  governor's 
acquiescence  was  in  keeping  with  the  advice  of  the  European  com- 
mission. 


147]       MOVEMENTS  LEADING  TO  THEIR  UNION  147 

A  German,  Mr.  M.  A.  Schmidt,  had  ahxady  rendered 
valuable  service  in  caring  for  the  financial  affairs  of  the 
province  under  the  direction  of  the  international  commis- 
sion. Taking  note  of  the  sentiment  favoring  his  retention, 
the  governor  appointed  him  Director  of  Finance.  Most  of 
the  other  appointive  offices  were  filled  v^ith  Bulgarians. 

With  the  Russian  troops  rapidly  departing,  leaving  a  local 
militia  already  quite  well  organized,  drilled  and  equipped, 
by  the  Russians,  and  with  the  presence  of  the  European  com- 
mission in  the  capital,  Eastern  Roumelia  was  now  started 
on  her  brief  period  of  autonomy.^ 

While  this  preparatory  work  had  been  going  on  in  rela- 
tion to  Eastern  Roumelia,  the  provisional  government  in 
Bulgaria  was  putting  matters  in  order  there  for  the  inaugur- 
ation of  the  new  regime.  The  man  selected  to  be  the  first 
prince  of  this  new  tributary  state  was  but  twenty-two  years  of 
age,  and,  at  the  time  of  his  election  (April  29,  1879),  he  was 
serving  as  an  officer  in  the  Prussian  garde  du  corps  at  Pots- 
dam. He  was  a  son  of  Alexander  of  Hesse,  by  a  Morgan- 
atic marriage  which  that  prince  contracted  with  a  Polish 
lady,  who  was  made  Princess  Battenberg.  Through  mar- 
riages contracted  by  other  members  of  the  Hessian  and  Bat- 
tenberg families,  he  was  connected  with  the  British  royal 
family.  He  was  also  a  nephew  of  the  Russian  empress.^ 
His  education  and  military  training  had  been  obtained  at 
Berlin ;  and  as  he  had  accompanied  the  invading  army  that 
fought  its  way  towards  Constantinople  in  1877-78,  he  was 
not  without  some  very  practical  knowledge  of  warfare. 

The  parties  to  the  treaty  of  Berlin  readily  assented  to  the 
election  of  Prince  Alexander  of  Battenberg;  and  he  visited 
the  principal  European  courts  before  going  to  Bulgaria. 


^  Pari.  Papers,  1878-79,  vol.  Ixxxi,  p.  882. 
Aftnual  Register,  1879,  p.  180;  Miiller,  op.  cit.,  p.  557. 


148  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [148 

He  went  first  to  Russia  to  pay  his  respects  to  his  Imperial 
uncle,  Tsar  Alexander  11.  It  was  there  that  he  received 
from  a  Bulgarian  deputation  the  official  notification  of  his 
election  to  the  princel}^  dignity  in  the  new  state.  Finally  he 
journeyed  from  Rome  to  Constantinople,  where  he  received 
his  investiture  (July  5th)  from  the  Sultan.  He  then  went 
on  to  Bulgaria,  and  was  received  there  with  no  lack  of  en- 
thusiasm. On  July  9th,  at  the  old  capital — Turnovo — ,  he 
took  the  oath  of  fidelity  to  the  constitution;  and  a  few  days 
later  he  entered  the  new  capital — Sofia — and  proceeded  to 
set  in  motion  the  governmental  machinery  of  the  new 
principality.^ 

Prince  Dondoukofif  departed  at  once,  and  within  a  month 
the  Russian  army  of  occupation  had  left  the  country.  A 
very  liberal  supply  of  Russian  officers  remained  behind, 
however,  in  care  of  the  native  militia. 

Within  a  week  after  entering  his  capital  Prince  Alexander 
selected  his  first  cabinet.  He  made  choice  of  five  conserva- 
tive Bulgarians,  and  one  Russian — the  Minister  of  War — 
General  BarantzofT.  The  elections  for  the  Sobranje  came 
on  in  the  fall,  and  when  the  Assembly  convened  (November 
8th)  it  was  found  to  contain  a  large  majority  of  Liberals.^ 

For  some  little  time  the  national  parties  were,  for  the 
most  part,  passing  through  formative  stages.  It  is  not 
easy,  therefore,  to  characterize  them  with  any  considerable 

*See  ch.  vii  of  the  Constitution;  also  Appleton  s  Annual  Cyclopedia, 
New  Series,  vol.  iv. 
■''The  one-chambered  legislative  assembly. 

Annual  Register,  1879,  p.  159;  Washburn,  op.  cit.,  p.  152.  Dr. 
Washburn  speaks  from  personal  knowledge  when  he  says:  "...  there 
were  no  leaders  who  had  had  any  experience  in  government,  and  the 
National  Assembly  chosen  by  the  people  was  hopelessly  ignorant  and 
unmanageable."  But  he  sympathetically  adds,  "I  suppose  nothing 
better  could  have  been  expected  of  a  people  suddenly  emancipated  from 
Turkish  rule." 


149]       MOVEMENTS  LEADING  TO  THEIR  UNION  149 

definiteness.  It  may  be  said,  however,  that,  generally  speak- 
ing, the  Conservatives  v^ere  willing  to  follow  the  lead  of 
Russian  advisers,  while  the  Liberals  held  that  the  Bulgarians 
could  and  should  exercise  their  share  of  authority  and  re- 
sponsibility in  the  affairs  of  the  principality.  Being  a  favor- 
ite nephew  of  Tsar  Alexander  II,  Prince  Alexander  very 
naturally  worked  for  some  time  quite  in  harmony  with 
Russia's  agents,  and  thus  in  accord  with  the  Conservatives. 

But  there  was  at  the  same  time  another  line  of  cleavage, 
which  caused  more  or  less  overlapping  in  respect  to  these  two 
national  parties.  A  vigorous  agitation  was  being  kept  up 
among  the  Bulgarians  in  the  principality,  as  well  as  in 
Eastern  Roumelia,  for  the  early  union  of  the  two  territories. 
Some  of  the  Liberals  favored  a  temporizing  policy  on  the 
part  of  the  Bulgarian  government  towards  the  object  of  this 
agitation;  and  in  this  attitude  they  were  in  full  accord  with 
the  Conservatives.  But  there  were  other  would-be  leaders 
among  the  Liberals  who  were  supremely  interested  in  press- 
ing upon  the  Government  the  expediency  of  taking  imme- 
diate steps  looking  towards  the  consummation  of  the  union. ^ 
It  was  not  long  before  a  keen  rivalry  sprang  up  between  the 
leaders  of  these  two  Liberal  factions,  Zankoff  and  Caraveloff, 
and  that  added  somewhat,  also,  to  the  party  complications.^ 

The  prince  found  that  he  could  not  make  any  headway 
with  the  Sobranje  and  he  dissolved  the  assembly  (Decem- 
ber 5th).  The  second  elections  were  held  in  the  spring  of 
1880,  and  resulted  in  greatly  increasing  the  Liberal  ma- 
jority. Prince  Alexander  determined  now  to  try  a  Liberal 
Ministry,  and  he  picked  Zankoff  to  form  a  Cabinet.^ 

^  Cf.  Beaman,  op.  cit.,  p.  42. 

^Minchin,  The  Balkan  Peninsula,  ch.  xiv. 

'Zankoff  called  himself  a  Constitutional  Liberal.  His  chief  anxiety 
was  to  see  the  principality  organized  and  administered  in  strict  accord- 


I50  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [150 

These  gains  for  the  Liberals  greatly  strengthened  the 
unionist  movement.  The  chief  agitators  held  a  mass  meet- 
ing (May  29)  at  Slivno,  in  Bulgaria,  and  the  prince  sent 
two  delegates,  in  order  that  he  might  have  definite  infor- 
mation regarding  the  situation.  As  the  head  of  the  new 
Liberal  Ministry  in  England,  Mr.  Gladstone  had  let  it  be 
known  that  the  sympathy  of  the  British  government  for  the 
Christian  nationalities  of  the  Balkans  was  dependent  on  the 
good  use  that  they  should  make  of  the  liberties  that  Europe 
had  already  secured  for  them.  This  declaration,  coupled 
with  the  efforts,  particularly  of  English  and  Austrian  offi- 
cials in  the  two  provinces,  had  a  most  favorable  influence  in 
dissuading  Bulgarians,  both  north  and  south  of  the  Balkans, 
from  taking  any  decisive  steps  at  this  juncture  to  bring 
about  the  union.  Prince  Alexander's  delegates  returned 
from  the  Slivno  conference  to  report  that  the  time  had 
not  arrived  yet  for  a  general  unionist  movement;  and 
for  the  next  two  or  three  years  the  question  seems  to  have 
been  kept  more  in  the  background.^ 

The  internal  conditions  in  Bulgaria  and  Eastern  Roumelia 
were  still  anything  but  promising.  Brigandage  had  sprung 
up  anew,  and  there  were  many  instances  of  racial  and  re- 
ligious strife  in  which  neither  the  Bulgarians,  the  Greeks, 
nor  the  Moslems  seem  to  have  been  blameless.  There  were 
difficult  problems,  likewise,  to  be  solved  in  connection  with 
the  financial  needs  of  the  two  impoverished  provinces.^ 

Throughout  the  year  1880,  the  premier,  Zankoff,  failed 
to  get  along  well  with  the  Russian  War  Minister  (now 

ance  with  the  constitution.  Pari.  Papers,  1880,  vol.  Ixxxi,  p.  438; 
Minchin,  op.  cii.,  p.  234. 

^  Pari.  Papers,  1880,  vol.  Ixxxi,  pp.  445  et  seq.;  Beaman,  op.  cit., 
ch.  ii. 

"^Parl.  Papers,  1880,  Turkey,  No.  19;  1881,  Turkey,  No.  4;  Appleton's 
Cyclopedia,  1879,  "Bulgaria,"  loc.  cit.;  ibid.,  1880,  p.  74. 


151]       MOVEMENTS  LEADING  TO  THEIR  UNION  151 

General  Ernroth)  at  Sofia;  and  in  December  the  prince  * 
gave  the  premiership  to  Caraveloff/  Under  these  Liberal 
cabinets  a  considerable  number  of  important  legislative  bills 
v^ere  passed.  Provisions  were  made  for  a  better  system  of 
national  education  and  for  ecclesiastical  reforms  intended  to 
place  a  limit  on  hierarchical  domination,  and  the  rights  and 
duties  of  village  magistrates  were  better  defined.  But  when 
the  Liberals  set  on  foot  a  movement  to  reduce  the  number 
and  the  rank  of  Russian  officials  in  Bulgaria  and  manifested 
strong  socialistic  tendencies,  the  prince  was  ready  to  break 
with  the  Liberals  and  to  resort  to  rather  high-handed 
measures.^ 

In  March,  188 1,  Tsar  Alexander  II,  the  uncle  and  patron 
of  Prince  Alexander  of  Bulgaria,  was  assassinated.  Prince 
Alexander  attended  the  funeral  of  his  Imperial  uncle,  and 
then  visited  the  courts  of  Berlin  and  Vienna.  After  an  ab- 
sence of  about  six  weeks,  he  returned,  and  shortly  after- 
wards (May  loth)  dismissed  the  ministry  and  appointed 
the  Russian  War  Minister,  General  Ernroth,  premier.  He  an- 
nounced at  the  same  time  his  determination  to  surrender  his 
crown  unless  a  Grand  Sobranje  should  decide  in  accordance 
with  his  views.  Then  he  submitted  three  proposals  which 
were  to  be  acted  upon  by  the  Grand  Assembly.  He  asked 
to  be  invested  for  seven  years  with  "  extraordinary  powers  " 
enabling  him  to  create  new  institutions,  and  empowering 
him  to  summon  a  Grand  Sobranje  within  the  seven  years,  so 
that  the  constitution  might  be  revised  on  the  basis  of  such 
institutions  as  he  had  created.  Also,  the  ordinary  As- 
sembly, then  in  session,  was  to  be  suspended. 

'  Caraveloff  was  at  this  time  a  moderate  Liberal,  or  Nationalist.  He 
was  in  general  more  interested  in  looking  after  internal  affairs,  and 
bringing  about  the  union  of  Eastern  Roumelia  with  the  principality, 
than  in  opposing  Russian  interference. 

^Annual  Register,  1881;  Appleton' s  Cyclopedia,  1881,  "Bulgaria," 
loc.  cil. 


1^2  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [152 

Prince  Alexander  and  his  Russian  helpers  arranged  for 
most  careful  oversight  of  the  elections,  and  a  Grand  As- 
sembly was  convened  that  accepted  the  prince's  proposals 
without  delay  or  opposition/  Whether  or  not  the  prince 
effected  this  coup  d'etat  as  a  result  of  advice  proffered  to 
him  at  St.  Petersburg,  Berlin  and  Vienna,  it  is  certain  that 
the  Russians  were  in  full  accord  with  the  movement.^ 

It  appears  that  the  prince  feared  he  had  weakened  his 
prestige  in  Bulgaria,  for  he  asked  Russia  to  send  him  two 
ministers.  The  Tsar  replied  by  sending  General  Soboleff, 
who  became  Minister  of  the  Interior,  General  Kaulbars,  who 
was  made  Minister  of  War,  and  General  Tioharoff,  who  be- 
came Minister  of  Justice.^ 

Bulgaria  was  now  practically,  so  far  as  the  government 
was  concerned,  a  Russian  province.  The  Russians  in  the 
Ministry  claimed  to  receive  their  orders  from  the  Tsar ;  and 
they  soon  made  it  plain  to  the  prince  that,  though  he  might 
continue  to  reign,  he  would  not  be  permitted  to  rule.*  But 
Prince  Alexander  was  not  the  man  to  be  forced  into  sub- 
mission to  subordinate  officials.  Hence  there  was  for  a 
little  time  something  like  a  three-cornered  fight.  The  Bul- 
garian leaders  were  bitter  towards  the  prince  for  having  set 
aside  the  constitution,  and  the  exploitation  of  their  coun- 
try by  Russian  commercial  speculators  tended  to  increase 
their  opposition  to  Russian  domination. 

With  the  accession  of  Alexander  III  to  the  Russian 
throne  (1881),  a  new  element  had  been  introduced  into 
the  situation  in  Bulgaria.    Up  to  the  time  of  his  death, 

^Cf.  Annual  Register,  1881;  Beaman,  op.  cif.,  p.  46. 
^Cf.  Miiller,  op.  cit.,  p.  557;  Minchin,  op.  cit.,  p.  234. 
^Koch,  Furst  Alexander  von  Bulgaria  (Darmstadt,  1887),  p.  104. 
*  Beaman,  op.  cit.,  p.  48;  Leonoff,  Documents  Secrets  (Berlin,  1893), 
passim.    Minchin,  op.  cit.,  p.  238. 


153]       MOVEMENTS  LEADING  TO  THEIR  UNION  153 

Alexander  II  manifested  a  fatherly  interest  in  the  success 
of  his  favorite  nephew's  reign.  But  the  son  (Alexander 
III)  is  said  to  have  cherished  an  enmity  towards  his  cousin, 
Prince  Alexander.  This  dislike,  it  seems,  was  due  to  some 
unpleasantness  that  came  up  between  them  during  their 
youth.  ^  The  young  Tsar's  animosity  is  thought  to  have  at 
least  encouraged  the  Russian  officials  in  the  principality  in 
manifesting  unfriendliness  and  arrogance  towards  the  prince, 
as  soon  as  he  presumed  to  slight  their  counsel.^ 

Throughout  the  year  1882,  the  Bulgarians  were  greatly 
agitated  over  the  loss  of  many  of  their  liberties  through 
the  suspension  of  the  constitution.  In  fact,  the  country  was 
so  near  the  verge  of  revolution  that  martial  law  was  de- 
clared. Meanwhile,  the  prince  was  taking  a  more  and  more 
decided  stand  against  the  dictation  of  his  Russian  officials. 
Even  the  threats  of  dethronement  failed  to  hold  him  longer 
in  check,  and  from  this  time  until  his  abdication  the  breach 
between  him  and  the  Tsar  widened  more  and  more.^ 

Finding  that  Prince  Alexander  was  slipping  his  halter,  the 
Russian  ministers  undertook  to  ingratiate  themselves  with 
the  Liberals.*  The  St.  Petersburg  government,  or  rather 
the  Tsar,  had  now  determined  that  the  union  of  Eastern 
Roumelia  with  Bulgaria  should  not  be  brought  about  until 
Prince  Alexander  could  be  forced  to  abdicate.  The  lead- 
ers of  the  popular  party  in  Bulgaria  were  told  that  the  prince 
was  the  principal  obstacle  in  the  way  of  union.  The  Bul- 
garians, however,  were  just  now  most  intent  on  the  re- 
establishment  of  constitutional  government.  Consequently, 

^Washburn,  op.  cit.,  pp.  161,  183;  Koch,  op.  cit.,  p.  81;  Bismarck's 
Autobiography,  Eng.  trans.,  vol.  ii,  p.  117. 

'Dicey,  The  Peasant  State  (London,  1894),  p.  23. 

'Beaman,  op.  cit.,  p.  49;  Appletofi  s  Annual  Cyclopedia,  1882. 

^  The  Contemporary  Review  for  1886  contains  an  article  dealing  quite 
fully  with  this  period. 


154 


THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES 


[154 


Russia's  next  move  was  to  call  upon  the  prince  to  give  up  his 
autocratic  power  and  restore  the  constitution,  on  pain  of 
losing-  his  throne/ 

Meanwhile,  the  prince  had  been  leaning  more  and  more 
on  the  counsel  of  the  moderate  Liberal  leaders.  He  had 
hesitated  about  trying  again  to  govern  with  a  radical  minis- 
try and  assembly,  but  when  there  was  no  alternative  except 
the  humiliation  of  submitting  to  the  dictation  of  Russian 
agents,  he  determined  to  follow  his  own  plans  in  restoring 
the  constitution.  He  found  the  leaders  of  all  the  Bulgarian 
parties  ready  to  join  with  him,  and  arrangements  for  the 
restoration  of  constitutional  government  were  quickly  ma- 
tured. The  small  assembly  "  petitioned  the  prince  to  re- 
store the  constitution  of  1879,  and  he  at  once  issued  a  pro- 
clamation to  that  effect  (September,  1883). 

The  Russian  ministers  had  not  been  consulted  in  refer- 
ence to  this  step.  They  were  taken  unawares,  and  in  their 
surprise  and  anger,  they  resigned.  Zankoff  (Liberal)  was 
asked  now  to  form  a  ministry.^  The  elections  for  the  So- 
branje,  however,  resulted  in  a  sweeping  victory  for  the  par- 
tisans of  his  rival,  Caraveloff,  and  Zankoff  resigned.  Zan- 
koff had  earlier  expressed  himself  as  wanting  neither 

Russia's  honey  nor  Russia's  sting."  ^  From  this  time, 
however,  he  became  an  out-and-out  Russophil,  and  we  shall 
see  a  little  later  what  an  important  and  shameful  part  he 
played  in  helping  to  bring  about  the  abdication  of  Prince 
Alexander.   The  Caraveloff  ministry  and  the  prince,  in  spite 

^Leonoff,  op.  cit.,  passim;  cf.  Rose,  op.  cit.,  p.  310. 
Appletofi  s  Annual  Cyclopedia,  1883.  One  of  England's  represent- 
atives at  Philippopolis  has  expressed  the_ opinion  that  "up  to  this  time 
(1883)  the  prince  seemed  to  listen  to  every  one  and  to  find  in  everyone 
a  broken  reed;  but  since  1883  the  prince  has  relied  upon  himself  alone, 
and  has  hardly  ever  made  a  mistake."    Minchin,  op.  cit.,  p.  297. 

^Koch,  op.  cit.,  p.  45. 


155]       MOVEMENTS  LEADING  TO  THEIR  UNION  155 

of  Stormy  times  in  the  government,  managed  to  maintain  a 
firm  grasp  on  the  situation  until  the  unionist  outbreak  in 
September,  1885. 

In  Eastern  Roumelia  Aleko  Pasha's  term  of  office  expired 
in  1884,  and  his  deputy,  M.  Christovitch,  was  appointed  by 
the  Sultan  with  the  unanimous  consent  of  the  great  powers. 
The  new  governor-general,  officially  called  Gavril  Pasha, 
was  a  Bulgarian,  had  been  educated  in  Paris  and  had  a 
Greek  wife.  He  was  understood  to  be  opposed  to  the  rev- 
olutionary tendencies  in  Eastern  Roumelia,  and  conse- 
quently, for  the  time  being,  he  was  sure  of  Russian  support.^ 
He  proceeded  to  dismiss  many  of  the  Liberal  officials  who 
were  known  to  be  zealous  in  the  cause  of  the  union.  This 
line  of  action  merely  increased  the  agitation,  and  led  at  the 
same  time  to  greater  secrecy  in  the  formation  of  a  unionist 
plot.  In  the  spring  of  1885  a  secret  movement  was  regu- 
larly organized  in  the  southern  province  with  the  object 
of  overthrowing  the  government  of  Gavril  Pasha  and  ef- 
fecting a  union  with  Bulgaria.  September  26th  was  the 
day  fixed  upon  for  the  uprising,  but  the  government  under- 
took to  arrest  some  of  the  agitators,  and  this  hastened  the 
outbreak.  It  appears  that  Prince  Alexander  was  informed 
about  September  9th  of  the  secret  plans  of  the  revolution- 
ary committee.  He  claimed  to  have  strongly  disapproved 
of  the  undertaking,  and  to  have  told  the  representative  of 
the  committee  that  Russia  would  not  countenance  the  move- 
ment. And,  moreover,  he  urged  that  he  had  given  positive 
assurances  to  the  Emperor  of  Austria-Hungary  that  tran- 
quillity would  be  maintained  for  the  present.^  He  seems 
to  have  thought  that  after  these  representations  on  his  part 
the  plot  would  not  be  carried  out.    At  the  same  time,  his 

^  Annual  Register,  1884,  1885. 

^Parl.  Papers,  1886,  vol.  Ixxv,  pp.  39,  133  {Turkey,  No.  i). 


1^6  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [156 

premier,  Caraveloff,  was  looked  upon  by  some  of  the  people 
in  Philippopolis  as  the  principal  organizer  of  the  movement. 

The  prince  was  at  his  summer  home  (at  Varna)  near  the 
coast  of  the  Black  Sea,  when,  on  the  morning  of  September 
1 8th,  he  was  apprised  of  the  fact  that  the  "  foreign  govern- 
ment of  Roumelia  "  had  been  overthrown,  and  that  a  pro- 
visional government  had  proclaimed  the  union  of  that  pro- 
vince with  Bulgaria,  under  his  sceptre.  On  the  afternoon 
of  the  same  day,  a  resolution  was  adopted  at  a  meeting  in 
Sofia  calling  upon  Prince  Alexander  to  sanction  the  union. 
On  the  same  day,  also,  the  militia  of  both  provinces  de- 
clared for  the  union  under  Prince  Alexander. 

The  prince  and  Caraveloff  left  Varna  the  same  evening, 
arriving  at  Tirnovo  the  next  day.  From  there — ^the  old 
capital  of  Bulgaria — the  prince  issued,  on  the  20th,  a  mani- 
festo proclaiming  the  union,  and  assuming,  "  by  the  grace 
of  God  and  the  national  will,"  the  title  of  "  Prince  of  North- 
ern and  Southern  Bulgaria."  The  next  day,  he  was  en- 
thusiastically received  at  Philippopolis.^  He  telegraphed 
immediately  to  Constantinople  announcing  what  had  been 
done,  and  affirming  that  there  was  no  hostile  intention  to- 
wards the  Ottoman  government,  whose  suzerainty  he  re- 
cognized. He  likewise  requested  the  Sultan  and  the  Porte 
to  sanction  the  union,  adding  that  the  people  were  deter- 
mined to  defend  with  their  lives  the  new  state  of  affairs. 

The  Tsar  at  once  expressed  his  entire  disapproval  (Sep- 
tember 21)  of  what  had  been  done  and  forbade  the  Russian 
officers  in  the  armies  of  Northern  and  Southern  Bulgaria  to 
take  any  part  whatever  in  the  movement.  A  little  later, 
all  these  officers  were  called  home.  All  the  great  powers 
were  taken  by  surprise,  and  there  was  a  general  expression 
of  opinion  that  the  mode  in  which  the  union  had  been  ef- 

^ParL  Papers,  1886,  vol.  Ixxv,  p.  43  {Turkey,  No.  i). 


157]       MOVEMENTS  LEADING  TO  THEIR  UNION         157  « 

fected  should  be  strongly  condemned.  On  the  24th,  Russia  . 
proposed  that  an  informal  conference  of  the  Constantinople 
ambassadors  be  held  in  order  to  reach  some  common  ground 
in  relation  to  the  situation.  The  prince  had  already  declared 
himself  responsible  for  the  tranquillity  of  the  two  districts 
now  united;  but  the  Bulgarian  and  Turkish  armies  were 
soon  facing  each  other  along  the  frontier.  The  situation 
was  rendered  still  more  critical,  also,  by  the  threatening  at- 
titude of  Greece  and  Servia,  in  opposition  to  the  enlarge- 
ment of  Bulgaria. 

Shortly  before  the  prince  had  arrived  in  Philippopolis  on 
the  2 1  St,  the  President  of  the  provisional  government.  Dr. 
Stransky,  took  great  care  to  point  out  to  British  representa- 
tives that  "  the  revolution  was  directed  against  Russian 
tutelage."  And  he  added  the  assurance,  that  "  united  Bul- 
garia "  could  stand  alone.  ^  It  became  evident  in  London 
that  these  united  provinces  meant  to  be  self-governing,  and 
hence,  within  a  week  after  the  union  was  proclaimed,  the 
British  ambassador  at  Constantinople  was  instructed  to  take 
part  there  in  an  informal  conference  of  the  ambassadors, 
and  to  advise  that  the  Sultan  should  abstain  from  military 
intervention  and  that  Prince  Alexander  of  Bulgaria  should 
be  governor-general  for  life  of  Eastern  Roumelia.^ 

After  deliberating  for  more  than  two  weeks,  the  Con- 
stantinople ambassadors  agreed  on  a  "  Declaration,"  to  be 
presented  to  the  Porte  and  to  Bulgaria.  The  note,  in  sub- 
stance, merely  disapproved  what  had  transpired  in  Eastern 
Roumelia,  and  suggested  that  the  Bulgarians  should  cease 
military  preparations  and  take  care  not  to  spread  the  agita- 

^  Pari.  Papers,  1886,  vol.  Ixxv,  p.  51  {Turkey,  No.  i). 

Pari.  Papers,  1886,  vol.  Ixxv,  p.  29  {Turkey,  No.  i);  Edwards,  Sir 
William  White  (London,  1902),  ch.  xviii. 


1^8  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [158 

tion/  In  reply  to  this  note,  the  Porte  expressed  the  wish 
that  the  powers  would  request  Prince  Alexander  to  restore 
without  delay  the  status  quo. 

At  the  joint  suggestion  of  the  courts  of  St.  Petersburg 
and  Vienna,  the  Porte  requested  the  powers  to  instruct  their 
ambassadors  at  Constantinople  to  form  a  conference,  in 
which  Turkey  should  take  part,  for  settling  the  troubles  in 
Southern  Bulgaria,  on  the  basis  of  the  treaty  of  Berlin. 
The  first  meeting  of  the  conference  was  held  on  November 
4th.  England's  ambassador  was  instructed  to  move  for  a 
consideration  of  the  means  of  meeting  the  wishes  of  the 
population,  before  discussing  a  return  to  the  status  quo. 
He  was  to  refer  to  his  government  for  further  instructions 
on  any  proposal  looking  towards  a  return  to  the  former  situ- 
ation in  relation  to  the  two  provinces.  The  seventh  and 
last  sitting  of  the  conference,  until  the  final  one  of  the  fol- 
lowing April,  was  held  on  November  25th.  All  of  the 
powers  except  England  were  practically  agreed  at  the 
seventh  sitting,  that  Turkey  might  go  on  and  re-establish 
a  separate  government  in  Eastern  Roumelia,  in  accordance 
with  the  organic  statute.^ 

Meanwhile,  Servia  had  broken  away  from  all  restraint 
and  declared  war  on  Bulgaria  (November  14th). ^  Servia 
had  evidently  expected  that  the  threatening  attitude  of  the 
Turkish  forces  gathered  along  the  Roumelian  frontier  would 
result  in  holding  a  large  part  of  the  Bulgarian  force  in  that 
quarter.  Such  was  not  the  case,  however.  Prince  Alex- 
ander put  himself  at  the  head  of  an  army  representing  united 
Bulgaria,  and  in  less  than  two  weeks  his  forces  had  driven 

'  Pari.  Papers,  1886,  vol.  Ixxv,  p.  141  {Turkey,  No.  i). 
'The  protocols  of  the  conference  may  be  found  in  Pari.  Papers,  1886, 
Turkey,  No.  i. 

'For  the  Servian  and  Bulgarian  declarations,  see  Hertslet,  op.  cit., 
vol.  iv. 


159]       MOVEMENTS  LEADING  TO  THEIR  UNION         159  # 

the  Servian  army  under  King  Milan  out  of  Bulgaria  and 
ten  miles  over  the  frontier  towards  the  Servian  capital. 
Austria-Hungary  checked  the  further  advance  of  the  Bul- 
garian army,  and  a  military  commission,  representing  the 
seven  treaty  powers,  aided  Bulgaria  and  Servia  in  fixing  the 
terms  of  an  armistice  (Nov.  28-Dec.  21),  and  in  concluding 
a  treaty  of  peace  (March  3,  1886).^ 

As  soon  as  the  ambassadors  at  Constantinople  ceased  to 
meet  in  conference,  without  having  reached  any  full  agree- 
ment, the  Porte  dispatched  two  delegates  to  Eastern  Rou- 
melia  in  order  to  prepare  the  minds  of  the  people  there  for 
the  re-establishment  of  a  separate  government  in  that  pro- 
vince. The  delegates  carried  with  them  a  proclamation 
from  the  Sultan  which  pointed  out  that  a  few  "  evil-dis- 
posed persons  "  had  "  disturbed  the  order  and  tranquility  of 
the  country,"  and  promised  entire  amnesty  and  all  good 
things  for  the  province,  under  a  governor-general  to  be  ap- 
pointed.^ These  Turkish  commissioners  were  told  at  Philip- 
popolis  that  the  only  qualified  representatives  of  Southern 
Bulgaria,  were  the  prince  and  the  government  at  Sofia. 
After  a  stay  of  four  days,  therefore,  they  left  without  hav- 
ing even  been  allowed  to  circulate  the  Sultan's  proclama- 
tion.^ 

Before  the  end  of  December  (1885)  Turkey  began  to 
urge  again  the  desirability  of  the  powers  uniting  on  some 
line  of  action.  Lord  Salisbury  took  occasion  at  this  time 
to  suggest  to  the  Turkish  ambassador  in  London  that  "  a 
Bulgaria,  friendly  to  the  Porte,  and  jealous  of  foreign  in- 
fluence, would  be  a  far  surer  bulwark  against  possible  ag- 

^  Pari.  Papers,  1886,  vol.  Ixxv,  passim. 

'The  proclamation  may  be  found  in  Pari.  Papers,  1886,  vol.  Ixxt, 
p.  422. 

^  Ibid.,  p.  21  {7urkey,  No.  2). 


l6o  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [i6o 


gression  than  two  Bulgarias,  severed  in  administration,  but 
united  in  considering  the  Porte  as  the  only  obstacle  to  their 
national  development."  The  English  Foreign  Secretary 
suggested,  moreover,  that  it  was  coming  more  and  more  to 
be  the  wish  of  the  powers  that  the  Porte  should  find  some 
solution  of  the  Bulgarian  question  by  direct  communica- 
tion with  Prince  Alexander.^  The  month  had  not  closed 
before  Russia  admitted  that  the  union  had  been  effected 
and  could  not  be  undone,  and  that  it  only  needed  to  be 
"  regularized."  Then,  almost  simultaneously,  the  Sultan 
expressed  his  readiness  to  negotiate  with  Prince  Alexander 
directly  and  to  sanction  some  form  of  union.^ 

By  the  end  of  January,  an  agreement  was  reached  be- 
tween the  Porte  and  the  Bulgarian  foreign  minister.  The 
settlement  was  delayed,  however,  for  two  months  longer, 
mainly  because  Prince  Alexander  was  unwilling  to  accept  an 
appointment  as  governor-general  of  Eastern  Roumelia  un- 
der Article  XVII  of  the  treaty  of  Berlin,  which  required 
re-appointment  by  the  sultan  every  five  years,  with  the  as- 
sent of  the  powers.  The  conference  of  the  Constantinople 
ambassadors  was  called  together  at  last,  April  5th,  and  the 
settlement  was  signed,  regardless  of  the  prince's  objections. 
Fortunately,  Prince  Alexander's  name  was  not  in  the  ar- 
rangement. The  governor-generalship  of  Eastern  Rou- 
melia was  entrusted  to  the  prince  of  Bulgaria,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  above-mentioned  article  of  the  treaty  of 
Berlin.  The  British  government,  nevertheless,  reserved  the 
right  of  proposing  at  the  end  of  the  first  five  years  the  re- 
nomination  of  Prince  Alexander.  Two  other  important 
points  in  this  settlement,  were  the  separation  of  the  Mussul- 
man villages  of  Kirdjali  and  the  Rhodope  district  from 

Pari.  Papers,  1886,  vol.  Ixxv,  p.  424. 
"^Ibid.,  1886,  vol.  Ixxv,  p.  22  {Turkey,  No.  2). 


l6l]       MOVEMENTS  LEADING  TO  THEIR  UNION  i6l 


Eastern  Roumelia,  and  the  relinquishment  by  the  Porte,  in 
return,  of  the  right  to  provide  for  the  defense  of  the  land 
and  sea  frontiers  of  Eastern  Roumelia.^ 

The  union  as  thus  defined  was  only  the  minimum  of 
what  the  Bulgarians  had  intended  to  secure.  As  the  head 
of  the  Eastern  Roumelian  government,  the  prince  was  looked 
upon  by  some  of  his  people  as  merely  a  Turkish  function- 
ary. One  party  now  began  to  clamor  for  a  more  complete 
union,  another  for  an  attempt  to  regain  the  friendship  of 
Russia,  and  still  another  for  determined  resistance  to  any 
form  of  Russian  aggression.  From  April  5th  to  August 
2 1st,  party  spirit  in  both  provinces  was  at  high  tide.  The 
powers  had  sanctioned  a  merely  personal  union  between 
Eastern  Roumelia  and  Bulgaria.  Nevertheless,  the  prince 
set  about  the  work  of  making  the  union  political  and  ad- 
ministrative as  well.  As  a  beginning  in  that  direction,  the 
southern  province  was  ordered  to  elect  deputies  to  the  Bul- 
garian national  assembly. 

Party  antagonism  caused  some  serious  disturbances  in 
the  June  election.  On  his  tour  through  the  southern  prov- 
ince, the  prince  had  proclaimed  that  only  Bulgarian  would 
be  recognized  as  an  official  language  there.  That  attitude 
towards  the  languages  of  the  minorities  in  Eastern  Rou- 
melia still  further  alienated  the  Greeks  and  the  Turks  and. 
caused  many  of  them  to  refrain  from  voting.  In  general, 
however,  the  election  may  be  regarded  as  having  been  a 
struggle  between  the  rival  adherents  of  the  prince  and  the 
Tsar.  The  Russian  government  complained  most  bitterly 
to  the  Porte  that  the  prince  had  grossly  misused  his  author- 
s-Par/. Papers,  1886,  vol.  Ixxv,  Turkey,  No.  2;  Hertslet,  op.  cii., 
vol.  iv.  It  will  be  remembered  that  the  right  given  to  Turkey  by  the 
Treaty  of  Berlin  (art.  xv)  to  garrison  the  frontiers  of  this  province  had 
been,  for  some  months,  one  of  the  chief  obstacles  in  the  way  of  a  peace- 
ful organization  of  Eastern  Roumelia  and  Bulgaria.    Cf.  supra,  p.  135. 


j62  the  making  of  the  BALKAN  STATES  [162 

;ity,  by  putting  every  obstacle  in  the  way  of  an  expression 
of  public  opinion  at  the  polls.  The  fact  seems  to  be,  how- 
'^ever,  that  neither  the  government  nor  the  opposition  was 
uTi  any  sense  blameless  in  connection  with  the  serious  dis- 
turbances during  the  elections. 

When  the  Sobranje  convened,  on  June  14th,  it  was  found 
that  the  majority  were  prepared  to  support  the  prince  and 
his  ministry.  In  opening  the  Assembly,  the  prince  seems 
to  have  been  most  unfortunate,  from  some  points  of  view, 
both  in  what  he  said  and  in  what  he  omitted  to  say.  He 
declared  to  the  deputies  from  both  sides  of  the  Balkans, 
representing,  as  he  said,  the  "  Bulgarian  nation,"  that  the 
union  of  the  two  Bulgarias  was  already  accomplished.  As 
a  proof  that  the  union  was  complete,  he  pointed  out  that 
the  "  general  national  Bulgarian  assembly  "  would  hence- 
forth care  for  the  interests  of  the  united  country.  But 
beyond  all  this,  the  prince  failed  to  make  the  accustomed 
reference  to  Russia,  as  the  liberator  "  of  the  Bulgarians. 
So,  taken  as  a  whole,  the  speech  was  disappointing,  not  to 
say  annoying,  to  all  except  the  most  radical  Bulgarians 
in  the  "  united  country." 

But  Prince  Alexander's  struggles  with  Bulgarian  af- 
fairs were  now  nearly  ended.  In  the  early  hours  of  August 
2 1st,  a  small  band  of  Bulgarian  conspirators  gained  entrance 
to  the  palace,  forced  him  to  sign  an  illegible  paper,  spirited 
him  out  of  the  country,  and  conveyed  him  through  Rou- 
mania  and  Russia,  to  Lemburg  (Austria).  In  the  actual 
execution  of  the  plot,  the  leader  appears  to  have  been  the 
director  of  the  military  school.  Major  Grueff.  His  prin- 
cipal associates  were  likewise  connected  with  the  army,  and 
several  of  them  had  personal  grievances  against  the  prince.^ 

'  For  a  detailed  account  of  the  plot  and  its  execution,  see  Quarterly 
Review  (London,  1886);  see  also  Minchin,  op.  cit.,  ch.  xv.    In  his 


163]       MOVEMENTS  LEADING  TO  THEIR  UNION  163 

Now  was  the  opportunity  for  the  Russophil  Zankoff,  and 
his  followers.  In  the  early  dawn,  Zankoff  led  the  way  in 
denouncing  the  prince  as  "  a  German  foreigner,  who  had 
tried  to  estrange  Russia."  ^  The  Zankoffists  at  once  tele- 
graphed everywhere, — "  Prince  Battenberg  dethroned  .  .  . 
Make  army  take  oath  to  the  provisional  government."  In 
order  to  give  the  proceedings  the  appearance  of  a  national 
movement,  they  forged  the  names  of  several  of  the  national- 
ist leaders.  By  evening  it  became  clear  to  the  leaders  in 
this  first  provisional  government  that  the  men  whose  names 
had  been  made  use  of  without  their  consent,  could  not  be 
counted  upon  as  even  friends  of  the  new  regime.  Then  a 
government  was  formed  exclusively  of  Zankoff's  followers; 
and  a  proclamation  was  issued  to  the  effect  that  "  Prince 
Alexander  of  Battenberg  had  abdicated  forever  the  throne 
of  Bulgaria,  owing  to  his  firm  conviction  that  a  continua- 
tion of  his  reign  would  only  bring  about  the  ruin  of  the 
Bulgarian  people."  This  proclamation  closed  with  the  sig- 
nificant assurance  to  the  Bulgarian  people  that  the  Tsar, 
^'  the  Protector  of  Bulgaria,"  would  not  cease  to  afford  his 
powerful  aid  and  protection  to  their  country.^  The  local 
head  of  the  Bulgarian  Church  was  the  president  of  this 
second  ministry,  and  Zankoff  was  Minister  of  the  Interior, 
with  Major  Grueff  commander-in-chief  of  the  army.^ 

This  proclamation  was  issued  on  Saturday.    The  next 

biography  of  Stambouloff,  the  author  claims  that  "it  is  not  proved  that 
official  Russia  had  any  cognizance  of  the  plot,  though  .  .  .  the  con- 
spirators were  sure  of  having  the  most  complete  approval  from  St. 
Petersburg  if  they  succeeded."    Beaman,  op.  cit.,  p.  88. 

^  Pari.  Papers,  1887,  vol.  xci,  p.  124  {Turkey,  No.  i). 

'Beaman,  op.  cit.,  p.  92. 

*  There  were  six  in  the  ministry.  An  English  writer  names  Zankoff 
and  the  president  of  this  government,  Metropolitan  Clement,  as  the 
civil  leaders  in  the  plot  to  abduct  the  prince.    Minchin.  op.  cit.,  p.  254. 


x64  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [164 


Monday,  Stambiiloff,  who  was  at  Tirnovo,  issued  a  counter- 
proclamation/  In  the  name  of  Prince  Alexander,  and  of 
the  National  Assembly,  of  which  he  had  been  president,  he 
declared  the  members  of  the  provisional  government  to  be 
outlaws,  and  that  anyone  who  should  obey  their  orders 
would  be  punished  by  military  law.  At  the  same  time  he 
appointed  Colonel  Mutkuroff,  then  in  command  of  the  troops 
at  Philippopolis,  to  be  commander-in-chief  of  all  the  Bul- 
garian forces.  The  English  consul  at  Philippopolis,  Cap- 
tain H.  Jones,  had  already  appealed  to  Mutkuroff  not  to 
take  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  revolutionary  govern- 
ment.^ Mutkuroff  soon  determined  not  to  recognize  the 
government  of  the  traitors  to  the  prince,  and  when  Stam- 
buloff's  proclamation  reached  him,  on  Monday  (23rd),  he 
was  preparing  to  march  on  Sofia. 

Stambuloff's  proclamation  and  the  movement  of  Mut- 
kuroff's  army  towards  Sofia,  caused  the  members  of  the  re- 
voluntionary  government  to  lose  all  hope,  and  they  resigned 
and  disappeared  (24th).  Prince  Alexander's  late  premier, 
Caraveloff,  now  formed  a  government  at  Sofia;  but  a  re- 
gency of  three,  with  Stambuloff  as  the  leading  member, 
was  constituted  three  days  later,  to  last  until  the  prince 
could  be  found  and  brought  back.^ 

On  reaching  Lemburg  (P.  M.  27th),  Prince  Alexander 
learned  that  a  government  loyal  to  him  had  been  established 
in  Bulgaria.  He  found  a  dispatch  from  Stambuloff  await- 
ing his  arrival,  stating  that     the  whole  of  Bulgaria  was 

^At  this  time  Stambuloff  was  practicing  law.  He  was  a  staunch 
nationalist  and  had  been  active  in  agitation  for  the  national  cause  since 
1876.    See  Beaman,  op.  cit.,  Stambuloff. 

Pari.  Papers,  1887,  vol.  xci,  p.  155  {Turkey,  No.  i);  Minchin,  op. 
cit.,  ch.  xvi. 

^Parl.  Papers,  1887,  vol.  xci,  p.  143;  Beaman,  op.  cit.,  p.  96. 


165]       MOVEMENTS  LEADING  TO  THEIR  UNION  165 

longing  for  his  return."  ^  Realizing  now  that  the  ordeal  he 
had  undergone  was  the  work  of  a  band  of  conspirators,  and 
feeling  that  he  had  the  sympathy  of  western  Europe,  the 
prince  left  the  next  day  for  Sofia.  His  entire  journey  back, 
by  way  of  Bucharest^,  has  been  described  as  a  triumphal 
progress." 

On  the  northern  boundary  of  Bulgaria,  at  Rustchuk,  the 
prince  was  enthusiastically  greeted  (30th)  by  an  official 
Bulgarian  deputation,  in  the  presence  of  local  foreign  repre- 
sentatives. And  it  was  before  proceeding  further  that 
Prince  Alexander  committed  what  some  of  his  faithful 
friends  and  ardent  admirers  have  styled  his  fatal  blunder.^ 
We  have  seen  how  he  had  started  out  three  years  earlier 
to  dispense  with  the  counsel  of  Russia's  agents.  From  that 
time  the  breach  between  the  prince  and  the  Tsar  had  con- 
stantly widened.^  But  now,  on  his  way  back  to  take  up 
again  at  this  critical  juncture  the  reins  of  government  in 
Bulgaria,  he  seemed  willing  to  stake  his  all,  as  the  ruler  of 
that  country,  on  an  appeal  to  the  magnanimity  of  his  Im- 
perial cousin,  Alexander  III.*  In  his  now  well-known  tele- 
gram to  the  Tsar,  he  said,  among  other  things : 

"  My  first  act  on  assuming  my  legitimate  authority  is 
to  announce  to  your  Imperial  Majesty  my  firm  intention  to 
spare  no  sacrifice  in  order  to  aid  your  Imperial  Majesty's 
magnanimous  intention  to  terminate  the  present  grave  crisis 
through  which  Bulgaria  is  passing.  ...  I  shall  be  happy 
to  be  able  to  give  your  Imperial  Majesty  decisive  proof  of 
my  unalterable  devotion  to  your  august  person.    The  prin- 

^Beaman,  op.  cit.,  p.  96. 

'^Quarterly  Review,  op.  cit.,  1886;  Beaman,  op.  cit.,  pp.  98,  loi;  Min- 
chin,  op.  cit.,  pp.  280  et  seq. 

^  Koch,  Furst  Alexander  von  BuLgairen,  passim. 

*The  Saturday  Revieiu  (London,  1887),  vol.  Ixiv,  p.  93. 


THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [i66 


ciple  of  monarchy  has  compelled  me  to  re-establish  a  legal 
government  in  Bulgaria  and  Roumelia.  Russia  gave  me 
my  crown:  I  am  ready  to  return  it  into  the  hands  of  her 
sovereign." 

Three  days  later,  on  reaching  Philippopolis,  the  prince  re- 
ceived from  the  Tsar  the  following  reply : 

"  Have  received  your  Highness'  telegram.  Cannot  ap- 
prove your  return  to  Bulgaria,  foreseeing  disastrous  conse- 
quences to  country  already  so  severely  tried  ...  I  shall  re- 
frain from  all  interference  with  the  sad  state  to  which  Bul- 
garia has  been  brought  as  long  as  you  remain  there.  Your 
Highness  will  judge  what  is  your  proper  course.  I  reserve 
my  decision  as  to  my  future  action,  which  will  be  in  con- 
formity with  the  obligations  imposed  on  me  by  the  vener- 
ated memory  of  my  father,  the  interests  of  Russia,  and  the 
peace  of  the  East."  ^ 

The  same  day  that  this  telegram  was  received  by  the 
prince  ( September  2 )  the  London  government  suggested  to 
the  German  and  Austrian  governments  that  the  treaty  pow- 
ers consult  together  with  a  view  of  giving  their  support  to 
Prince  Alexander.  Neither  Berlin  nor  Vienna  gave  any 
encouragement,  however^  towards  such  a  project,  and  the 
idea  seems  to  have  been  abandoned.^ 

Prince  Alexander  passed  on  the  next  day  (September  3) 

^It  has  been  said  that  the  Russian  consul  at  Rustchuk  induced  the 
prince  to  send  the  telegram  to  the  Tsar.  The  Bulgarian  officials  knew 
nothing  of  this  message  until  the  Tsar's  reply  was  received  at  Philip- 
popolis. "Then  the  prince  confessed  his  thoughtless  action,  and  ad- 
mitted to  the  full  the  enormity  of  his  fault."  Beaman,  Stambuloff,  p. 
loi.  The  consul  had  just  informed  the  prince  that  a  Russian  general 
was  already  on  the  way  to  look  after  the  administration  of  Bulgaria,  in 
the  Tsar's  name.  Minchin,  op.  cit.,  pp.  282  et  seg.;  Pari.  Papers,  1887, 
vol.  xci,  p.  136. 

Ibid.,  pp.  127  et  seg. 


167]       MOVEMENTS  LEADING  TO  THEIR  UNION  167 

to  his  capital,  and  the  hearty  greetings  of  the  populace 
voiced  the  confidence  and  approval  of  his  people.  With 
the  Tsar's  telegram  before  him,  however,  and  with  the 
feeling  that  a  large  number  of  the  army  officers  had  been  im- 
plicated in  the  plot  against  him,  he  at  once  expressed  his 
determination  to  appoint  a  regency  and  leave  Bulgaria/ 
All  the  arguments  that  some  of  the  members  of  his  govern- 
ment could  bring  to  bear  failed  to  persuade  him  to  alter  his 
purpose.  A  meeting  of  political  leaders  was  then  held  at 
which  the  decision  was  reached  to  accept  the  formal  abdica- 
tion of  the  prince,  providing  the  great  powers  would  give 
some  guarantee  that  Russia  would  not  occupy  Bulgaria, 
and  that  further  foreign  interference  in  the  internal  affairs 
should  not  be  permitted.^ 

On  the  7th,  the  foreign  representatives  were  called  to  the 
palace  to  take  leave  of  the  prince.  In  his  parting  address 
to  the  diplomatic  corps,  he  said  he  had  returned  to  Bulgaria 
in  order  that  "  he  might  be  able  to  leave  it  by  the  light  of 
day  instead  of  being  dragged  like  a  malefactor  through  the 
streets  at  the  dead  of  night."  The  Constantinople  settle- 
ment appointing  him  a  Turkish  functionary  in  Eastern  Rou- 
melia  had  been  fatal  to  him,  he  contended.  He  had  made- 
every  effort  to  save  himself  from  that  misfortune;  but  it 
was  not  possible,"  he  added,  for  one  man  alone  to  stand 
against  Europe."  ^  Then  followed  Prince  Alexander's  last 
official  announcement  to  the  Bulgarian  nation  " — his  pro- 
clamation— giving  notice  of  the  formation  of  a  regency  and 
of  his  abdication.    The  first  few  lines  are  very  significant: 

"  We,  Alexander,  etc., — Being  convinced  of  the  painful 
truth  that  our  departure  from  Bulgaria  will  facilitate  the 

^  Pari.  Papers,  1877,  Turkey,  No.  i,  pp.  i^A^t  ^eq. 

Ibid.,  Turkey,  No.  i,  pp.  148-160. 
^ Ibid.,  Turkey,  No.  i,  p.  149;  cf.  supra,  p.  160. 


l68  ™^  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [i68 


restoration  of  good  relations  between  Bulgaria  and  her  liber- 
ator Russia,  and  having  received  an  assurance  from  the 
government  of  His  Imperial  Majesty  the  Russian  Emperor 
.that  the  rights,  freedom  and  independence  of  our  State 
shall  remain  intact,  and  that  no  one  shall  meddle  in  its 
internal  affairs : 

"  Do  hereby  announce  to  our  beloved  people  that  we  re- 
nounce the  Bulgarian  throne."  ^ 

Prince  Alexander  is  said  to  have  borne  himself  with 
manly  dignity  throughout  these  trying  hours.  At  four 
o'clock  of  the  same  day,  he  rode  out  of  the  city,  with  Stam- 
buloff,  through  the  crowded  streets.  His  carriage  was 
repeatedly  stopped  by  the  efforts  of  the  long  line  of  people 
to  kiss  his  hand.  At  last  he  called  back,  "  Long  live  Bul- 
garia," and  passed  on  with  a  number  of  carriages  following 
lo  the  Austrian  frontier.^ 

The  regents  named  by  the  prince  before  his  abdication 
were  S.  Stambuloff,  P.  Caraveloff,  and  Colonel  Mutkuroff. 
The  regency  announced  without  delay  the  intention  of  call- 
ing for  the  election  of  a  Grand  Sobranje  to  choose  a  prince.^ 
The  Chamber  met  on  September  13th  and  approved  the 
measures  taken  for  convoking  the  larger  assembly.  October 

'  Leonoff,  Documents  Secrets,  pp.  98  et  seq.;  Pari.  Papers,  1887,  vol. 
xci,  Turkey,  No.  i,  pp.  166,  169. 

"^Parl.  Papers,  1887,  vol.  xci,  Tufkey,  No.  i,  p.  173.  In  the  Hun- 
garian Chamber  of  Deputies  it  was  asked  how  it  came  about  that  the 
hostility  of  Russia  alone  could  have  compelled  a  popular  prince  to  abdi- 
cate, and  that  the  empire  was  enabled  to  interfere  in  the  internal  afYairs 
of  the  principality.  The  questioner  also  wished  to  know  how  the  sup- 
port given  by  German  diplomacy  to  Russian  interest  had  effected  the 
close  friendly  relations  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Germany.  Pari. 
Papers,  1887,  Turkey,  No.  i,  pp.  183,  190. 

'The  Grande  Sobranje,  or  National  Assembly,  it  will  be  remembered, 
was  made  up  of  double  the  number  of  deputies  in  the  ordinary  sobranje. 
'C/.  supra,  p.  140, 


169]       MOVEMENTS  LEADING  TO  THEIR  UNION  169 


loth  was  appointed  as  the  day  for  holding  the  elections. 
On  the  25th  (September),  General  Kaulbars  arrived  in 
Sofia  as  the  Russian  diplomatic  agent,  with  instructions  to 

assist  "  the  Bulgarians  in  relation  to  their  affairs/  The 
same  day  he  demanded  the  postponement  of  the  elections  for 
the  Grand  Assembly,  together  with  the  immediate  raising 
of  the  state  of  siege  and  the  release  of  all  persons  impli- 
cated in  the  late  conspiracy.^  The  ministers  replied  (Octo- 
ber I  St)  that  the  latter  demands  were  accepted,  but  that  the 
elections  announced  were  in  strict  accordance  with  the  re- 
quirements of  the  Bulgarian  constitution,  and  could  not 
therefore  be  postponed. 

Despite  the  opposition  of  General  Kaulbars,  the  elections 
were  held,  and  passed  off  without  very  serious  disturb- 
ances. Of  the  450  deputies,  only  about  one-sixth  were 
Zankoffists.  The  Grand  Sobranje  opened  on  October  31st 
and  in  spite  of  protests  from  Constantinople  deputies  from 
Eastern  Roumelia  formed  a  part  of  the  assembly.  A 
brother  of  the  Empress  of  Russia,  Prince  Waldemar  of  Den- 
mark, was  elected  Prince  of  Bulgaria  by  acclamation  (No- 
vember 10).  Two  days  later  the  reply  came  that  Prince 
Waldemar  would  not  accept  the  honor  without  the  approval 
of  the  Tsar,  and  must  therefore  decline.^  The  Sobranje 
now  appointed  a  deputation  of  three  to  visit  various  Euro- 
pean courts  in  search  of  a  prince,  and  then  adjourned.  Gen- 
eral Kaulbars  failed  to  persuade  what  he  termed  the  de  facto 

^The  brother  of  the  General  Kaulbars  who  was  so  officious  as  the 
Russian  War  Minister  in  Bulgaria,  1881-1883. 

^ Pari.  Papers,  1887,  Turkey,  No.  i,  pp.  183,  193.  As  an  explanation 
of  General  Kaulbars'  mission,  the  St.  Petersburg  government  urged 
"special  duty  and  moral  obligation  incumbent  on  Russia  as  having 
called  Bulgaria  into  existence." 

^Beaman,  Stambulof,  op.  cit.,  p.  115. 


I^o  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [170 

government  to  listen  to  his  "  advice,"  so  he  left,  together 
with  all  the  Russian  consuls  in  Northern  and  Southern 
Bulgaria  (November  19)/ 

Early  in  December  Russia  proposed  to  the  Porte  Prince 
MingreHa,  a  Russian  subject,  as  a  candidate  for  prince.  A 
little  later,  however,  Bulgaria  notified  the  Porte  that  she 
would  not  accept  Russia's  candidate,  as  all  of  the  Bul- 
garians were  opposed  to  him.  It  was  not  true  that  all  the 
Bulgarians  were  opposed  to  him,  for  Zankoff  and  his  fol- 
lowers were  anxious  for  his  election.^ 

By  the  middle  of  December  Prince  Ferdinand  of  Saxe- 
Coburg  was  understood  to  be  a  candidate,  and  the  emperor 
of  Austria-Hungary  was  reported  as  having  given  his  as- 
sent.^ Prince  Bismarck  thought  Prince  Ferdinand's  can- 
didature out  of  the  question  for  the  reason  that  the  Tsar 
would  not  be  likely  to  give  his  consent. 

During  the  following  months,  one  plot  succeeded  another 
in  Bulgaria;  and  several  projects  looking  toward  foreign 
occupation  were  considered.  Finally,  another  Grand  So- 
branje  was  elected.  The  opening  session  was  held  at  Tir- 
novo,  on  July  4th  (1887),  ^"^^  the  7th  Prince  Ferdinand 
of  Saxe-Coburg  was  elected  prince  of  Bulgaria.  The 
prince  replied  on  the  8th  that  he  would  go  to  Bulgaria  and 
devote  his  life  to  that  nation  as  soon  as  the  approval  of  the 
Porte  and  the  powers  should  be  given.* 

^  For  the  reasons  assigned  by  the  St.  Petersburg  government,  see 
Pari.  Papers,  1887,  Turkey,  No.  2,  p.  3. 

^Parl.  Papers,  1888,  vol.  cix,  Turkey,  No.  i,  p.  16. 

^ Ibid.,  p.  3.  Prince  Ferdinand,  born  1861,  was  serving  at  this  time 
in  the  Hungarian  army.  His  father  was  Prince  Augustus  of  Saxe- 
Coburg  (an  Austrian)  and  his  mother  was  a  daughter  of  Louis  Philippe 
(King  of  France,  1830-48). 

*  For  an  account  of  some  of  the  plots  against  the  regency,  see  Beaman, 
Stambuloff,  pp.  \i%  et  seq. 


17 1 ]       MOVEMENTS  LEADING  TO  THEIR  UNION  lyi 

Russia  alone  among  the  powers  held  that  the  elections  for 
the  Grand  Sobranje  had  been  illegal,  and  that  she  could  not 
therefore  even  consider  the  question  of  recognizing  any  per- 
son as  prince  of  Bulgaria  who  might  be  elected  by  that  body. 
Russia  now  proposed  to  the  Porte  that  General  Ernroth 
be  appointed  sole  regent  of  the  two  Bulgarians.^  The  Porte 
procrastinated  in  relation  to  this  proposition.  Meanwhile, 
Prince  Ferdinand  of  Coburg  determined  to  accept  the  reiter- 
ated call  of  the  Bulgarians,  and  to  become  their  prince.  In 
making  his  decision  known  to  Europe,  he  pointed  out  that 
he  had  waited  for  the  replies  of  the  great  powers  to  the 
Porte,  and  ascertaining  that  none  of  the  treaty  powers  had 
expressed  any  hostility  to  him  personally,  he  had  resolved  to 
"  take  in  hand  the  destinies  "  of  the  Bulgarian  people.  He 
was  resolved,  he  said,  to  work  for  the  consolidation  of 
order  and  peace  "  in  his  new  country,  and  he  expressed  an 
"  unwavering  hope  that  His  Majesty  the  Sultan  would  con- 
tribute to  that  end  by  hastening  to  confirm  his  election."  ^ 

Prince  Ferdinand  entered  Bulgaria  August  nth,  and  on 
the  14th  he  took  the  constitutional  oath  before  the  Grand 
Sobranje,  at  Tirnovo.  In  his  proclamation  to  the  Bulgarian 
nation,  he  made  no  reference  to  any  foreign  power,  and 
closed  with — "  Long  live  free  and  independent  Bulgaria." 
On  the  23rd,  when  the  prince  arrived  in  Sofia,  none  of  the 
foreign  diplomatic  agents  were  present  at  his  reception.  All 
of  the  signatory  powers  to  the  treaty  of  Berlin  had  already 
instructed  their  representatives  in  Bulgaria  to  avoid  any  offi- 
cial recognition  whatever  of  the  newly  installed  prince. 
Russia  had  refused  to  recognize  the  legality  of  his  election 
on  the  ground  that  existing  conditions  in  Bulgaria  ren- 

'  General  Ernroth  (Russian)  was  formerly  minister  of  war  at  Sofia 
(1882). 

^  Pari.  Papers,  1888,  vol.  cix,  Turkey,  No.  i,  p.  126. 


THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [172 


dered  impossible  any  trustworthy  expression  there  of  the 
popular  will.  Now  all  the  other  powers  refused  to  recog- 
nize him  in  his  new  capacity,  because  he  had  gone  to  Bul- 
garia without  the  approval  of  the  Sultan  and  the  assent  of 
the  treaty  powers.  This  relationship  between  Prince  Fer- 
dinand's "  de  facto  "  government  and  the  great  powers  was 
destined  to  continue,  as  we  shall  see,  for  nearly  ten  years. 

After  some  days  of  effort  a  ministry  was  formed  (Sep- 
tember I )  in  which  Stambuloff  became  President  and  Min- 
ister of  the  Interior,  and  Mutkuroff  the  Minister  of  War. 
Elections  for  the  Sobranje  were  held  on  October  9th  and  re- 
sulted in  a  sweeping  victory  for  the  government  party 
(National). 

Russia  complained  bitterly  of  the  "  terrorism  "  of  the  new 
government,  and  put  forth  renewed  efforts  to  secure  the 
appointment  of  General  Ernroth  as  regent  or  governor  of 
Bulgaria.  The  Porte  requested  Germany  to  take  the  initia- 
tive in  bringing  this  proposal  to  the  attention  of  the  powers. 
Germany,  however,  referred  the  matter  back  to  the  Porte. 
Stambuloff  and  his  followers  let  it  be  known  that  Bulgaria 
would  not  allow  General  Ernroth  to  cross  her  frontier  un- 
less he  were  able  to  fight  his  way  into  the  country.  Russia 
counted  on  European  unanimity  to  bring  the  Bulgarian  gov- 
ernment under  submission;  but  England  and  Austria,  in 
particular,  favored  a  let  alone  "  policy,  and  so  nothing  was 
done.  Before  the  end  of  the  year,  Russia's  Foreign  Min- 
ister, M.  de  Giers,  was  ready  to  say  in  reference  to  the  Bul- 
garians :  They  may  do  anything  and  everything  they 
please,  from  cutting  each  other's  throats  to  declaring  them- 
selves an  empire.  We  shall  not  move  a  finger  to  prevent 
them.    We  wash  our  hands  of  the  whole  concern."  ^ 


'For  the  attitude  of  the  powers  in  relation  to  the  Bulgarian  question, 
see  Pari.  Papers,  1888,  Turkey,  No.  i.    A  writer  who  has  an  intimate 


173]       MOVEMENTS  LEADING  TO  THEIR  UNION  173 

Back  in  1881,  Turkey  had  ceded  to  her  foreign  bond- 
holders the  income  from  the  Eastern  Roumelian  tribute. 
This  tribute  to  Turkey  had  been  fixed  in  the  organic  statute 
(1879)  at  about  one  million  dollars  per  year,  representing 
three-tenths  of  the  estimated  provincial  revenues.  Any  tri- 
bute that  might  be  received  from  the  principality  of  Bul- 
garia was  also  ceded  at  that  time  to  these  bondholders. 
The  treaty  of  Berlin  left  the  amount  of  the  annual  tribute 
due  from  Bulgaria  to  be  fixed  by  the  treaty  powers  within 
one  year  after  the  beginning  of  the  new  organization  in  the 
principality.  But  the  powers  never  "  fixed  "  the  amount  to 
be  paid  by  Bulgaria.  The  new  government  under  Prince 
Ferdinand  now  made  early  arrangements  (November  3, 
1887)  for  paying  the  arrears  due  on  account  of  the  Eastern 
Roumelian  tribute.  The  government  declared,  however, 
that  three-tenths  of  the  income  of  the  province  amounted 
now  to  only  something  more  than  a  half  a  million  dollars 
per  year,  and  Turkey  agreed  to  the  reduction.^ 

Six  months  after  Prince  Ferdinand  went  to  Bulgaria, 
Russia  made  one  more  abortive  effort  to  force  him  out  of 
the  principality.  This  plan,  emanating  from  St.  Peters- 
burg, was  to  have  the  treaty  powers  join  in  a  collective  note 
to  the  Porte  declaring  the  present  situation  in  Bulgaria  il- 
legal. The  Porte  would  then  be  expected  to  notify  the  Bul- 
garian government  that  Prince  Ferdinand's  presence  as  the 
head  of  the  government  of  the  principality  was  held  to  be 
illegal  and  contrary  to  the  treaty  of  Berlin.  Russia's  agents 
at  least  pretended  to  believe  that  Prince  Ferdinand  would 

knowledge  of  every  phase  of  this  part  of  Bulgaria's  history  has  expressed 
the  opinion  that  "  there  is  nothing  more  pathetic  in  the  history  of  Eu- 
rope and  nothing  more  diabolical  in  the  history  of  Russia  than  the  story 
of  the  events  in  Bulgaria  which  followed  the  Philippopolis  revolution  " 
{1885).  Washburn,  op.  cit.,  p.  183. 
'  See  Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  \\,  passim. 


174 


THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES 


[174 


leave  when  he  found  that  all  the  great  powers  were  op- 
posed to  his  remaining.  England,  Austria  and  Italy  re- 
fused to  countenance  the  St.  Petersburg  proposal,  but  Ger- 
many and  France  joined  with  Russia,  with  the  result  that 
the  Porte  sent  the  desired  notification  to  Sofia  (March  5, 
1888).  The  communication  was  sent  to  M.  Stambuloff, 
and  merely  stated  that  Prince  Ferdinand  (of  Coburg)  had 
been  informed  when  he  first  arrived  in  Bulgaria  that  his  elec- 
tion had  not  received  the  assent  of  the  powers  nor  the 
sanction  of  the  Porte,  and  was  therefore  illegal.  The  note 
pointed  out  also  that  the  Porte  still  held  Prince  Ferdinand's 
position  in  Bulgaria  to  be  contrary  to  the  treaty  of  Berlin. 
As  soon  as  this  declaration  was  dispatched  from  Constanti- 
nople, Russia's  Foreign  Minister  (de  Giers)  said  that  the 
policy  of  his  country  now^  was  "to  return  to  her  passive  atti- 
tude and  await  events."  After  the  lapse  of  nearly  a  month, 
the  Sofia  government  decided  not  to  take  any  official  notice 
whatever  of  the  above  communication.  It  is  evident  that 
the  Porte  forwarded  the  declaration  to  the  Bulgarian  gov- 
ernment at  the  instigation  of  the  St.  Petersburg  authorities, 
and  hence  there  was  no  need  of  England's  warning  against 
"  any  further  imprudent  action  "  at  Constantinople.  This 
episode  proved  to  be  the  last  attempt  from  without,  of  any 
considerable  magnitude,  to  thwart  the  will  of  the  majority 
in  Bulgaria.^ 

For  nearly  seven  years  (1887- 1894)  Stambuloff  re- 
mained at  the  head  of  Prince  Ferdinand's  government. 
He  was  ever  a  staunch  nationalist,  and  during  his  premier- 
ship everything  was  done  to  establish  friendly  relations  with 
Turkey  rather  than  with  Russia.    There  were  always  those 

'  For  the  correspondence  in  connection  with  this  final  diplomatic  at- 
tempt of  Russia  to  bring  the  Bulgarians  under  subjection,  see  Pari. 
Papers,  1889,  vol.  Ixxxvii,  Turkey,  No.  3. 


175]       MOVEMENTS  LEADING  TO  THEIR  UNION  175 

who  stood  out  against  the  dictatorial  and  even  despotic 
methods,  perhaps  too  often  employed  by  the  patriotic  Stam- 
buloff.  The  prince  finally  joined  with  the  opponents  of  his 
Russophobe  premier,  and  Stambuloff  was  forced  to  re- 
sign (1894)/ 

There  was  already  a  growing  desire  in  Bulgaria  for  rec- 
onciliation with  Russia.  The  death  of  Alexander  III 
(1894),  the  arch  enemy  of  the  late  Prince  Alexander  and  of 
those  who  followed  him  in  the  Bulgarian  government,  may 
be  said  to  have  cleared  the  way  in  a  large  measure  for  a 
restoration  of  friendly  relations  between  these  two  kindred 
peoples.^ 

In  1894  there  was  great  rejoicing  throughout  Bulgaria 
over  the  birth  of  a  son  to  the  royal  family.  The  prince 
and  his  consort  were  Catholics,  however,  and  according  to 
the  Bulgarian  constitution  the  heir  to  the  throne  must  pro- 
fess the  Orthodox  Eastern  faith.  Two  years  later  Prince 
Ferdinand  announced  to  the  National  Assembly  that  he  had 
resolved  "  to  lay  on  the  altar  of  the  Fatherland  the  great- 
est and  heaviest  of  sacrifices,"  and  to  have  the  rite  of  holy 
confirmation  administered  to  the  heir-apparent.  Prince  Boris, 
according  to  the  usages  of  the  (Bulgarian)  National  Or- 
thodox Church.  In  reply  to  a  request  from  Prince  Ferdinand 
to  the  Emperor  Nicholas  II  for  the  presence  of  a  Russian 
representative  at  the  ceremony,  the  Tsar,  "  inspired  with 
sentiments  of  magnanimity  and  sincere  good  will  for  the 
Bulgarian  people,"  delegated  a  member  of  the  Imperial  staff 
to  attend  in  his  name.    All  the  powers  now  signified  their 

'  Beaman,  Stambuloff,  ch.  x.  Stambulofif  was  most  cruelly  assassinated 
in  Sofia  the  following  year.  He  has  often  been  referred  to  as  the  "  Bis- 
marck of  Bulgaria." 

'Prince  Alexander  died  in  1893,  and  an  imposing  ceremony  took 
place  in  Sofia  when  his  body  was  taken  there  for  interment. 


1-76  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [176 


recognition  of  Prince  Ferdinand  as  the  lawful  ruler  of  Bul- 
garia, and  within  a  few  months  he  was  most  cordially  re- 
ceived at  Constantinople  by  the  Sultan,  and  at  St.  Peters- 
burg by  the  royal  family/ 

Throughout  the  remaining  dozen  years,  in  the  political 
life  of  the  principality,  the  Macedonian  question  continued 
seriously  to  disturb  the  relations  of  Bulgaria  and  her  peo- 
ple with  the  outside  world.  Roughly  speaking,  Macedonia 
lies  between  Servia  and  Bulgaria  on  the  north,  and  Greece 
and  the  Aegean  sea  on  the  south.  The  population  near  to 
Bulgaria  and  Servia  is  undoubtedly  made  up  mostly  of 
Bulgarians  and  Servians,  while  in  the  extreme  south  the 
Greeks  are  clearly  in  the  majority.  For  the  most  part, 
however,  the  nationality  of  the  people  in  central  Macedonia 
appears  to  be  hopelessly  mixed,  so  far  as  race  characteristics 
are  concerned.^ 

The  treaty  of  Berlin  provided  that  there  should  be  a  sort 
of  European  supervision  over  the  introduction  of  new  laws 
which  Turkey  promised  to  settle  upon  for  her  remaining 
European  provinces.^  During  the  eighties,  many  of  the 
Slavs  in  Macedonia  became  weary  of  waiting  for  the  new 
organization  in  that  territory  and  migrated  in  considerable 
numbers,  especially  to  the  new  principality  of  Bulgaria. 
Under  the  influence,  perhaps,  of  some  of  these  emigrants, 
the  idea  of  a  revolutionary  movement  in  Macedonia  aiming 
at  autonomy  for  that  province  began  to  gain  adherents 
rapidly  after  about  1897.  Bulgarians,  Servians  and  Greeks 
appear  to  have  joined  together  for  a  time  in  helping  to 
work  up  the  revolutionary  propaganda.    There  was  such  an 

^Annual  Register,  1896;  Miller,  The  Balkans,  op.  cit.,  ch.  vii. 
*  Odysseus,  Turkey  in  Europe  (London,  1900),  ch.  viii;  Upward^ 
The  East  End  of  Europe  (London,  1908),  passim. 
^Article  xxiii.    See  Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iv. 


177]       MOVEMENTS  LEADING  TO  THEIR  UNION  177 

active  sympathy  in  Bulgaria  with  this  movement  that  by 
1901  Sofia  had  become  the  headquarters  of  the  revolutionary 
Macedonian  Committee. 

In  1897  Russia  and  Austria-Hungary  had  entered  into  a 
compact  with  a  view  of  maintaining  the  status  quo  in  East- 
ern Europe,  and  in  1901,  under  the  pressure  of  these  two 
countries,  the  Bulgarian  government  arrested  some  mem- 
bers of  the  Macedonian  committee  and  undertook  to  keep 
the  troops  and  civil  officials  from  taking  any  part  in  the 
agitation.  About  this  time,  also,  the  Bulgarians  and  the 
Greeks  began  to  fall  apart  in  connection  with  the  movement 
in  Macedonia.  So  when  the  armed  uprising  came  in  1902- 
1903  the  Turkish  forces  had  little  trouble  in  suppressing 
the  revolts.^ 

Not  long  after  the  Turkish  troops  were  set  in  motion  to 
put  an  end  to  the  revolutionary  movement  for  autonomy  in 
Macedonia,  Russia  and  Austria-Hungary  determined  to 
send  each  a  civil  agent  to  Macedonia,  accompanied  by  a 
foreign  officer  to  have  general  charge  of  the  police  force 
there.  This  action  by  the  two  powers  put  an  end,  in  the 
main,  to  the  movement  for  an  autonomous  Macedonia. 
From  that  time  (1903)  down  to  the  change  of  government 
in  Turkey,  (1908)  a  most  cruel  religious  and  racial  war  was 
carried  on  in  the  heart  of  Macedonia.  Armed  bands  of 
Bulgarians  and  of  Greeks  have  vied  with  each  other  in  a 
resort  to  ruthless  and  murderous  methods  in  carrying  for- 
ward their  respective  propagandas.  As  allegiance  to  the 
Bulgarian  Exarchate  or  to  the  Greek  Patriarchate  signifies 
in  general  either  Bulgarian  or  Greek  nationality,  this  prose- 
lyting had  a  political  or  national  end  in  view.^    We  are  here 

^  Annual  Register,  1897,  1901. 

'■'The  two  sides  in  relation  to  this  most  destructive  warfare  may  be 
found  in  Upward,  op.  cit.,  and  in  The  Near  East  (anonymous)  (New 
York,  1907).    See  also  Villari,  The  Balkan  Question  (London,  1905). 


1^8  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [178 

concerned  mainly  with  the  fact,  however,  that  Bulgaria 
was  greatly  disturbed  by  reason  of  this  agitation  and  war- 
fare in  Macedonia^  and  that  the  principality  was  thereby 
brought  several  times  to  the  verge  of  war  with  Turkey. 

The  renewal  of  the  appointment  of  Prince  Ferdinand  to 
the  governor-generalship  of  Eastern  Roumelia  was  gradually 
discontinued,  and  that  province  had  come  to  be  quite  gener- 
ally regarded  as  merely  the  southern  part  of  Bulgaria/  By 
a  process  of  historic  growth,  the  status  of  the  Bulgarian  gov- 
ernment had  now  passed  far  beyond  the  bounds  fixed  for  the 
principality  in  the  treaty  of  Berlin.  At  the  courts  of  the 
European  powers  there  were  Bulgarian  diplomatic  agents 
representing  their  country,  with  scarcely  ever  an  intima- 
tion from  any  quarter  that  they  represented  a  vassal  state. 
In  1899  Turkey  sanctioned  the  sending  of  Bulgarian  dele- 
gates to  the  first  Hague  Conference.  These  delegates  were 
required,  nevertheless,  to  have  seats  at  that  time  back  of 
those  occupied  by  the  Sultan's  representatives,  and  to  sign 
official  documents  after  the  signatures  of  Turkey's  delegates. 
When  the  second  conference  was  held  in  1907,  however, 
Bulgaria  again  sent  her  own  delegates,  and  they  now  took 
equal  rank  so  far  as  seats  and  signatures  were  concerned, 
with  those  from  Constantinople.^ 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  at  the  close  of  thirty  years  after  the 
settlement  in  the  Berhn  congress  (1878),  the  Bulgarian 
principality  had  come  to  exercise  so  many  of  the  functions 
of  an  independent  state  that  any  act  on  the  part  of  Turkey 
signifying  her  intention  to  assert  her  suzerainty  over  Bul- 
garia was  a  source  of  alarm  and  irritation  to  the  Bulgarian 
government.  The  Porte  found  various  ways,  however,  of 
keeping  up  the  appearance  of  claiming  the  territory  of  the 

^  New  International  Year  Book  (New  York,  IQ08),  "Bulgaria," 
loc.  cit. 

'Hull,  The  Two  Hague  Conferences  (Boston,  1908),  pp.  11,  14;  Fort- 
nightly  Review  (London,  1908),  vol.  xc,  p.  866. 


179]       MOVEMENTS  LEADING  TO  THEIR  UNION  lyg 

principality  as  a  part  of  the  Ottoman  empire.  During  the 
latter  part  of  Abdul  Hamid's  reign,  anybody  who  wished  to 
travel  about  from  place  to  place  in  the  empire  was  required 
to  have  a  permit  (teskereh),  properly  signed  by  the  Turkish 
authorities.  In  the  various  towns  the  police  kept  a  close 
watch  and  no  one  was  free  to  go  or  come  without  a  properly 
endorsed  teskereh.  In  this  matter,  the  Turkish  authorities 
were  unwilling  to  make  any  exception  whatever  in  the  case 
of  persons  going  to  or  coming  from  Bulgaria.  This,  of 
course,  was  but  one  of  the  many  ways  in  which  the  Turkish 
government  kept  alive  the  claim  to  Bulgaria  as  an  integral 
part  of  the  Ottoman  domains. 

In  working  their  way  towards  actual  independence  the 
Bulgarians  and  their  rulers  may  be  said  to  have  been,  on  the 
whole,  moderately  though  constantly  aggressive.  While 
they  have  shown,  at  times,  a  willingness  to  wait  for  ad- 
vancement on  the  way  towards  statehood,  they  have  all 
along  invariably  manifested  an  unwavering  determination 
never  to  relinquish  any  acquisition  in  that  direction.  For 
some  years  past,  the  jealous  watchfulness  in  the  two  capitals 
for  any  signs  of  a  change  of  attitude  towards  the  existing 
relations  between  the  governments  has  frequently  given  rise 
to  disquieting  apprehensions.  Irrespective  of  the  European 
regulations  (notably  of  1878  and  1886),  there  had  grown 
up  such  a  strained  relationship  between  the  two  countries 
that  the  tension,  not  to  mention  the  ever  present  danger  of 
direful  eventualities,  had  come  to  be  a  standing  menace  to 
both  parties.  Except  for  the  outgrown  and  almost  obso- 
lete formula  embodied  in  the  treaty  of  Berlin — a  European 
document  already  shattered  in  several  particulars — there 
was  little  reason  why  Bulgaria  should  not  openly  and  reso- 
lutely take  her  place  among  the  sovereign  nations  of  the 
world.*  That  a  sufficient  cause  existed  for  a  recognition  on 
^The  Nineteenth  Century  (New  York,  1908),  vol.  Ixiv,  pp.  705  et  seq. 


l8o  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [igo 

the  one  side,  or  a  declaration  on  the  other,  of  the  independ- 
ence of  Bulgaria,  has  not  been  appreciably  questioned. 
Considering  all  the  circumstances,  it  was  too  much  to  ex- 
pect, no  doubt,  that  the  Porte  would  take  the  initiative  in 
such  a  measure.  It  was  but  natural  then  that  Bulgarian 
authorities  should  watch  for  some  seemingly  justifiable  oc- 
casion for  taking  the  final  step.^ 

In  the  late  summer  and  fall  of  1908,  a  combination  of 
events  was  readily  turned  to  account  at  Sofia  and  made  to 
furnish  the  desired  occasion  for  putting  an  end  to  the 
theoretical  vassalage  of  the  Bulgarian  principality.^  The 
Yoimg  Turk  Revolution  came  on  in  July,  and  the  restora- 
tion of  constitutional  government  in  Turkey  caused  some 
doubt  among  the  Bulgarians  as  to  the  effect  of  this  move- 
ment upon  the  acquired  status  of  their  country.  Then  early 
in  September  the  Sultan's  Foreign  Minister,  Tewfik  Pasha, 
created  a  stir  by  omitting  to  invite  the  Bulgarian  representa- 
tive at  the  Porte,  M.  Gueshoff,  to  a  dinner  in  honor  of  the 
Constantinople  diplomats.  This  omission  being  quite  un- 
usual, a  protest  followed,  and  the  Porte  explained  that  only 
representatives  of  sovereign  states  had  been  invited.  Al- 
though the  Turkish  authorities  proffered  other  amends  for 
the  neglect,  M.  Gueshoff  was  not  invited,  and  his  govern- 
ment recalled  him  from  the  Turkish  capital.  Some  days 
following  this  incident  a  strike  was  declared  on  the  Eastern 
Roumelian  section  of  the  Oriental  Railway,  and  the  Bul- 
garian government  sent  troops  and  employees  to  look  after 
the  operation  of  the  line.  Three  days  later  (September  21) 
the  strike  was  terminated,  but  Bulgaria  continued  her  mili- 
tary occupation.  When  the  southern  province  became 
practically  united  with  the  principality  of  Bulgaria  in  1886 

^  Spectator  {'London,  1908),  vol.  101,  passim. 
"^Annual  Register,  1908,  "  Bulgaria,"  loc.  cit. 


l8[]       MOVEMENTS  LEADING  TO  THEIR  UNION  igi 

no  new  arrangement  was  made  affecting  Turkey's  owner- 
ship of  the  railway  in  Eastern  Roumeha;  consequently,  by 
the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  Berlin,  Bulgaria  possessed  no 
proprietary  rights  in  that  part  of  the  line. 

Subjects  of  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  being  among 
the  principal  shareholders  in  the  company  that  had  been 
operating  the  line  under  a  lease  from  Turkey,  these  two 
countries,  together  with  Turkey,  made  strong  protests 
against  the  continued  Bulgarian  occupation  of  the  road. 
Bulgaria  contended  that  her  interests  rendered  it  necessary 
that  she  should  control  that  section  of  the  railway,  and  sug- 
gested the  possibility  of  some  arrangement  with  the  com- 
pany.^ This  question,  however,  was  soon  merged  with 
others  of  even  more  serious  moment. 

Two  days  after  the  termination  of  the  strike,  Prince  Fer- 
dinand was  received  at  Budapest  by  Emperor  Francis 
Joseph,  and  the  prince  is  said  to  have  been  apprised  at  this 
time  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  plans  for  the  annexation  in 
the  near  future  (December  2)  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina. 
There  seems  to  be  some  reason  for  believing  that  this  in- 
formation hastened  the  action  of  Prince  Ferdinand.^  How- 
ever that  may  be,  he  surprised  Europe  somewhat  by  issuing 
a  declaration  from  Tirnovo,  October  5th,  proclaiming  the 
independence  of  Bulgaria. 

In  the  rather  brief  declaration  read  by  Prince  Ferdinand 
at  the  old  capital,  he  pointed  out  that  practically  independ- 
ent, the  nation  was  impeded  by  certain  illusions  and  formal 
limitations  which  resulted  in  a  coldness  of  relations  between 
Bulgaria  and  Turkey.  "  Turkey  and  Bulgaria,"  he  con- 
tinued, "  free  and  entirely  independent  of  each  other,  may 
exist  under  conditions  that  will  allow  them  to  strengthen 

^Contemporary  Reviezv  (London,  1908),  vol.  xciv,  pp.  513  et  seq. 
*The  Fortnightly  Review  (London,  1909),  vol.  xci,  pp.  224  et  seq. 


l82  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [182 

their  friendly  relations  and  to  devote  themselves  to  peace- 
able internal  development."  In  this  declaration  he  fore- 
stalled any  question  relating  to  the  territory  of  Eastern 
Roumelia  (Southern  Bulgaria)  by  proclaiming  "Bulgaria, 
united  since  September,  1885,  as  an  independent  kingdom."  ^ 
Prince  Ferdinand  and  his  government  were  criticised,  es- 
pecially by  England,  for  having  proclaimed  the  independence 
of  Bulgaria  at  a  time  when  its  realization  might  seriously 
discredit  the  Young  Turk  Party  that  was  making  such 
worthy  efforts  to  regenerate  the  disordered  Ottoman  empire. 
There  does  not  seem,  however,  to  have  been  any  expression 
in  Europe  of  an  intention  to  try  to  undo  what  the  prince 
had  done.^ 

Two  days  after  Prince  Ferdinand's  proclamation  was  is- 
sued, Austria-Hungary  formally  announced  the  annexation 
to  that  empire  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  These  two 
Turkish  provinces,  as  is  well  known,  were  placed  by  the 
Berlin  congress  under  the  administrative  control  of  the 
Dual  Monarchy.  The  complete  absorption  now  of  the  two 
provinces  into  the  Austro-Hungarian  empire  was  held  at 
Vienna  to  be  necessary  in  order  to  put  into  operation  there 
certain  much-needed  and  radical  reforms.  Emperor  Francis 
Joseph's  government  was  unwilling  that  the  validity  of  this 
action  should  be  questioned  in  a  European  conference,  so 
any  joint  action  by  the  treaty  powers  bearing  on  the  whole 
situation  was  delayed.^ 

The  Turkish  authorities  took  rather  a  calm  view  of  the 

^For  the  text  of  the  proclamation,  see  The  International  Year  Book 
(New  York,  1908),  "Bulgaria,"  loc.  cit. 
"^Spectator,  op.  cit.,  vol.  loi,  passim. 

^  Early  in  1909  Turkey  accepted  about  eleven  million  dollars,  ostensibly 
for  property  she  possessed  in  the  two  provinces,  and  allowed  Austria- 
Hungary  to  keep  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  The  Outlook  (New  York, 
1909),  vol.  y.QA,  passim. 


183]       MOVEMENTS  LEADING  TO  THEIR  UNION  183 

Bulgarian  declaration.  A  general  recognition  of  the  in- 
dependence of  the  principality  appears  to  have  been,  almost 
from  the  first,  a  foregone  conclusion.  Because  of  the  East- 
ern Roumelian  annual  tribute  due  to  Turkey,  and  the  Porte's 
ownership  of  the  railroad  through  that  province,  however, 
there  was  a  necessity  for  a  settlement  between  the  prin- 
cipality and  Turkey  on  the  basis  of  compensation  from 
Bulgaria.  Happily,  the  government  at  Sofia  was  ready  to 
discuss  the  question  of  compensation  to  Turkey.  Before 
the  end  of  the  month,  England,  France  and  Russia  joined 
(October  27)  in  a  communication,  which  was  approved  by 
Italy  and  Germany,  advising  Bulgaria  to  undertake  direct 
negotiations  with  the  Porte.  The  Sofia  government 
promptly  acted  on  this  advice,  and  sent  a  representative,  M. 
Dimitroff,  to  Constantinople.^  Within  another  month,  the 
negotiations  at  the  Turkish  capital  had  resulted  in  an  agree- 
ment on  the  principles  that  were  to  form  the  basis  of  a 
settlement. 

The  chief  difficulty  proved  now  to  be  the  difYerence  of 
opinion  between  the  two  parties  respecting  the  amount  of 
total  indemnity  due  to  Turkey.  After  several  weeks,  Bul- 
garia offered  to  pay  about  $16,400,000;  but  in  the  fore  part 
of  February,  1909,  the  Turkish  government  declined  to  ac- 
cept that  amount,  and  demanded  a  lump  sum  of  $24,000,000. 
Bulgaria  complained,  as  she  had  done  before,  of  Turkey's 
uncompromising  attitude,  and  refused  to  pay  any  more 
than  she  had  already  offered.  The  efYorts  of  the  treaty 
powers  to  bring  about  some  compromise  utterly  failed,  for 
a  time,  and  both  Turkey  and  Bulgaria  renewed  their  war- 
like demonstrations.  After  about  a  fortnight,  however,  the 
Russian  government  hit  upon  a  plan  for  relieving  the  ten- 
sion, and  made  a  definite  financial  proposition  to  both 
governments. 

^  The  New  International  Year  Book,  1908,  "  Bulgaria,"  loc.  at. 


l84  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [184 

Turkey  was  bound  by  treaty  to  pay  an  annual  war  in- 
demnity to  Russia  (on  account  of  Russo-Turkish  War, 
1 877- 1 878)  of  about  $1,600,000  without  interest/  Russia 
now  proposed  to  relieve  Turkey  of  the  obligation  to  make 
these  yearly  payments  until  the  total  sum  remitted  should 
amount  to  $24,000,000 — Turkey's  claim  against  Bulgaria. 
Then,  as  an  offset  to  this,  Russia  proposed  to  accept  from 
Bulgaria  in  annual  installments,  with  interest,  a  sum  aggre- 
gating $16,400,000 — the  amount  of  Bulgaria's  offer  to 
Turkey.^  Turkey  accepted  Russia's  proposal,  and  an  agree- 
ment to  that  effect  was  signed  by  the  Constantinople  and 
St.  Petersburg  governments,  on  March  i6th.  Bulgaria 
likewise  agreed  to  the  proposition  and  signed  protocols  ac- 
cordingly on  April  19th,  with  Russia  and  Turkey.^ 

The  signing  of  these  international  documents  settled  all 
the  claims  at  issue  between  the  parties.  King  Ferdinand 
was  the  recipient  of  personal  congratulations  from  European 
rulers ;  and  within  a  few  days  the  governments  of  the  great 
powers  formally  recognized  Bulgaria  as  an  independent 
kingdom.* 

This  new  kingdom  has,  in  general,  a  fertile  soil  and  a 
favorable  climate ;  and,  with  rare  exceptions,  abundant  crops 
are  harvested.  During  their  thirty  years  of  semi-independ- 
ent political  life,  these  people,  who  are  now  legally  recog- 
nized as  being  their  own  masters,  have  won  the  reputation 
of  being  industrious,  generally  progressive  and  zealous  in 
the  pursuit  of  knowledge.    By  their  persistent  and  patriotic 

^  Hertslet,  Map  of  Europe  by  Treaty,  vol.  iv. 

^  The  amounts  stated  here  in  American  money  are  not  strictly  exact. 
For  the  terms  of  settlement,  see  Outlook,  vol.  xci,  p.  375. 

^The  signing  of  the  protocol  with  the  Porte  implied  the  recognition 
by  Turkey  of  Bulgarian  independence.  Saturday  Revieiv  (April,  1909"), 
vol.  cvii. 

Review  of  Reviews  (New  York,  1909),  vol.  xxxix,  passim. 


185]       MOVEMENTS  LEADING  TO  THEIR  UNION  185 

efforts  throughout  these  years  and  with  the  help  of  their 
two  foreign  rulers,  they  have  won  their  independence  with- 
out much  sacrifice  in  warfare.  They  begin  their  history 
as  an  independent  people  with  the  good-will  of  the  great 
powers,  and  without  carrying  over  any  serious  impediment 
to  mar  the  tranquillity  or  impede  the  progress  of  the  Bul- 
garian kingdom/ 

^  T/ie  Nineteenth  Century  (1908),  vol.  Ixiv,  pp.  705-723;  The  New 
International  Encyclopedia,  vol.  iii,  "Bulgaria."  For  a  fuller  con- 
sideration of  the  characteristics  of  the  Bulgarians  and  of  their  country, 
see  Dicey,  The  Peasant  State,  London,  1894. 


CHAPTER  V 


Summary — Present  Situation  in  the  Balkan  States 

The  phenomenal  success  of  the  Young  Turk  party  in 
overthrowing  the  autocracy  and  establishing  constitutional 
government  in  Turkey  satisfied  in  a  measure,  for  the 
time  being,  the  aspirations  of  the  people  in  Macedonia.  The 
promise  of  an  equality  of  races  and  religions  throughout  the 
empire,  in  local  as  well  as  national  affairs,  leaves  the  people 
of  that  heretofore  disordered  province  slight  excuse  at  the 
present  for  further  insurrection.  Turkey  in  Europe  then, 
as  a  whole,  is  for  once  both  nominally  and  in  reahty  an  in- 
tegral part  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.^ 

We  have  seen  above  (ch.  i)  that  Montenegro  and  the 
provinces  of  Moldavia  and  Wallachia  were  never  more  than 
loosely  united  to  Turkey.  During  a  period  of  about  three 
hundred  years  previous  to  1774,  there  were  spasmodic  ef- 
forts in  these  three  provinces,  as  in  Servia,  to  lessen  their 
submission  to  Ottoman  authorities.  The  beginning,  how- 
ever, of  a  continuous  and  progressive  movement  towards 
self-government  in  one  or  more  of  the  Sultan's  Balkan  pro- 
vinces was  inaugurated  in  1774,  by  the  terms  of  the  treaty 
of  Kainardji  between  Russia  and  Turkey.  The  Russian 
army  had  been  victorious  over  the  Turkish  forces;  and  in 
restoring  Moldavia  and  Wallachia  to  Turkey  Catherine  II 
exacted  from  the  Sultan  favorable  stipulations  for  the  gov- 


^  Annual  Register  (1908),  pp.  312  et  seq.    For  the  constitution  of  the 
Ottoman  empire,  see  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  vol.  Ixvii. 
186  [186 


187]  SUMMARY  187 

ernment  of  these  provinces.  Moreover,  she  exacted  from 
the  Sultan  and  his  government  the  solemn  promise  that 
Russia  might  henceforth  watch  over  the  rights  of  a  part  of 
Turkey's  Christian  subjects.^ 

The  consummation  of  Bulgarian  independence  (April, 
1909)  stands  at  the  other  end,  as  it  were,  of  the  series  of 
events  which  may  be  said  to  have  grown  out  of  the  situa- 
tion created  by  the  treaty  of  Kainardji.  Thus  it  will  be 
seen  that  for  nearly  a  century  and  a  half  an  almost  incessant 
struggle  had  been  kept  up  by  one  or  more  of  the  Sultan's 
Balkan  provinces  to  secure  added  privileges  and  rights  in 
the  direction  of  self-government.  It  would  indeed  be  diffi- 
cult to  estimate,  even  approximately,  the  weight  of  foreign 
influence  in  connection  with  these  struggles.  The  people 
in  these  provinces  are  certainly  entitled  to  their  full  share 
of  credit  or  of  blame  for  what  has  transpired  in  the  course 
of  this  prolonged  contest.  It  would  not  be  safe,  perhaps, 
to  conclude  that  the  outcome — the  independence  of  the  four 
Balkan  states — would  not  have  been  brought  about  without 
foreign  interference;  nevertheless  it  is  true  that  foreign  in- 
tervention has  repeatedly  rendered  these  aggressive  groups 
of  people  secure  from  any  retrogression  in  connection  with 
their  advancement  towards  statehood. 

Another  result  of  foreign  intervention  has  been  to  divide 
this  extended  and  almost  continuous  agitation  and  unrest  in 
some  parts  of  the  Balkan  country,  into  three  quite  distinct 
periods.  From  the  treaty  of  Kainardji  to  the  treaty  of 
Paris  (1774-1856)  Russia  maintained  her  sole  guardian- 
ship over  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  groups  that  were 
then  contending  for  a  greater  and  greater  degree  of  local 

^This  referred  to  the  Orthodox  Eastern  Christians,  and  included  the 
Greeks,  as  well  as  Catherine  11 's  co-religionists  in  the  Balkan  country, 
who  are  likewise  of  a  kindred  race  with  the  Russians.  Cf.  supra,  ch.  i, 
p.  13. 


l88  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [i88 

self-government.  The  policy  of  the  European  powers  as 
set  forth  in  the  treaty  of  1856  was  to  create  a  radically  dif- 
ferent situation.  Russia  was  accordingly  forced  to  sur- 
render whatever  exclusive  rights  she  had  acquired  to  inter- 
fere in  the  affairs  of  Turkey;  and  such  privileges  and  im- 
munities as  Wallachia,  Moldavia  and  Servia  already  pos- 
sessed were  placed  under  the  guarantee  "  of  the  seven 
signatory  powers.  The  Sublime  Porte  was  now  formally 
admitted  into  the  "  concert  " ;  and,  what  might  well  have 
seemed  still  more  formidable  to  the  aspiring  Balkan  peoples, 
the  rulers  of  Great  Britain,  Austria,  Prussia,  France,  Sar- 
dinia and  Russia,  engaged,  each  on  his  part,  to  respect  the 
independence  and  the  territorial  integrity  of  the  Ottoman 
empire,"  and  guaranteed  in  common  the  strict  observance 
of  this  engagement.  Then,  two  weeks  later.  Great  Britain, 
Austria  and  France  guaranteed  jointly  and  severally  the 
independence  and  integrity  "  of  Turkey,  and  promised  to 
consider  any  infraction  of  the  treaty  of  Paris  (1856)  as  a 
casus  belli. ^ 

Doubtless  the  struggles  in  Europe  occasioned  by  the  uni- 
fication of  Italy  and  of  Germany  had  a  derogatory  influence 
on  the  effectiveness  of  the  treaty  of  Paris  (1856)  in  relation 
to  political  affairs  in  Turkey.  At  any  rate,  it  required 
but  two  decades  to  wear  out  the  high-sounding  engage- 
ments "  in  this  treaty  respecting  the  independence  and  ter- 
ritorial integrity  of  the  Ottoman  empire.  Insurrection 
spread  throughout  the  Balkans  (1875-1876);  the  Sultan 
refused  to  grant  certain  concessions  which  were  advised 
collectively  by  the  other  powers  in  the  European  concert; 
Russia's  army,  aided  by  the  Roumanians,  forced  its  way 

^  Copies  of  the  various  documents  covering  this  period  may  be  seen 
in  Hertslet,  Map  of  Europe  by  Treaty,  vol.  ii. 


SUMMARY 


against  the  stubborn  resistence  of  the  Turkish  forces  and 
encamped  within  sight  of  the  Sultan's  capital/ 

In  the  final  settlement  after  this  war,  the  Sultan  was 
forced  to  grant  independence  to  Roumania,  Servia  and 
Montenegro,  comprising  considerably  more  territory  than 
Turkey  actually  kept  for  herself  in  Europe.  She  was  com- 
pelled, likewise,  to  assent  to  the  formation  of  two  new 
semi-independent  provinces  —  Bulgaria  and  Eastern  Rou- 
melia.  Then,  also,  the  way  was  opened  for  the  loss  to 
Austria-Hungary  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  This 
second  period  of  struggle  in  the  Balkan  country  (1856- 
1878)  had  been  carried  on  under  the  supervision  of  the 
European  concert,  and  in  the  face  of  the  avowed  policy  of 
the  great  powers  to  protect  Turkey  in  the  matter  of  her 
sovereignty  and  of  her  territorial  possessions.  But  the 
lapse  of  twenty-two  years  found  the  contracting  parties 
holding  another  European  congress,  this  time  at  the  capital 
of  the  German  empire,  where  the  agreement  was  somewhat 
readily  reached  virtually  to  strip  Turkey  of  fully  two-thirds 
of  her  European  territory. 

The  Berlin  settlement  placed  Bulgarian  and  Eastern  Rou- 
melian  affairs  under  the  supervision  of  the  European  Con- 
cert. But  this  time  the  treaty  contained  no  intimation  of 
an  intention  on  the  part  of  any  of  the  signatory  powers  to 
guard  either  the  sovereignty  or  the  territorial  integrity  of 
the  Ottoman  empire.  It  took  only  thirty  years,  as  we  have 
seen,  to  wear  out  the  stipulations  of  this  treaty,  respecting 
Turkey's  remaining  Balkan  provinces.    The  development 

^Russia's  loss  in  this  war  was  reported  as  being  321,000  men.  A 
Russian  church-monument,  a  few  miles  from  Constantinople,  marks  the 
place  where  something  more  than  10,000  Russians  were  buried  who  died 
of  sickness  in  Turkey  during  the  war.  Cf.  Miiller,  Political  History  of 
Recent  Times,  trans,  by  Peters  (New  York,  1882). 


I90  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [190 

of  Eastern  Roiimelia  and  Bulgaria  into  an  independent  king- 
dom, and  the  complete  absorption  of  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina by  Austria-Hungary,  during  this  third  and  last 
period  of  the  long  struggle  in  the  Balkan  country,  put  an 
end  to  at  least  one  phase  of  the  troublesome  Eastern 
Question. 

Under  the  wise  and  rather  conservative  leadership  of 
King  Charles  I,  Roumania  has  steadily  progressed,  prac- 
tically along  all  lines/  In  general  it  has  been  the  national 
policy  to  care  for  internal  improvements,  and  to  protect  the 
independence  of  the  country  by  keeping  clear  of  foreign  en- 
tanglements. The  capital — Bucharest — is  now  much  like 
the  better  European  cities  of  similar  size,  about  three  hun- 
dred thousand  population.  The  country  covers  an  area  of 
nearly  fifty-one  thousand  square  miles.  The  population 
now  is  something  more  than  six  and  a  half  million,  as 
against  practically  five  million  when  Roumania  became  in- 
dependent, thirty  years  ago.  Neither  King  Charles  nor  his 
invalid  consort  has  any  liking  for  show  or  pomp.  Queen 
Elizabeth,  whose  pen-name,  as  is  well  known,  is  Carmen 
Silva,  is  held  in  high  repute  as  a  writer  of  poems  and  dramas. 

Montenegro  has  the  distinction  of  being  one  of  the  small- 
est of  independent  nations.  Although  the  provisions  of 
the  treaty  of  Berlin  more  than  doubled  the  size  of  the  prin- 
cipality, still  the  area  is  only  a  little  more  than  three  and 
a  half  thousand  square  miles — about  one-thirteenth  the  size 
of  New  York  State.  The  added  territory,  however,  sup- 
plied the  little  group  of  mountaineers  with  a  good  stretch 
of  excellent  pasture  land,  together  with  a  harbor  and  thirty 
miles  of  seaboard.  The  present  ruler,  Nicholas  I,  has  been 
at  the  head  of  the  government  for  fifty  years.    Through  the 


'Prince  Charles  (Karl)  of  Hohenzollern,  elected  prince  of  Roumania 
in  1866,  has  borne  the  title  of  king  since  1881. 


191  ]  SUMMARY  igi 

marriages  of  his  daughters,  his  dynasty  has  become  con- 
nected with  the  royal  famiHes  of  Russia  and  Italy.  The 
efforts  of  King  Victor  Emanuel's  consort  in  helping  to  re- 
lieve the  sufferings  of  the  Messina  earthquake  victims  has 
now  made  the  name  of  the  former  Montenegrin  princess, 
Queen  Helena,  a  household  word  in  many  parts  of  the  world. 

During  the  past  few  years  much  has  been  done  in  Monte- 
negro to  improve  the  public  highways.  In  1908  the  first 
line  of  railway,  only  eleven  miles  long,  was  opened.  The 
chief  source  of  livelihood  for  a  great  number  of  the  people 
is  in  the  rearing  of  all  kinds  of  live  stock.  Elementary  in- 
struction is  free  and  compulsory,  but  not  much  has  been 
done  by  the  Montenegrins  to  provide  facilities  for  second- 
ary and  higher  education. 

Of  the  four  Balkan  constitutional  monarchies  that  have 
been  carved  out  of  Ottoman  territory,  largely  under  the 
supervision  of  the  great  powers,  the  case  of  Servia  seems 
to  be  the  most  unsettled  and  unpromising.  For  nearly  a 
hundred  years  now,  more  or  less  frequent  disturbances 
there  have  resulted  from  rivalry  and  intrigues  in  connection 
with  the  two  native  dynasties  (Karageorgevich  and  Obreno- 
vich).^  The  revolting  incidents  connected  with  the  most 
recent  and  the  most  horrifying  tragedy  in  the  little  kingdom 
— the  murder  of  King  Alexander  (Obrenovich)  and  Queen 
Draga,  1903 — lost  for  the  Servian  nation,  in  a  large  meas- 
ure, the  sympathy  and  support  of  Europe.  The  present 
king,  Peter  Karageorgevich,  was  called  to  the  throne  at  that 
time.  During  his  reign,  however,  there  have  been  so  many 
changes  in  the  ministry  that  the  country  can  not  be  said  to 
have  had  anything  like  a  stable  government.  Nevertheless, 
the  economic  conditions  throughout  the  country  have  grown 

^Miller,  The  Balkans,  pp.  309-351;  Mijatovitch,  A  Royal  Tragedy 
(London,  1906). 


'ig2  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  BALKAN  STATES  [192 

more  and  more  promising.  The  people  in  the  main  lead  a 
pastoral  and  an  agricultural  life.  Practically  every  family 
outside  the  larger  cities  owns  and  cultivates  a  piece  of 
ground ;  and  the  country  has  not  a  great  number  who  are 
unemployed,  or  who  suffer  from  extreme  poverty.^ 

Being  a  small  kingdom  that  comprises  only  a  minor  por- 
tion of  the  Serbs,  the  Servians  have  strained  every  nerve 
during  the  past  three  decades  to  obtain  concessions  from 
some  quarter  that  would  enlarge  their  borders  and  unite 
with  them  other  groups  of  the  Serb  race.^  This  national 
ambition  had  led  them  to  hope  that  they  might  obtain  at 
least  a  part  of  the  provinces  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina, 
and  thus  make  their  territory  contiguous  with  that  of  their 
kinsfolk  in  Montenegro.  Then,  also,  one  of  the  three 
villayets  that  make  up  what  is  now  commonly  called  Mace- 
donia contains,  for  the  most  part,  a  Serb  population.^  The 
people  of  the  present  kingdom  of  Servia  have  greatly  de- 
sired also  that  that  part  of  Macedonia — the  villayet  of 
Kossova — should  form  a  part  of  what  they  have  dared  to 
hope  for  and  have  earnestly  striven  to  realize — a  Greater 
Servia. 

For  some  years  past  Servia's  foreign  policy  has  fre- 
quently revealed  her  Pan-Serbian  aspirations.  At  no  time, 
however,  had  she  felt  forced  to  take  an  open  and  determined 
stand  in  this  connection,  until  by  annexing  Bosnia  and 

^Am.  Review  of  Reviews  (1909),  vol.  xxix,  p.  741.  Only  eight  or  ten 
of  the  Servian  cities  have  a  population  above  ten  thousand. 

*The  Servian  kingdom  has  a  population  of  nearly  three  millions  and 
covers  an  area  of  nearly  nineteen  thousand  square  miles.  There  are 
said  to  be  altogether  about  ten  million  Serbs,  scattered  through  Slavonia, 
Bosnia,  Herzegovina,  Montenegro,  Servia,  Dalmatia,  Kossovo  and 
some  parts  of  Hungary.    Cf.  The  Forum,  vol.  xli,  p.  104. 

'Odysseus,  Turkey  in  Europe,  p.  373;  The  Near  East  (New  York, 
1907),  p.  147. 


193] 


SUMMARY 


I9S 


Herzegovina,  Austria-Hungary  virtually  eliminated  every 
possibility  of  Servian  expansion  in  that  direction.  Servia's- 
appeal  to  the  European  powers  for  compensation,"  and 
her  preparations-  for  an  appeal  to  arms  against  her  mam- 
moth neighbor  to  the  north,  are  v^ell  known.  But  when 
there  was  none  to  help,  what  could  the  little  kingdom  do 
except  to  submit  ?  ^  Meanwhile,  with  the  passing  of  their 
cherished  hopes  for  a  union  with  some  part  of  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina,  and  thus  with  Montenegro,  the  Servians  are 
rather  forced  by  the  turn  of  events  to  abandon  all  hope  of 
bringing  the  Serb  district  in  Macedonia  into  their  kingdom. 

If  it  were  merely  somewhat  vague  national  aspirations 
inspired  by  race  sentiment  among  the  Serbs  that  had  been 
doomed  to  failure  by  recent  events,  the  case  would  scarcely 
merit  any  mention  here.  A  glance,  however,  at  Servia's 
geographical  situation  is  likely  to  convince  an  unbiased  ob- 
server that  there  were,  after  all,  something  more  than  senti- 
mental grounds  for  the  determined  opposition  of  the  Serv- 
ians to  the  recent  settlement  in  the  Balkans.  Doubtless 
there  are  good  grounds  for  the  argument  that  the  tempera- 
ment and  the  rather  obstinate  restlessness  of  the  Servians 
only  serve  to  aggravate  the  dangers  of  their  position.  But 
the  fact  remains,  nevertheless,  that  these  people  are  now 
hemmed  in,  as  it  were,  by  a  geographical  combination  that 
threatens  to  become  at  any  moment  a  serious  menace  to 
their  national  existence.^  The  complete  triumph,  in  one 
sense,  of  Austro-Hungarian  diplomacy  in  relation  to  the 

^  A  discussion  of  the  Servian  and  the  Austro-Hungarian  views  may- 
be found  in  Nineteenth  Century  (1908),  vol.  Ixiv,  pp.  705  et  seq.;  and 
Fortnightly  Review  (1909),  vol.  xci,  pp.  i,  1040;  The  Am.  Review  of 
Reviews  (1909),  vol.  xxxix,  pp.  411,  537. 

^This  small  kingdom  has  no  passage  to  the  sea  and  is  surrounded  by 
vastly  stronger  states  to  which,  in  view  of  past  relations,  the  Servians 
may  not  naturally  look  for  support.  Blackiuood' s  Magazine  (New 
York,  1909),  p.  579. 


™^  MAKING  OP  THE  BALKAN  STATES        [  194 

/vaking  over  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  has  not  only 
blasted  the  hopes  of  the  Servians  for  a  union  with  other 
groups  of  Serbs,  but  has  left  them  in  fear  for  the  future 
welfare  and  even  the  safety  of  their  own  kingdom. 

In  view  of  the  present  outlook  in  Servia,  it  is  no  doubt 
'.quite  natural  that  her  people  should  revive  the  idea  of  a 
federation  of  the  Balkan  states/  So  far  as  is  generally 
known,  however,  the  representations  intended  to  urge  the 
;  expediency  and  even  the  necessity  of  such  a  movement  have 
mot  met,  lately,  with  any  particular  response. 

If  the  people  in  the  Balkan  peninsula  could  at  once  ac- 
cept the  attempt  now  being  made  to  establish  constitutional 
government  in  Turkey  as  furnishing  a  final  solution  of  the 
Macedonian  question,  then  the  present  outlook  for  a  Balkan 
confederation  might  seem  more  favorable.  But  there  are 
indications  already  (Feb.,  19 10)  that  some  of  the  states  bor- 
dering on  Macedonia  are  inclined  to  interfere  with  the  ad- 
ministration of  affairs  there  under  the  new  Turkish  regime.^ 
It  is  well  known  at  the  same  time  that  for  several  years  past 
strife  has  been  engendered  between  some  of  these  states 
hy  the  overlapping  of  their  claims  to  the  loyalty  of  parts 
of  the  mixed  Macedonian  population.  In  view  of  all  this, 
unless  there  should  be  some  real  danger  from  without,  a 
federation  of  these  states  seems  for  the  time  being  quite  im- 
probable. It  may  be  said  then  that  the  present  situation  in 
relation  to  Macedonia,  as  well  as  to  Servia,  presents  the 
problems  that  now  appear  most  likely  to  disturb  the  tran- 
quillity of  one  or  more  of  the  Balkan  states.'^ 

^Fortnightly  Reviezv  (1909),  vol.  xci,  pp.  1040  et  seq.;  Outlook  (New 
York,  1909),  vol.  xcii,  pp.  353  el  seq. 
'London  Times,  Feb.  3,  1910. 

^  In  addition  to  references  already  cited,  see  The  Nation  (New  York, 
1909),  vol.  Ixxxviii,  Balkans  (index);  Fortnightly  Review  (1509),  vol. 
xci,  p.  C09. 


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VITA 


The  author  of  this  sketch  was  born  at  Phoenix,  N.  Y.,  in 
i860.  He  graduated  at  Phoenix  Academy  in  1884 
Syracuse  University  in  1888.  After  being  principal  of 
graded  and  high  schools  for  ten  years  he  spent  two  years 
in  graduate  study  at  Columbia  University.  From  1901  to 
1907  he  was  professor  and  director  of  the  Preparatory  De- 
partment in  Robert  College,  Constantinople,  Turkey.  Since 
then  he  has  pursued  graduate  courses  at  Columbia  Univer- 
sity under  Professors  Sloane,  Osgood,  Robinson,  Dunning, 
Shotwell  and  Burgess  in  history,  and  under  Professors 
Fletcher,  Spingarn,  Thomas  and  Page  in  comparative  liter- 
ature. His  seminar  courses  have  been  under  the  direction 
of  Professors  Sloane  and  Dunning.  The  past  two  years 
he  has  been  on  the  staff  of  public  lecturers  under  the  di- 
rection of  the  New  York  City  Board  of  Education,  and  the 
present  year  he  is  a  teacher  in  the  College  of  the  City  of 
New  York.  In  1892  he  obtained  the  Master's  degree,  on 
examination,  from  his  Alma  Mater.  For  twelve  years  he 
has  been  an  active  member  of  the  National  Educational 
Association. 

201 


